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David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a
skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of
Western philosophy. Since the publication of Norman Kemp
Smith's Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, however, there has
been an increasing tendency to downplay the skeptical
dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point
of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic
at all. Much of the motivation for a nonskeptical reading of
Hume comes from recognition of his endorsement of empirical
science and his own project of founding a "science of man.
Recent scholarship has, in my opinion correctly, recognized
Hume as a constructive rather than a purely destructive
thinker. Yet this recognition has, in my opinion
incorrectly, gone hand in hand with a tendency to overlook
or deny the skeptical side of Hume's thought.
In this work, I address the issue of Hume's skepticism.
I believe that though the issue of Hume's skepticism
is more
complicated than is suggested by some of those who interpret
him as a skeptic, nevertheless the traditional view is more
true to Hume's texts than is a nonskeptical interpretation.
I argue, on the basis of a reading of the Treatise of Human
Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , that Hume
is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to much of our
alleged knowledge.
In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I
mean that (i) Hume's skeptical pronouncements are in general
sincere, not ironic, (ii) Hume's skepticism extends to a
large part of our alleged knowledge, and (iii) Hume's
skepticism is a result of his substantive philosophical
views. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic
I mean that though Hume doesn ' t prescribe eschewal of
beliefs that are not rationally justified, he thinks that
much of our alleged knowledge essentially involves beliefs
that cannot be rationally justified and that hence much of
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Throughout the following chapters all references to A
Treatise of Human Nature and the Abstract of A Treatise of
Human Nature are to the second Selby-Bigge edition and all
references to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are
to the third Selby-Bigge edition of the the Enquiries . I
will use the following abbreviations in citing Hume's works:
T: A Treatise of Human Nature [References to the Treatise
will be by Book, Part, Section, and page number except where
that information would be redundant. For example, a
reference to the first section of the third part of the
first book of the Treatise would have the form (T, I. III. I,
n) ]
A: Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature [References to the
Abstract will be by page number only.]
E: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [References to
the Enquiry will be by section, part, and page number except
where that information would be redundant. For example, a
reference to part two of section seven would have the form
(E, VII. II, n) ]
All references to works other than the Treatise , Abstract,
and the Enquiry will be in author-date form with
page
numbers only. Exceptions to full author-date citation where
required to avoid redunancy will be announced in the text.






David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a
skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of
Western philosophy. This traditional view of Hume has not
been limited to his contemporaries, to those who ignore
Hume's aspirations concerning a "science of man," or to
those who are generally unsympathetic to empiricism or
unappreciative of Hume's genius. For example, in A History
of Western Philosophy , Bertrand Russell writes of Hume that
It is evident that he started out with a belief that
scientific method yields the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth; he ended, however, with the
conviction that belief is never rational, since we know
nothing. After setting forth the arguments for
skepticism. . .he goes on, not to refute the arguments, but to
fall back on natural credulity (Russell [1945] , 671)
.
Russell, however, also says this of Hume:
To refute him has been, ever since he wrote, a
favourite pastime among metaphysicians. For my part, I find
none of their refutations convincing; nevertheless I cannot
but hope that something less sceptical than Hume's system
may be discoverable (Russell [1945] , 659)
.
In spite of the widespread acceptance of the traditional
view of Hume's philosophy as skeptical, since the
publication of Norman Kemp Smith's Philosophy of David Hume
in 1941, in which he presents searching criticism of what is
generally referred to as the "Reid-Beattie" interpretation
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of Hume, there has been a tendency to downplay the skeptical
dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point
of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic
at all . 1 I agree with Kemp-Smith's criticism of the Reid-
Beattie interpretation insofar as that interpretation
presents Hume as a solely destructive thinker intent only on
taking empiricism to its logical conclusion. I do not,
however, agree with any interpretation of Hume according to
which he is not a serious skeptic.
In this work, I will address the issue of Hume's
skepticism. I believe that though the issue of Hume's
skepticism is more complicated than is suggested by some of
those who interpret him as a skeptic, nevertheless the
traditional view is more true to Hume's texts than is a
nonskeptical interpretation. I will argue that in fact Hume
is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to a large part
of our alleged knowledge, that is, that for Hume much of our
supposed knowledge is not knowledge at all because the
relevant beliefs cannot be rationally justified.
In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I
mean that (i) Hume's skeptical pronouncements are in general
sincere, not ironic, (ii) Hume's skepticism extends to a
large part of our alleged knowledge, (and hence is broader
than, for example, what one might refer to as Kant's
"skepticism" about noumena) , and (iii) Hume's skepticism is
a result of his substantive philosophical views concerning
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topics such as causation, causal inference, and the extent
of our conceptual capacity, that is, the extent of our
meaningful thought. In saying that Hume is a serious
theoretical skeptic I mean that though Hume doesn't
prescribe eschewal of beliefs that are not rationally
justified, he thinks that much of our alleged knowledge
essentially involves beliefs that cannot be rationally
justified and that hence much of our alleged knowledge is
not knowledge at all.
In arguing that Hume was a serious skeptic I consider
both the Treatise and the first Enquiry . Though the Treatise
contains discussion of topics not treated in the Enquiry ,
the Enquiry was the latter of the two works and according to
Hume himself it contains his mature views on epistemology
and metaphysics . 2 So the Enquiry too must be taken account
of in assessing the seriousness of Hume's skepticism.
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It is, perhaps, a sign of the strength of the
traditional skeptical interpretation of Hume that the thesis
that he is a serious skeptic is often met with puzzlement -
after all, isn't it beyond doubt that Hume is a skeptic?
Such puzzlement is often the result of a lack of familiarity
with Hume's texts and with recent Hume scholarship. Still,
given the influence and duration of the traditional
skeptical interpretation it is important to point out at the
3
beginning at least some of the motivations behind a
nonskeptical interpretation of Hume's philosophy.
Of course, any serious, nonskeptical interpretation of
Hume rests on a reading of Hume's texts involving many fine
of textual interpretation. Many such points are
discussed in the following chapters. It seems to me,
however , that the motivation for such a reading usually
comes from one or more of the five following sources: 3
(1) Hume's various disavowals or putdowns, in both the
Treatise and the first Enquiry
, of (some form of)
skepticism.
(2) Hume's enthusiasm for empirical science and his own
project of founding a "science of man."
(3) Hume's statement, in Treatise I. III. XV, of apparently
normative rules for making causal judgments.
(4) Analysis of Hume's argument concerning causal inference,
the argument traditionally held to be an argument for
induative skepticism, as it appears in the Treatise
I. III. VI, the Abstract 650-52, and the first Enquiry IV. II.
(5) The fact that Hume distinguishes between various kinds
of inductive inference and accepts some kinds of inductive
inference but rejects others. This raises what I refer to in
chapter IV as "the problem of discrimination."
4
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Why is it important to know whether or not Hume was a
skeptic? Not because deciding this point is primarily a
matter of knowing what was in Hume's head or what his
intentions were. In my view, deciding this point is not
primarily a matter of doing forensic psychology, though of
course considerations about Hume's purposes are relevant to
the scholarly issue of Hume's skepticism. Rather, deciding
this point is a matter of knowing whether or not the
philosophy Hume actually produced, as represented in the
Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding , is skeptical.
Why, then, is it important to know whether or not the
Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding present a skeptical philosophy? Hume is a
major figure of Western philosophy (and thereby of Western
civilization) and the Treatise and first Enquiry are
generally considered to be two of the great works of the
Western philosophical tradition. So, if understanding our
own philosophical tradition is important to us - and I
assume that it is - we should determine, so far as is
possible, whether or not the philosophy of one of our
greatest philosophical predecessors is or is not skeptical.
In other words, whatever conclusion one comes to with regard
to the question of Hume's skepticism, surely scholars of the
modern period of philosophy should have a consistent
5
interpretation of one of the central figures of that period.
Further, insofar as scholarship informs teaching, possession
of a consistent interpretation of the figures of modern
philosophy can reasonably be expected to enhance one's
teaching.
Finally, Hume's philosophy is based on principles that
still possess some degree of appeal - for example, the
empiricist principle that the content with which we think
comes ultimately from our having experiences and the
principle that in thought we are immediately acquainted not
with things as they are in themselves but with our own
subjective representations. So, unless we foolishly believe
that we can have nothing to learn from earlier thinkers such
as Hume, it is reasonable to expect that an understanding of
Hume's own view of the implications of empiricism and the
"theory of ideas" may be philosophically enlightening.
6
Notes to Introduction
1 . The "Reid Beattie interpretation" is the interpretation
of Hume found in works and correspondence of Thomas Reid and
James Beattie, in particular in Reid's An Inquiry into the
Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (Reid [1764]),
and Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth
in opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Beattie [1770]).
This is an interpretation according to which Hume's main
achievement was to show the weakness of classical empiricism
by taking it to its logical conclusion in skepticism. On
this rather unflattering (and, in Beattie's case, hostile)
interpretation, Hume is indeed a skeptic, but his skepticism
is seen as the self-defeating result of uncritical
acceptance of empiricist principles. This interpretation,
moreover, focuses almost exclusively on Hume's skeptical
results to the exclusion of his attempts to create a
"science of man." Though the Reid-Beattie interpretation is
not restricted to the authors who gave it its name, by no
means do all of those who accept what I refer to as the
traditional view of Hume - a view according to which he is a
skeptic - accept the Reid-Beattie interpretation or the
specific criticisms of Hume's position made by Reid and
Beattie
.
2. In the "Advertisement," written by Hume and attached to
the posthumous 1777 Essays And Treatises On Several
Subjects , which includes his two Enquiries , Hume refers to
the Treatise as his "juvenile work," and announces that
Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following
Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical
sentiments and principles (E, 2)
.
Lest it be thought that the "Advertisement" is merely Hume's
attempt to increase sales by distancing himself from his
unpopular earlier work, two points should be noted: (1) By
the time Hume wrote the "Advertisement" he had become a
well-known and financially independent literary figure. Even
discounting Hume's reputation for honesty, he hardly needed
to resort to false repudiations of his earlier work in order
to boost his readership. (2) In personal correspondence with
friends Hume advises against reading the Treatise and
directs them instead to the first Enquiry , then published as
7
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding . See,
for example, Hume's 1751 letter to Gilbert Elliot, in The
Letters of David Hume , Volume I, 158.
3. I am not claiming these considerations are fully discrete
nor am I claiming that they cannot be brought under some
more general headings. Clearly, (2) - (5) all concern Hume's





HUME'S SKEPTICISM AT THE CLOSE OF BOOK I OF THE TREATISE
1
In the final section of Book I of the Treatise of Human
Nature
, Hume pauses to consider his situation as he prepares
to enter "those immense depths of philosophy" which lie
before him in Books II and III. Hume must enter these
immense depths in order to carry out his project, announced
in the Introduction, of establishing an experimental
"science of man," which will serve as the foundation for and
further the progress of the other sciences. Initially, this
consideration of his situation nearly reduces him to despair
and inaction. Not only does he remember his many past
errors and perplexities, but the epistemological
considerations of Book I have led him to recognize "The
wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties,
I must employ in my enquiries..." (T, I. IV. VII, 264).
Further, "the impossibility of amending or correcting these
faculties" reduces Hume, at this point, "almost to despair"
(T, 264)
.
In spite of his serious misgivings, Hume nevertheless
does, of course, set sail into the immense depths of
philosophy in Books II and III, not to mention his various
philosophical voyages in later works. Toward the end of
Section VII Hume expresses his hope that he might "establish
a system or set of opinions, which if not true. . .might at
9
least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the
test of the most critical examination” (T, 272) . He hopes
to "contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge" and
says that we should not only be willing to enter into
elaborate philosophical researches, but we should also
. . .yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be
positive and certain in particular points, according to the
light, in which we survey them in any particular instant "
(T, 273)
.
It seems, then, that Hume has had a decided change of
outlook between the beginning and the end of Section VII.
Though he begins the section with serious doubts about his
own epistemic capacities, he ends hoping to further
knowledge, attain certainty in particular points, and
establish a system that will withstand critical examination.
Perhaps, then, Hume's apparent negative assessment of his
epistemic capacities at the beginning of the section is not
an expression of his real view. Perhaps Hume is not, as his
initial pronouncements might suggest, a skeptic. The very
fact that Hume does embark on further philosophical voyages
seems to be evidence that he is not really a skeptic.
Given Hume's hopeful and even cheerful pronouncements
toward the end of this last section of Book I, it might seem
that Section VII should be read as describing a movement
from a skeptical and despairing position which is not Hume's
true position to a non-skeptical and hopeful one which is.
1
I do not, however, think that such a reading is correct.
10
Though I agree that Hume's mood changes dramatically from
the earlier to the later parts of the section, I believe
that Hume begins and ends Section VII as a skeptic, as I
now attempt to show by a more detailed consideration of
that section.
2
Before I look in detail at particular passages of
Section VII, I need to say what I mean when I claim that
Hume is a skeptic. Basically, I will adopt Robert Fogelin's
distinction between theoretical and prescriptive skepticism
and between a theoretical, a prescriptive, and a practicing
2
skeptic. Theoretical skepticism is the view that the
members of a certain set of beliefs or claims are not
rationally justified - we do not and cannot have good reason
for thinking that those beliefs or claims are true, for we
3
can have no evidence for those beliefs or claims. The
theoretical skeptic thus holds that the members of the
corresponding set of knowledge claims are false. So
theoretical skepticism can also be characterized as the view
that all knowledge claims of a certain kind are false. A
theoretical skeptic, then, is one who holds with regard to a
certain set of beliefs or claims, that the members of that
set are not rationally justified. He thus holds that all of




Prescriptive skepticism is the view that we should
abstain from holding certain beliefs or making certain
knowledge claims because those beliefs or claims lack
rational justification. A prescriptive skeptic is one who
makes such prescriptions with regard to some set of beliefs
or knowledge claims. A practicing skeptic is one who
follows , or attempts to follow, the prescriptions of
prescriptive skepticism, that is, one who refrains from
holding certain beliefs or from making certain knowledge
claims
.
I also adopt Fogelin's distinction between
epistemological skepticism and conceptual skepticism.
Epistemological skepticism is the view that challenges the
supposed grounds or justification for the members of a set
of beliefs or claims while accepting that those beliefs or
claims are intelligible. Conceptual skepticism is the view
that the members of a certain set of purported beliefs or
claims are unintelligible and hence are in fact psuedo-
beliefs or pseudo-claims.
When I say that Hume is a skeptic throughout Section
VII (and throughout the Treatise and the first Enquiry
generally) , I mean that he is a theoretical epistemological
skeptic, that is, that he espouses a theoretical
epistemological skepticism. [For brevity's sake I will
usually drop 'epistemological' and will often drop
'theoretical' in speaking of Hume's theoretical
epistemological skepticism. ] In general Hume is a
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prescriptive skeptic only with regard to those claims that
go beyond our capacities, and he is a conceptual skeptic
on^Y with regard to a limited set of claims made in
philosophy. I will discuss Hume's prescriptive and
conceptual skepticisms and the extent to which he is a
practicing skeptic at various points in later chapters.
As Fogelin points out, one can, without inconsistency,
be a theoretical skeptic without being a prescriptive or
4
practicing skeptic. Thus ad hominem arguments from the
fact that the skeptic does not refrain from holding beliefs
or making knowledge claims are irrelevant to theoretical
skepticism. Of course, there are various reasons one might
have for holding theoretical skepticism. It will become
clear as I proceed what Hume's reasons are for holding
theoretical skepticism and what kinds of beliefs or claims




Why does Hume begin Section VII in such a state of
doubt with regard to his ability to gain knowledge? Within
Section VII, Hume gives us a general overview of "those
desponding reflections" which have led him nearly to
despair. This overview is, of course, basically an outline
of some of his main epistemological and metaphysical
reasonings and conclusions in the earlier parts of Book I.
One "desponding reflection" that he mentions early on is
13
this: No matter how carefully he reasons on any particular
matter, he ultimately cannot provide a justification for his
assenting to a conclusion; his assenting is merely a matter
of psychological propensity:
After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I
can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel
nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly
in that view, under which they appear to me (T, 265) .
The most important example of this occurs in causal
reasoning. Experience of constant conjunctions together
with a habit instilled by that experience leads Hume to
certain conclusions as a result of causal reasoning. These
conclusions are the result of the combined effect of
experience and habit on the imagination, and that effect is
that Hume forms "certain ideas in a more intense and lively




Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some
ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so
little founded on reason) we cou'd never assent to any
argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which
are present to our senses (T, 265)
.
So, if not for a feature of our psychological makeup
"which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on
reason" we would be locked in a solipsism of the present
moment, unable to attribute independent existence to
material objects, to trust our reasoned conclusions, or to
14
trust our apparent memories. Hume concludes that "The
memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of
them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our
ideas" (T, 265)
.
Hume uses 'imagination' in two main senses. In one
sense, the imagination is the faculty by which ideas are
entertained and are recombined as we wish, as in
daydreaming, though even this is guided by the "gentle
force" of association. The output of the imagination in this
first sense is distinguished from belief. In a second sense,
the imagination is the faculty of the mind which,
conditioned by experience, associates ideas according to
principles of association and transfers force and vivacity
from impressions and ideas to other ideas so as to cause
belief. The output of the imagination in this sense is
belief.
According to Hume, belief is, basically, vivid
6
conception. Hume writes:
An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately
defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A
PRESENT IMPRESSION (T, I. III. VII, 96).
Note that Hume's definition of belief seems to be
restricted to occurrent beliefs. With regard to
dispositional beliefs, Hume doesn't present a definition,
but it seems that given his theories about mental operations
he must think of a dispositional belief that P as a
15
propensity to vividly conceive P in certain circumstances .
7
Of course, for Hume, to vividly conceive a proposition is to
vividly conceive a set of ideas.
Though Hume characterizes belief in phenomenological
terms, as vivid conception, he also characterizes belief in
terms of its fixedness, or, as he also puts it, its
"solidity
, or firmness , or steadiness , " and its influence on
behavior. In the "Appendix" to the Treatise Hume says that
the manner in which the ideas composing a belief are
conceived
...gives them more force and influence; makes them
appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and
renders them the governing principles of all our actions (T,
629 ) .
My believing is not directly under my control in the way
that my fantasizing is - what I believe forces itself upon
me, so to speak. Further, my beliefs influence my behavior
in a way that my fantasies do not.
So, then, all of our beliefs based on the senses,
memory, or the operations of the understanding, beyond those
concerning the present data of consciousness, are based on
the imagination's capacity for investing certain ideas with
greater force and vivacity. This "principle" (that is, the
imagination with its power and propensity to invest certain
ideas with greater force and vivacity, thus engendering
16
belief)
, however, is "inconstant and fallacious" and it will
lead us into error when implicitly followed. Hume writes,
'Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes
and effects; and ’tis the same principle, which convinces us
of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent
from the senses. But tho' these two operations be equally
natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some
circumstances they are directly contrary, nor is it possible
for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and
effects and at the same time believe the continu'd existence
of matter (T, 266)
.
Both causal reasoning and our belief in the existence
of an independent external world are based on the
imagination's vivification of certain ideas. Yet causal
reasoning undermines our belief in an independent external
world. So when implicitly followed the principle on which
most of our beliefs (that is, all of those beliefs not
limited to first-person-present subjective experience) are
based leads us to engage in forms of reasoning and belief
formation that are inconsistent with one another, that is,
8
that give rise to inconsistent conclusions. However, the
imagination must be implicitly followed, Hume says, "in all
its variations" (T, 265-6). Thus we must, Hume thinks, be
guided in our reasoning and belief formation by the
imagination, though this will lead us into error and
absurdity.
Why does Hume say that we must follow this "inconstant
and fallacious" principle, despite the fact that it will
lead us into error? Hume's reasoning here starts from
17
considerations about causation. In seeking the causes of
phenomena we "wou 1 d not willingly stop before we are
acquainted with that energy in the cause, by which it
operates on its effect..." (T, I. IV. VII, 266). We seek to
discover, Hume says, the tie or connection between cause and
effect, the "ultimate and operating principle" by means of
which the cause produces its effect (T, 267) . Yet, if
Hume's earlier analysis of causation is correct, we can
never discover this ultimate connection as a component of
9
the objective world. Importantly, though we sometimes
think we perceive such a connection, this is "an illusion of
the imagination" (T, 267)
.
The observation that our belief that we perceive a tie
between certain objects is an illusion of the imagination
leads Hume to an important question. The question, Hume
says, is "how far we ought to yield to these illusions" (T,
267) . The question of how far we ought to yield to the
suggestions of the imagination (that is, the beliefs to
which the imagination naturally gives rise) leads to a "very
dangerous dilemma." The basic dilemma is this: If we accept
all of the suggestions of the imagination, we will be led
into error and contradiction. But if we resolve not to
accept all of the suggestions of the imagination, if we
decide, that is, to reject the "trivial" suggestions of the
imagination, the consequences are equally bad. For then we
will be resolved to "adhere to the understanding, that is,
to the more general and establish'd properties of the
18




For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when
it acts alone, and according to its most general principles,
entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree
of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or
common life" (T, 267-8)
.
We are saved from this total skepticism, Hume says,
only by one of the "trivial" properties of the imagination.
This trivial property of the imagination is that it invests
little force and vivacity in elaborate reasoning, and so
such reasoning is unable to undermine those beliefs we form
more easily and naturally.
Suppose, then, that in accord with the trivial property
that saves us from total skepticism we take as a principle
that we should not accept conclusions established on the
basis of "refin’d or elaborate reasoning." Then we are "cut
off entirely" from "all science and philosophy," which are
pursued mainly through refined and elaborate reasoning. In
addition, we are then inconsistent, because we are taking
the suggestion of one of the trivial properties of the fancy
as a principle to the exclusion of certain others though "by
a parity of reason" we ought to embrace all or none.
Further, that principle itself has been established only on
the basis of the kind of refined and elaborate reasoning it
proscribes . So, then, the original dilemma resolves to this:
If we embrace the principle that no refined and elaborate
19
reasoning be countenanced, we are precluded from doing
philosophy or science and we are manifestly inconsistent.
But if we reject this principle, then (assuming that the
epistemological findings of the earlier parts of the
Treatise are correct) "we subvert entirely the human
understanding." Hume's less-than-sanguine conclusion: "We
have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason
[the reason that implicitly follows the suggestions of the
imagination] and none at all" (T, 268) .
One would think that if Hume is to end his reflections
in Section VII on a hopeful note, he must have some solution
to this "very dangerous" dilemma. What is Hume's solution?
In my opinion, he has none, at least if having a solution to
the dilemma requires showing either that it is a false
dilemma or that the outcome of accepting one or the other of
its options does not have the unfortunate implications it
seems to have. What Hume in fact says is that he has no
such solution:
For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the
present case. I can only observe what is commonly done;
which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought
of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is
quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it.
Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon
us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule,
that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a
manifest contradiction (T, I. IV. VII, 268).
20
Of course, sometimes "very refined reflections" do have
an at least temporary influence on us, which is why Hume
begins Section VII nearly in despair. He writes,
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and
heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and
reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more
probable or likely than another (T, 268-9)
.
What saves Hume from this wretched state? Not reason,
but nature: "Fortunately it happens, that since reason is
incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself
suffices to that purpose..." (T, 269)
.
How does nature
perform this rescue? Only by relaxing Hume's philosophical
bent of mind or by distracting him with lively sense
impressions. In this way Hume's confidence in his ordinary
views, his "indolent belief in the general maxims of the
world", returns. Hume tells us his own method of dispelling
the clouds of doubt raised by philosophical reflection: "I
dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry
11
with my friends..." (T, 269). Still, he feels enough of
his former mood, engendered by his earlier "desponding
reflections," that he resolves to eschew philosophy and
elaborate reasoning in the future. These are the sentiments
of his "spleen and indolence," and before long they will
give way to other, less pessimistic sentiments, sentiments
that will allow Hume to take up philosophy once again. Put
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simply, Hume's mood will improve. However, with regard to
his splenetic sentiments Hume says
I must confess, that philosophy has nothing to oppose
them, and expects a victory more from the returns of a
serious good-humour ' d disposition, than from the force of
reason and conviction (T, 270)
.
Hume does offer a reason for pursuing philosophy. But
this reason is not that philosophy will lead us to truth or
is especially likely to yield knowledge. Rather, Hume says
that given that it is "almost impossible" for us not to
consider philosophical issues, we should choose the "safest
and most agreeable" guide, and he recommends that we choose
philosophy rather than its alternative, superstition. But
Hume prefers philosophy to superstition, not because
philosophy is more likely to lead to truth, but only because
it is less likely to disturb us in the conduct of our lives.
(See T, I. IV. VII, 271-2.)
With the return of a good humored disposition, Hume
will naturally be inclined to investigate philosophical
topics; the pursuit of philosophy will once again provide
him with a pleasure that he would lose by eschewing it:
"...I feel I shou'd be a loser in point of pleasure; and
this is the origin of my philosophy" (T, 271). However, in
spite of the optimism, industry, and renewed interest in
philosophy that result from a changed mood, Hume says
clearly that
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In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve
our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water
re^res^es / ' tis only because it costs us too much pains to
think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only
to be upon sceptical principles..." (T, 270).
What is this skepticism that we ought to preserve in
all the incidents of life? Hume cannot mean that we should
carry out a prescriptive skepticism with regard to our
about the existence of an external world, the
deliverances of memory, or the conclusions of the
understanding, which he earlier called into question. For
(1) Hume's causal theory of belief precludes our having the
kind of control over our beliefs required for carrying out
such a prescriptive skepticism, 12 and (2) Hume says
explicitly in discussing his splenetic mood that even after
his skeptical reflections he finds himself "absolutely and
necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other
people in the common affairs of life" (T, 269)
.
In the same
paragraph he says further that
...I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting
to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission
I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and
principles" (T, 269)
.
The skepticism displayed in Hume's submission to nature
cannot, then, be a prescriptive or practicing skepticism.
It is, I suggest, a theoretical skepticism which is based on
the epistemological and metaphysical reasoning of Book I.
Moreover, Hume begins and ends Section VII as a theoretical
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skeptic. Though he expresses optimism and ambition toward
the end of the chapter, he nevertheless maintains his
theoretical skepticism. In the closing paragraph of Section
VII, after saying that we should in general indulge our
inclination to do philosophy and even yield to our
propensity to feel certain with regard to particular points,
Hume goes on to offer a caveat against any objection that
might be offered against his use of expressions such as
'"tis evident, 'tis certain" and "'tis undeniable." These
expressions, he says, are "extorted" from him by a present
view of things, but they
...imply no dogmatical spirit nor conceited idea
of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible
can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other
(T, 274) .
This suggests that Hume considers himself a skeptic in spite




I have quoted several passages from Section VII in
which Hume seems to refer to himself as a skeptic. However,
what is far more important than these passages for gauging
Hume's epistemological standpoint at the end of Book I is
the fact that nothing has been said in the course of Section
VII to undermine the "desponding reflections" of its earlier
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passages . The fact that causal reasoning undermines our
belief in an independent material world has not been
challenged. The "very dangerous dilemma,' 1 on which we have
no choice but between "a false reason and none at all," has
not been resolved. The claim that the understanding,
operating according to its own principles, undermines all
belief has not been retracted or qualified. A change of
mood has occurred, to be sure. But this change of mood is
simply the result of nature taking its course; it is not the
result of Hume's having solved any of the epistemological
problems of the earlier parts of Book I that were outlined
in the beginning of Section VII. Hume can remain a serious
skeptic in spite of his later comments and philosophical
endeavors because his skepticism is primarily theoretical.
Hume does not hold that we should or can refrain from
believing in such things as causal connections, the
regularity of nature, or the external world. So, though a
shift in mood occurs toward the end of Section VII, a shift
which allows Hume to resume philosophizing, this shift is
fully consistent with Hume's holding a theoretical
skepticism throughout. For one can consistently espouse
theoretical skepticism while holding beliefs and seeking to
expand one's stock of beliefs. Hume does, after all, say
that "A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical
doubts as well as of his philosophical conviction" (T, 273) .
A true skeptic will thus yield to his inclination to do
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philosophy - as does Hume. He remains, for all that, a true
skeptic.
Actually, one can see Hume's change of mood from the
beginning to the end of T, I. IV. VII as a movement toward and
then away from practical skepticism. In the earlier parts
of this section, Hume, almost in despair, is nearly resolved
to becoming a practicing skeptic with regard to
philosophical issues. At the end, with a change of
sentiment, Hume is no longer tempted to become a practicing
skeptic with regard to philosophy. The shift is,
nevertheless, from nearly espousing a practical skepticism
to moving away from such an espousal, not from espousing
theoretical skepticism to dismissing it. It is instructive
that Hume thinks that a true skeptic will yield to his
inclination to do philosophy, for this suggests that the
kind of skepticism a true skeptic holds is theoretical
rather than prescriptive.
Of course, merely considering the short concluding
section of Book I is not sufficient for showing that Hume is
a serious skeptic. If Hume's doubts and worries at the
beginning of that section are not grounded in his
substantive reasoning concerning such topics as causation,
induction, our belief in the independent external world, and
our knowledge-gaining capacities in general, then they may
represent nothing more than a passing phase of insecurity in
a thinker about to embark on an arduous and unprecedented
undertaking. So, in chapter II I will turn to the earlier
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parts of Book I and to the later Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding in order to show that it is Hume's substantive
philosophical views, rather than passing sentiments, which
lead him to skepticism. First, however, I must address an
issue concerning Hume's use of 'knowledge'.
5
In "Of knowledge" (T, I. III. I, 69-73), Hume divides
philosophical relations into those that "depend entirely on
the ideas, which we compare together," and those that "may
be chang'd without any change in the ideas" (T, 69) . The
first are the "invariable" relations: resemblance,
contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity
or number. The second are the "variable" relations:
identity, situation in time and place, and causation. Only
the invariable relations "can be the objects of knowledge
and certainty," according to Hume (T, 70).
What we know, according to Hume, we ascertain either by
intuition or demonstration. What is ascertained by
intuition is recognized "at first sight, without any inquiry
or reasoning" (T, 70) . What is ascertained by demonstration
requires a "chain of reasoning." Hume's view in the Treatise
is that any proposition that is intuitively or demonstrably
certain expresses one of the four invariable relations.
These propositions are themselves necessary, for their
denials imply a contradiction and hence what they assert is
impossible (See T, 79-80, 89, and 161-2) . In the Enquiry
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Hume refers to such propositions as those expressing
relations of ideas , " in contrast with contingent
propositions expressing "matters of fact." The realm of
relations of ideas is the realm of certainty. It is the
realm of a priori knowledge.
Given that on Hume's official definition of 'knowledge'
we can have knowledge only of a priori, necessary truths, it
might seem that the claim that for Hume much of our alleged
knowledge is not knowledge at all is rather trivial . Since
according to Hume we find out by experience what things in
fact exist and what properties they have, and we ascertain
causal connections only a posteriori, it might seem that it
is merely by definition that Hume excludes much of what we
ordinarily think we know from the realm of knowledge.
I believe, however, that though on Hume's official
definition knowledge is restricted to the a priori, Hume
also employs our ordinary notion of knowledge, a notion
which is not so restrictive. This is the notion
traditionally analyzed as justified, true belief. Hume, as
a philosopher familiar with the history of philosophy, would
have been familiar with the traditional analysis of
'knowledge '
.
Why do I believe that Hume employs the traditional
notion of knowledge? For two main reasons. The first is that
Hume employs the term 'knowledge' in contexts in which it is
clear that it is not knowledge in the restricted technical
sense that is being discussed. The second is that some of
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Hume's skeptical attacks are focused on the supposed
justification for our beliefs regarding contingent matters
of fact. This shows both that (i) he recognizes that there
is a sense of 'knowledge' in which we take ourselves to have
a posteriori knowledge of matters of fact, and (ii) he is
interested in showing that in this traditional sense of
'knowledge' much of our alleged knowledge involves beliefs
that cannot be rationally justified.
For example, in "Of the inference from the impression
to the idea" (T, I. III. VI, 86-94), Hume writes:
There is no object, which implies the existence of any
other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never
look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an
inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the
absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving
anything different. But as all distinct ideas are separable,
'tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind (T,
86-7)
. [Italics added]
Note that at this point Hume has already ruled out our
possessing knowledge of causal connections in the technical
sense of 'knowledge'. Yet he goes on to consider the
justification for our causal claims and inferences and
concludes, I will argue, that they are without rational
justification
.
In the first Enquiry , after saying that "...the
knowledge..." of causal relations "...is not, in any
instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises
entirely from experience...," he goes on to say that "...all
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the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies are




So, Hume uses 'knowledge' in both a technical and a
traditional sense. It is with regard to knowledge in the
traditional sense that Hume holds that much of our alleged
knowledge is not knowledge at all.
14
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Notes to Chapter I1.
Such a reading of T, I. IV. VII is given by Annette Baierm chapter 1 of A Progress of Sentiments (Baier [1991]). I
will consider Baier' s anti -skeptical interpretation of Hume
in a later chapter.
2.
Fogelin draws these distinctions in his Hume '
s




When I say that Hume is a skeptic with regard to some set
of claims or beliefs, I'm not saying that he claims to know
or even believes that they are false. Hume's theoretical
skepticism is in fact a neutral skepticism. The sets of
claims with regard to which Hume is a skeptic are such that
for each claim they include, they also include its negation.
So Hume's theoretical skepticism may be characterized more
generally as the view that the members of certain sets of





Clearly, a philosopher can be a theoretical skeptic of
the most general and radical kind without prescribing
anything about holding beliefs and without himself following
any such prescriptions. This distinction, though obvious
enough, is important, for it disposes at once of vulgar ad
hominem arguments that attempt to refute the skeptic by
pointing to his conduct which it is said, gives the lie to
his supposed skepticism (Fogelin [1985] , 5) .
I don't mean to suggest that Fogelin is alone in
recognizing that Hume is a theoretical but not a
prescriptive skeptic with regard to much of our alleged
knowledge. Without explicitly drawing the distinction
between theoretical, prescriptive, and practical skepticism,
Bruce Aune makes what I take to be essentially the same
point when he says that Hume "...was a skeptic. . .only in
believing that his many instinctive beliefs could not be
rationally defended" but that Hume's "...inability to defend
them did not render them any less acceptable in his sober
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eyes" (Aune [1970], 71). The distinction is also recognizedby A.H. Basson, Terence Penelhum, and many others, thoughthey do not address it as directly, or express it in thesame terminology, as Fogelin.
The important point is that one can be a theoretical
skeptic without being a prescriptive or practicing skeptic.One can be a theoretical skeptic with regard to some claims
Cl...Cn without believing that all or even any of Cl...Cn
are false. One may, in fact, believe that some or all of
Cl. . .Cn are true, yet nevertheless adopt a theoretical
skepticism with regard to Cl...Cn.
5.
Hume's reasons for saying that ultimately he can give no
justification for assenting to any conclusion will be
discussed in later chapters. His view that he can provide no
such justification is based largely on his reasoning in
various sections of T, I. Ill (in which he discusses
knowledge, causal inference, and belief, and presents what
we call "the problem of induction"), T, I. IV. I, "Of
scepticism with regard to reason", and T, I. IV. II, "Of
scepticism with regard to the senses."
6.
Where the proposition one believes is a matter of fact,
that is, is contingent, one's belief simply is an idea
invested with a high degree of force and vivacity via its
relation to some impression. But with regard to beliefs
concerning non-contingent propositions Hume writes:
. . .Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing
and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is easy with
regard to propositions, that are prov'd by intuition or
demonstration. In that case, the person, who assents, not
only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but
is necessarily determin'd to conceive them in that
particular manner ... .Whatever is absurd is unintelligible;
nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive anything
contrary to a demonstration (T, I. III. VII, 95).
7.
In an unpublished article, Bruce Aune makes a similar
point. Aune writes that although Hume
...speaks of belief as a vivid idea, he would not
disagree with the contemporary claim that [beliefs] are
mental dispositions, for he held that the ideas we have
formed continue to be present to our minds "only in power"
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and will be "revived" when we experience something with





Causal reasoning and our propensity to believe in the
existence of an independent external world give rise to
inconsistent beliefs in that (1) our natural propensities
lead us to believe in the independent existence of the
immediate objects of perception, while causal reasoning
leads us to recognize that those objects are not
independent; (2) our natural propensities motivate us to
hold the philosophical theory of "double existence," while
causal reasoning provides no basis for an inference to the
supposed independent objects that we believe correspond to
our perceptions. Of course, the second inconsistency isn't
between a belief resulting from our natural propensity and a
conclusion arrived at by causal reasoning but rather between
a belief resulting from our natural propensity and a
conclusion arrived at by analysis of causal reasoning.
9.
I will discuss Hume's analysis of our idea of causation
in chapter IX.
10.
Hume argues in T, I. IV. I that reason operating
according to its own principles subverts itself. I will
discuss Hume's argument in that section in a later chapter.
Note, however, that the "reason" that is self-subversive is
not some idealized Cartesian reason which intuits truths
according to the "natural light", but simply the imagination
in its "general and more establish'd" operations. This fact
is important for evaluating the extent of Hume's skepticism,
as will appear further on.
11.
Hume writes:
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is
incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself
suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of
mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my
senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play
a game of back-gammon , I converse, and am merry with my
friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I
wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and
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strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot fina in my heart to




, Hume uses the example of the
unavoidability of a person's belief that heat exists, when
he has experienced the regular conjunction of heat with
flame and currently observes a flame. Hume writes,
This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind
in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when
ere so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of
love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with
injuries. All these operations are a species of natural
instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and





Of course, one might say that Hume's comments in E IV.
I
conflict with the skeptical interpretation I advance, for he
seems to be saying that we do have the kinds of empirical
knowledge with regard to which I claim he is a theoretical
skeptic. Note, however, that Hume is at that point taking
for granted the common sense view that we do have such
knowledge and inquiring into the genesis of that (alleged)
knowledge. So his point can be made by saying that if we
have empirical knowledge, that knowledge is based in
experience. The argument traditionally interpreted as an
argument for inductive skepticism comes after this stage in
Hume's reasoning and the upshot of that argument is, I will
argue, that our inductive inferences and inductively derived
beliefs cannot be rationally justified and that hence much
of our alleged empirical knowledge is not knowledge at all.
14.
Of course, one might say that the issue of whether or
not our beliefs constitute knowledge is not itself very
interesting. So long as we have rationally justified
beliefs, what does it matter if those beliefs constitute
knowledge? Though I have chosen to present Hume's skepticism
in terms of a negative assessment of much of our alleged
knowledge, that negative assessment results from his denial,
with regard to much of that alleged knowledge, that the
beliefs involved are rationally justified. So Hume's
critique of our alleged knowledge applies just as much to





HUME'S ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION AND CAUSAL INFERENCE
1
One of the cornerstones of Hume's philosophy is his
account of causation and causal inference. Moreover, it is
this part of Hume's philosophy which has traditionally been
seen as presenting the most formidable skeptical challenge
to our claims to knowledge about matters of fact. It is
primarily on the basis of Hume's analysis of our idea of
causation and his presentation of what we now call "the
problem of induction," that he has been widely regarded as a
skeptic who presented serious challenges to our claims to
empirical knowledge. Recently, however, Hume's views on
these matters have been interpreted in ways that downplay or
deny Hume's own skepticism and the seriousness of his
skeptical challenge. In following chapters I will consider
several such interpretations and argue that they are
mistaken. First, however, I will present Hume's basic
reasoning on the topics of causation and causal inference in
the Treatise , Book I, Part III. (I will also refer to the




In "Of probability; and of the idea of cause and
effect" (T, I. III. II, 73-8), Hume takes up the topic of
causation, the only form of relation that can "give us
assurance from the existence or action of one object, that
' twas follow'd or preceded by any other existence or
action..." (T, 73-4). Only this relation, he says, "informs
us of existences and objects which we do not see or feel..."
( T , .74) . What Hume begins in this section is an analysis
of our idea of causation. This analysis will have serious
consequences for the possibility of our having knowledge of
matters of fact and hence a direct bearing on the question
of whether or not Hume is a skeptic.
Hume's procedure in analyzing an idea is, of course, to
trace it to the simple impressions from which it ultimately
arises. According to Hume, each idea is copied from and
i
represents some impression or impressions. By examining
the impression or impressions from which an idea arises the
idea itself is made clear, and by examining the idea our
reasoning involving that idea is made clear. When we
understand an idea's etiology and hence its content, we can
reason more precisely; we will, for example, be less likely
to mistake the idea for some other, similar idea and will
thus be less likely to go astray in our reasoning.
Hume begins by considering whether the impression that
produces our idea of causation, "an idea of such prodigious
consequence," can be found in our experience of a particular
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pair of objects that we regard as cause and effect. The
impression cannot be of one of the particular qualities of
the objects, for there is no single quality or set of
qualities that characterizes all and only those objects we
regard as causes or effects. So, the idea of causation must
be based on some relation or relations between causally
connected objects. The relations discoverable by an
examination of an individual cause-effect pair are (i)
contiguity (spatial and temporal nearness) and (ii)
succession (the cause precedes its effect in time)
.
According to Hume, these are the only relations that we find
in examining a particular instance of causation.
The relations of contiguity and succession do not,
however, fully exhaust our concept of causation; our idea of
causation cannot be analyzed into merely the ideas of
contiguity and succession of objects. One object's being
contiguous and temporally prior to another is not a
sufficient condition of its being the cause of that other.
Thus Hume says
,
There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into
consideration; and that relation is of much greater
importance, than any of the other two above mention'd (T,
77 ) .
Why does Hume say that the relation of necessary
connection "is of much greater importance" than the
relations of contiguity and succession? One reason, of
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course, is that more seems to be involved in one object or
event's causing another than contiguity and succession, as
Hume says. When I say that the rock's hitting the window
caused the window to break I seem to say more than that the
rock hit the window and then the window broke. I seem to be
saying also that the rock's hitting the window in some way
necessitated its breaking, that the window had to break when
the rock hit it. But another reason, I believe, is that Hume
is concerned at this point with causal inference. The idea
of causation is "of such prodigious importance" because the
relation of causation is the only relation on the basis of
which we can infer objects beyond those present to our
senses or memory. Hume is concerned at this point with
necessary connection because necessary connection seems a
2
likely candidate for justifying our causal inferences.
Now, the impression from which the idea of necessary
connection is derived cannot be an impression of any of the
particular qualities of objects, for again, the relation of
cause and effect does not depend on these qualities. Still,
the only relations discovered by examining an individual
cause-effect pair are contiguity and succession. Hume
proposes to leave the direct examination of our idea of
necessary connection, that is, the direct search for the
impression or impressions from which that idea is derived,
and consider two related questions "the examination of which
will perhaps afford a hint, that may serve to clear up the




(1) "For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every-
thing whose existence has a beginning, shou'd also have a
cause?" (T, 78)
(2) "Why we conclude that such particular causes must
necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the
nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other,
and of the belief we repose in it?" (T, 78)
How will considering these questions help Hume in
finding the source of our idea of necessary connection?
Examination of (1) will show that the connection between
cause and effect is not logically or metaphysically
necessary and hence will support his answer to (2)
:
We
conclude that a given object must necessarily have a
particular effect on the basis of habit and our experience
of involuntary thought transitions. Our inference from an
object to its causal correlate (that is, its cause or its
effect) is a matter of the triggering of a habit instilled
in us by repeated experience of the regular conjunction of
similar objects, and our belief in the conclusion of a
causal inference is to be explained as the causal result of
experience and habit. The idea of necessary connection,
Hume will eventually say, arises from our experience of
regular and involuntary transitions among our thoughts when





In "Why a cause is always necessary” (T, I. III. Ill, 78-
82)
,
Hume considers the causal maxim, which states that
"whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence"
(T, 78)
.
This maxim is supposed to be certain and hence
founded on intuition. However, all certainty is based on
one or more of the four invariable relations - resemblance,
degrees in quality, proportion in number, or contariety -
and none of these is implied in the causal maxim.
3
Thus the
causal maxim is not intuitively certain. Hume proceeds to
show that it is not demonstratively certain either.
Hume's main argument is the following: We can
demonstrate that everything that begins to exist must have a
cause if and only if we can demonstrate that it is not
possible for an object to begin to exist without a cause.
4
We can, however, conceive of an object coming into existence
without conjoining with it the distinct idea of a cause. So
the separation of these ideas is possible, and hence the
actual separation of the objects is possible, that is, it
5
implies no contradiction. Thus the proposition that it is
possible for an object to begin to exist without a cause
cannot be refuted by reasoning "from mere ideas." So, we
cannot demonstrate that it is not possible for an object to
begin to exist without a cause. Therefore, we cannot




Hume's main conclusion in this section, then, is that
the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstrably
certain. We do not accept it on the basis of any a priori
intuition or demonstration. Yet it seems that we do accept
it, so this "opinion" must be the result of observation and
experience. However, rather than pursue the question of how
experience gives rise to our belief in this general
principle, Hume turns to this conjunctive question:
Why we conclude, that such particular causes must
necessarily have such particular effects, and why we form an
inference from one to another? (T, 82)
This is, of course, just the second of the two questions
raised earlier. Hume notes that perhaps in the end we will
find that "the same answer will serve for both questions"
(T, 82)
.
Hume's answer to the question of how experience
gives rise to belief in the causal maxim and his answer to
the conjunctive question quoted above will, as he suggests,
be the same. That answer will be, in short, that our belief
in the causal maxim and our conclusions and inferences with
regard to particular causally related objects are a result
of the operation of experience-instilled habits.
4
In "Of the impressions of the senses and memory" (T,
I. III. IV, 84-86), Hume notes that the "materials" of causal
reasoning are "heterogeneous . " Causal inferences proceed
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from impressions of an object by means of the memory or
senses to an idea of a causally connected object. One of
Hume's conclusions in this section is that the belief which
attends impressions of the memory or senses is "nothing but
the vivacity of those perceptions they present" (T, 86) .
The force and vivacity of the sense impression or memory
"lays the foundation" for our causal reasoning when we
"trace the relation of cause and effect" (T, 86) . The
central point Hume will undertake to explain in this and
succeeding sections is causal inference, that is, the
transition from an impression of an object to the vivified
idea of, that is, the belief in, a causally connected
object.
Hume's explanation of our belief in the conclusions of
causal inferences is as follows. Empirical belief in
general is "A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A
PRESENT IMPRESSION" (T, I. III. VII, 96). How does Hume reach
this conclusion? What Hume is concerned with are empirical
beliefs that rest on inference. Hence he says that since
reason alone cannot "...satisfy us that the existence of any
one object does ever imply that of another," our empirical
beliefs are not the result of reason but of "custom or a
principle of association" (T, 97)
.
The difference between believing P and merely
conceiving or imagining P cannot be that in believing P I
have different ideas than I do in simply conceiving or
imagining P. For if I have different ideas in believing P,
42
then what I believe is not the same thing that I conceived
or imagined. Nor can my belief that P be a matter of my
attaching some other individual idea to the set of ideas
which constitute my conception of P. For then it would be in
my power to believe whatever I wish, which, Hume says, is
clearly not the case. So the difference between believing P
and merely conceiving P must lie in the manner in which I
have the ideas . Since the only way of varying an idea
without changing its content is to vary its degree of force
and vivacity, belief consists in conceiving ideas with a
superior degree of force and vivacity.
How do the ideas that constitute my belief come to have
this high degree of force and vivacity? Through their




I wou'd willingly establish it as a general maxim in
the science of human nature, that when any impression
becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to
such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates
to them a share of its force and vivacity (T, 98)
.
Hume thus presents a causal theory of empirical belief:
I come to believe P because the idea of P is related to a
present impression by one of the natural relations, and
through the relation some of the force and vivacity of the
impression is transmitted to the related idea, thus
enlivening it. Thus my experience and a feature of my
psychological makeup, that is, the fact that my mind
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operates according to certain principles of association,
together cause me to have the empirical beliefs that I do.
How in particular do I come to believe in the
conclusions of causal inferences? The answer to this
question will appear in following sections, but the basic
explanation is as follows. According to Hume, when I have
had sufficient experience of objects of type A being
regularly conjoined with objects of type B, I develop a
habit of forming an idea of an object of type B on
experiencing an object of type A. So, when I have a new
impression of an object of type A, this habit is triggered
and I form the idea of an object of type B. Another way of
putting this is: because regularly conjoined objects of
types A and B stand in the causal relation, which is a
natural relation (a relation of association between
perceptions)
,
given my experience of their regular
conjunction, whenever I have an impression or idea of an
object of type A I have an idea of an object of type B.
Further, when I have an impression of an object of type A,
the natural relation of causation functions not only to
effect the transition to an idea of an object of type B but
also to transmit some of the force and vivacity of the
7
impression to it, thus enlivening it and producing belief.
5.1
In "Of the inference from the impression to the idea"
(T, I. III. VI, 86-94), Hume examines our causal inferences
44
on reason. In this
and concludes that they are not based
section Hume is still in the process of answering the
question of Section III (which appeared earlier, with
slightly different wording, in Section II)
:
Why we conclude that such particular causes must
necessarily have such particular effects, and why we form an
inference from one to another? (T, 82)
This question was intended to help in the search for the
impression or impressions from which the idea of necessary
connection is derived. Of course, determining the source
and nature of the idea of necessary connection is itself
part of Hume's analysis of our idea of causation. But note
that Hume's main interest from the beginning has been in
causal inference; it is because causal inference is our one
means of inferring the existence of things we are not now
perceiving or remembering to have perceived that the idea of
causation is "of such prodigious consequence" (See T,
I. III. II, 74-5)
.
Hume begins by noting that the inference we draw from
cause to effect is not based on knowledge of the essences of
the related objects. No object implies the existence of any
8
other distinguishable object. Thus our causal inferences
are not a priori. Rather, our causal inferences are based
on experience. What kind of experience? Experience of
repeated conjunctions of similar object pairs. When I have
repeatedly observed tokens of type A followed by tokens of
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type B, then, on observing a new token of type A, I infer
the existence of a token of type B. Similarly, on observing
a new token of type B, I infer the existence of a token of
type A. I infer both from cause to effect and from effect to
cause. In short, I infer from an object to its causal
correlate. Hume writes:
We remember to have had frequent instances of the
existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that
the individuals of another species of objects have always
attended them, and have existed in a regular order of
contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we
remember to have seen that species of object we call flame,
and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. We
likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past
instances. Without any farther ceremony, we call the one
cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the
one from that of the other (T, 87)
.
Hume has thus discovered a new relation between cause
and effect to add to those of contiguity and succession -
constant conjunction. Hume's initial reaction is
disappointment. He is still looking for the source of the
idea of necessary connection, but the constant conjunction
of objects doesn't seem to be a possible source for this
idea, for
From the mere repetition of any past impression, even
to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea,
such as that of a necessary connexion..." (T, 88).
However, given that we draw an inference from one object to
another (from the impression to the idea) after experience
of their constant conjunction, he will examine that
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inference. Perhaps ultimately it will appear that "the
necessary connexion depends on the inference, instead of the
inference's depending on the necessary connection" (T, 88).
Hume's words here suggest that he has been looking for
necessary connection as that which grounds or justifies our
causal inferences. His deceptively casual hint that perhaps
the necessary connection depends on the inference rather
than vice versa forshadows his eventual move away from
considering necessary connection as a candidate for
justifying our causal inferences.
Since it is clear that our causal inferences are
founded on past experience of constant conjunction, the next
question is whether experience produces the inference
through reason or through the imagination, that is, whether
we are determined to make these inferences by canons of
reason or by principles of association, by logic or merely
because of our psychological makeup. If our inferences were
based on reason, Hume says, we would have to be operating on
the assumption that instances of which we've had no
experience must resemble those of which we have had
experience and that nature is uniform. In other words, if
our causal inferences are based on reason, then a uniformity
principle stating that objects that we have not yet
experienced will have the same properties and stand in the
same causal relations as those we have experienced must be




Now, Hume asks, what supports this assumption? It is
not supported by intuition, for "we can at least conceive a
change in the course of nature" but intuitive truths are
based on invariable relations between ideas and hence are
such that their denials are inconceivable. So if we are
justified in believing the uniformity principle, UP, there
must be an argument which supports it.
For Hume, there are two kinds of arguments,
demonstrative" and "probable". Demonstrative arguments are
arguments in which the premises entail the conclusion.
Further, demonstrative arguments involve only propositions
stating relations between ideas and therefore their
conclusions state necessary truths. Hence, if P is the
conclusion of a demonstration, ~P is inconceivable. Probable
arguments (or, as Hume refers to them in the first Enquiry ,
"moral arguments") are arguments based on experience of the
way things happen to be; such arguments either do not entail
their conclusions (these are inductive arguments proper) or
entail their conclusions (these are deductive arguments) but
contain at least one premise that is arrived at by inductive
inference. Hume's probable arguments, then, either are or
depend on inductive arguments. So, Hume's dilemma stated in
terms of probable or demonstrative arguments can be stated
in outline this way: Support for the UP must be based either
on necessary truths involving invariable relations of ideas
or on contingent truths based on experience. But it can be
based on neither, so no such support is possible.
48
There can be no demonstrative argument for the UP, for
We can at least conceive a change in the course of
nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not
absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of anything, is
an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a
refutation of any pretended demonstration against it (T
ft Q\ —
'
There can be no probable argument for the UP, for all
probable arguments presuppose the UP. Hence any proffered
probable argument would be circular:
. . .probability is founded on the presumption of a
resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had
experience, and those, of which we have had none; and
therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can arise from
probability. . . (T, 90)
.
Hume makes the point about circularity more clearly in
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding :
We have said that all arguments concerning existence
are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our
knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from
experience; and that all our experimental conclusions
proceed upon the supposition that the future will be
conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof
of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments
regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle,
and taking that for granted, which is the very point in
question (E, IV. II, 35-6).
The UP is not intuitive. An argument for it must be
either probable or demonstrative. But the UP can be
supported neither by demonstrative nor probable arguments.
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Therefore, there is no support for the UP. Therefore,
(Hume's main conclusion) we are not determined by reason to
make causal inferences. Even after experience of the
constant conjunction of objects, we can't satisfy ourselves
by reason that we should extend that experience to
unobserved instances
:
We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there
must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we
have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of
our discovery (T, 91-2)
.
So, we must be determined to make causal inferences by
features of our psychological makeup, that is, principles of
association:
Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object
with another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation
of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When
the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of
one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not
determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite
them in the imagination (92)
.
5.2
The general problem Hume is concerned with essentially
involves inference from the observed to the unobserved.
Though one often discusses Hume's argument in terms of
justifying our predictions about the future, Hume's
inductive skepticism applies to inferences about the
unobserved past and unobserved parts of the present as well.
This is why it is calls into question the legitimacy of our
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present beliefs about contemporary matters of fact that we
are not directly observing.
Hume's position, then, seems to be this: All of our
beliefs in matters of fact that go beyond what we are now
observing or remember to have observed are based on causal
inference. Causal inference presupposes the UP, that is, the
principle that objects that we haven't observed will have
the same properties and stand in the same causal relations
as those we have observed. This principle, however, cannot
be rationally justified, for it is neither intuitive (that
is, it doesn't express an invariable relation between ideas)
nor can it be supported by either demonstrative or probable
arguments
, the only forms of argument there are . Thus our
causal inferences rest on a principle that cannot be
rationally justified and hence are themselves ultimately
without rational justification.
Now, since most of our beliefs in matters of fact are
based on causal inference and causal inferences are
ultimately without rational justification, it seems that
Hume has produced an argument showing that most of our
beliefs in matters of fact are, though psychologically
explicable, without rational justification. It seems, in
other words , that Hume has produced an argument showing that
the members of the set
{ b, c | b is a belief in a matter of fact and b is based on
causal inference .or. c is a claim with regard to a matter
of fact and c is based on causal inference }
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are without rational justification. This is clearly a
skepticism with regard to the greater part of our factual
beliefs. Of course, Hume doesn't think that we should or
can refrain from holding such beliefs, nor does he think
that such beliefs are unintelligible. Thus he seems to have
argued for a theoretical (but not a prescriptive or
conceptual) skepticism with regard to knowledge of matters
of fact.
In attempting to justify our belief in the uniformity
principle on which our causal inferences are based, Hume
raises what is now called "the problem of induction." It is
the problem of providing a justification for inductive
inferences, that is, those inferences in which a conclusion
is drawn from premises that do not deductively entail it.
In such inferences, it is possible for the conclusion we
draw to be false though the premises from which we draw it
are true. The question is, quite simply, what justifies us
in drawing a conclusion from a set of premises when the
falsity of the conclusion is fully consistent with the truth
of the premises? The causal inferences Hume is concerned
with are themselves inductive inferences: From the true
premise that all a's hitherto observed have been conjoined
with b's, it does not deductively follow that all a's are
conjoined with b's or that the next observed a will be
conjoined with a b, and this remains true no matter how
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extensive the class of observed a's and how randomly
selected those a's are.
I should stress that Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism is not merely aimed at inferences proceeding from
false premises or at inferences that we would ordinarily
regard as sloppy or based on improper evidence. Hume's
challenge is a challenge to even our best, most careful
inductive arguments, what we might call "strong" inductive
arguments containing all true premises. This raises a
problem for the practice of science. For example, scientists
make claims about the behavior of hydrogen even though
they've observed only a relatively tiny bit of the total
hydrogen in the universe. What justifies such an extension
from truths about what has been observed to claims about
what has not?
The problem of induction, in brief, is this: To provide
a reason why we should believe the conclusions of even
strong inductive arguments with all true premises. On
Hume's view, no such reason can be provided, yet all of our
beliefs about matters of fact that go beyond the present
testimony of the senses and memory are based on inductive
inference. This view is now often referred to as
"inductive skepticism." Inductive inferences cannot be
justified deductively, for they are not deductively valid.
Nor can such inferences be justified inductively without
11 _
circularity. But deductive and inductive inference are
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our only two kinds of inference. So, inductive inferences
cannot be rationally justified.
Fogelin refers to the argument of T, I. III. VI as Hume's
"no-argument argument." After noting that Hume recognizes
only two basic kinds of arguments, Fogelin writes:
Since, as he will argue, neither form of argument can
be used to justify the principle of the uniformity of
nature, we arrive at what has come to be known as Hume's
skepticism concerning induction. . . .Hume concludes that no
argument can justify our inductive inferences because no
argument can justify the uniformity principle upon which
they rely. .. (Fogelin [1985], 45-6).
It seems to me that Fogelin' s reference to Hume's
discussion as a "no-argument argument" very nicely captures
Hume's point. Contrary to the claim one sometimes hears,
that "Hume merely showed that induction is not deduction,"
what Hume has shown, I believe, is that ultimately we can
give no rational justification for one of our basic forms of
inference. Moreover, it is a form that does seem to require
some such justification. Intuitively, isn't there something
worrisome about a form of inference in which the truth of
the premises is fully consistent with the falsity of the
conclusion?
Hume seems to think that our only form of probable or
inductive inference is causal inference. But even if Hume
is wrong in saying that all inductive inference is causal
inference, the problem he raises is a problem for inductive
inference generally, since all such inference seems to
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presuppose a uniformity principle /
2
So even if some of our
beliefs concerning matters of fact are based on a form of
non -causal inductive inference, Hume's argument nevertheless
applies to them.
5.3
One might initially feel a sense of puzzlement or even
irritation with Hume's inductive skepticism. One wants to
say , "Of course we can ' t show that the conclusions of
inductive arguments with true premises must have true
conclusions, but that just shows that induction is not
deduction. But the conclusions of strong inductive arguments
are probable."
But what do we mean by "probable"? There are various
interpretations of "probability," and I can't consider them
all. But it is not clear that on any of these
interpretations we can solve the problem of induction.
There are two main approaches to probability: We can discuss
probability either in terms objective probability, or
subjective probability . Basically, to treat the probability
that x is F as objective is to interpret its probability as
independent of our beliefs about its probability or the
evidence we in fact have for it. On this view, something can
be probable even though we have no evidence that it is and
don't consider it probable.
One way of looking at probability as something
objective is the "relative frequency" interpretation.
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Roughly, on the relative frequency view, to say that it is
probable that the next observed A will be F is just to say
that in the long run the relative frequency of As that are F
is over 1/2. Hume is, of course, concerned with "singular
inference," of just this kind, e.g., "M/N observed As are F;
therefore, with probability M/N the next observed A will be
F." In this case we're talking about the probability that a
token of a certain kind possesses a certain property
(which may be complex)
.
But consider: Suppose there is a box of 40 apples, 10
of which are wormy
, and the wormy apples are randomly
distributed through the box. Knowing this beforehand I can
know that the probability that any randomly selected apple I
remove from the box (observe) will be wormy is 10/40=. 25.
But suppose I don ' t know beforehand how many apples there
are or how many are wormy. In that case I won't know what
proportion of the total number of apples are wormy apples. I
won't know, in this case, the probability that any given
apple is wormy before examining any apples. Suppose that I
then remove (observe) 10 apples, and it just so happens that
8 of them are wormy. Then I might infer that the probability
that the next apple I observe will be wormy is 8/10=. 80. But
clearly since there are now 30 unobserved apples , only 2 of
which are wormy, the probability (as relative frequency)
that the next apple I observe will be wormy is 2/30=. 0666.
So the probability judgments I make according to basic
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inductive rules can diverge wildly from probabilities
considered in terms of relative frequency.
Of course, if I could be sure that the total
distribution of wormy apples among all the apples was close
to the distribution of wormy apples among the apples I’d
selected (If I had a WUP - Wormy Uniformity Principle)
, then
I could be sure there would be no wild divergence. But (i) I
couldn't know the distribution a priori, and (ii) the class
of things we're making inferences about may well be infinite
or at least indefinitely large, but we can only pull a few
of them out of the box, so to speak. For example, we've only
"observed" a small sample of all electrons, or, for that
matter, apples. So I also can't know the total distribution
a posteriori. In other words, we can't really say what the
"long run" relative frequency of As that are F is. My
observations cover only a finite sample and the assumption
that that sample is typical is questionable. [Actually, this
is trivially true, given the very notion of moral reasoning
as terminating in conlusions about the unobserved.] Of
course, if I am justified in thinking the UP is true then if
M/N observed As have been F I can infer that in the long run
M/N of all As are F. But how can I justify my faith in the
UP? Hume showed that I can't. The problem of inferring
relative frequencies from observed cases is simply another
instance of the problem of induction.
I might want to say generally that the conclusions of
inductive inferences are probable because the relative
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frequency of true to false conclusions for good inductive
arguments with true premises is greater than 1/2. But how
can we show that? The class of all strong inductive
arguments with true premises is infinite; we've observed
oniy a relatively small number of such arguments. So again
we don't know the relevant relative frequency. We might
argue that of those strong inductive arguments we've
observed over 1/2 have true conclusions; therefore, over one
half of all strong inductive arguments have true
conclusions; therefore, for any randomly chosen strong
inductive argument the probability that it will have a true
conclusion is over 1/2. But then again we'd be presupposing
the UP, which Hume showed we can't support.
To treat probability subjectively is to treat it as a
measure of the degree of confidence a person or group of
people actually have in a certain claim or the degree of
confidence a person "ought" to have in a certain claim given
certain evidence. If we discuss probability in terms of the
degree of confidence we ought to have, that is, in terms of
degree of rational belief, to say that "The next observed A
will be followed by a B" is probable for a given person is
just to say that she would be rationally justified in
believing it. But rational belief isn't the same thing as
actual belief. Degree of rational belief is determined by
the relevant evidence. So according to the probabilist to
say that a statement is probable just means that it is
supported by the relevant evidence. So, to say that a person
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is rationally justified in accepting a conclusion is to say
that the conclusion is supported by the relevant evidence.
So there is a conceptual connection between probability,
rationality, and evidential support.
The probabilist argues further that our concept of
evidential support with regard to factual beliefs is such
that by definition the conclusions of strong inductive
arguments are supported by the evidence. For example, past
of many As all of which were followed by Bs is by
definition evidence for the claim that the next observed A
will be followed by a B. But then by definition it is
rational to accept the conclusions of strong inductive
arguments. So to ask if we are rationally justified in
accepting the conclusions of strong inductive arguments is
equivalent to asking if we are rationally justified in
accepting conclusions that we are rationally justified in




I believe that Hume's response to the probabilist would
be something like the following: Our idea of what degree of
belief it is rational to have in any conclusion depends on
our notion of relevant evidence and what we take as relevant
evidence depends on what inferential practices we accept. If
those inferential practices are themselves called into
question we can't simply take them for granted in attempting
to provide support for our reliance on them. There are an
indefinite number of other inferential procedures we might
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use and the mere fact that we have adopted one and that one
is reflected in our ordinary concepts of evidence and
rational justification doesn't mean that that one is
rationally justified in our sense, that is, that we have
shown that procedure leads from true premises to true
conclusions more often than not. Consider our example of the
box of 40 apples. This showed us how wildly the probability
judgments we would make using our inductive practices might
diverge from the objective probabilities we want our beliefs
to "track”.
The notion of probability Hume himself ultimately works
with is a subjectivist notion. Hume recognizes that belief
comes in degrees and he sees the probability of my strong
b®iief that the sun will rise tomorrow as a measure of my
confidence or degree of belief in the proposition "The sun
will rise tomorrow." He also recognizes that as a matter of
psychological fact a person who has observed a large number
of A's most of which have been B's will have a stronger
belief that the next A he observes will be a B than will a
person who either has never observed an A or who has
observed a large number of A's most of which have been non-
15
B's. This fact, however, itself leads to the question,
"Given that we do in fact adjust our degrees of belief in
the ways that Hume points out, what is the justification for
the inductively derived beliefs we hold and the confidence
with which we hold them?" Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism shows that his answer is "There is no
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justification for the inductively derived beliefs we hold
and the confidence with which we hold them."
The basic point can be expressed this way: Admittedly,
we ordinarily take experience of uniform conjunction of
objects of type A with objects of type B as evidence for the
claim that in unobserved cases objects of type A are
conjoined with objects of type B. What Hume points out,
however, is that observed conjunctions of as and bs can
serve as evidence for the claim that unobserved as and bs
are conjoined, only on the supposition of the UP. But the UP
itself is without support. So, experienced conjunctions




In "Of the idea of necessary connexion" (T, I. III. XIV,
155-72)
, Hume returns to the question "What is our idea of
necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily
connected together?" (T, 155). In line with Hume's method,
he must look for the impression that gives rise to such an
idea. Note, however, that though necessary connection
initially seemed a candidate for justifying our causal
inferences, whatever the impression from which our idea of
necessity is derived turns out to be, it cannot justify our
causal inferences; for Hume has already shown that nothing
16 . ,
,
can justify them. Nevertheless, Hume can continue with
his larger project of analyzing the idea of causation.
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Though Hume has argued for a theoretical skepticism with
regard to our alleged knowledge of unobserved matters of
fact, his larger goal throughout T , I. Ill is to provide an
analysis of our idea of causation. Of course, the goal of
providing an analysis of our idea of causation is itself
part of a larger goal, Hume's main goal of establishing a
"science of human nature" that will describe the operations
of the human mind and allow for prediction and explanation
of human behavior and mental phenomena. This remains Hume's
goal in spite of the skeptical result of his considerations
in T, I. III. VI.
Hume's proposed science of human nature involves causal
explanation and inference. So how can he continue with his
project of establishing such a science despite the skeptical
result of T, 1. 1 1 1.VI? Hume can continue because he is a
theoretical rather than a prescriptive or practicing
skeptic. Though Hume has shown that there is no ultimate
justification for our beliefs based on causal inference and
hence no ultimate justification for explanations couched in
terms of causation, he thinks it is part of our nature to
engage in causal inference and explanation. Hume as an agent
firmly believes in the uniformity of nature and the
17
reliability of causal reasoning.
Hume's basic argument concerning the idea of necessary
connection is the following: Our idea of necessity arises
only after experience of the constant conjunction of objects
in like relations of succession and contiguity. But this
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experience produces no new impression of any quality in the
objects which could serve as the model of the idea of
necessary connection. So, the idea of necessity doesn't
represent a quality in the objects. However, the
observation of resembling pairs of objects in like relations
of succession and contiguity has an effect on the observer -
it produces, via a habit, a new impression in the mind of
the observer and it is this impression that is the model for
our idea of necessity:
For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the
appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by
custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it
in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the
first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination,
which affords me the idea of necessity (T, I. III. XIV, 156).
The effect of observation of a number of pairs of
resembling objects in like relations of succession and
contiguity is that on having the idea or impression of one
member of the pair we feel a "determination of the mind" to
pass to the idea of the other member. It is this internal
impression that is the model of the idea of necessity. The




The idea of necessity arises from some impression.
There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can
give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv'd from
some internal impression, or impression of reflexion. There
is no internal impression, which has any relation to the
present business, but that propensity, which custom
produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual
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attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity (T
I. III. XIV, 165) .
*
Hume is not saying that our idea of necessity arises from an
impression of reflection but nevertheless represents some
quality in causally related objects themselves. According
to Hume, necessity is not in the objects but in the mind
that regards them:
Necessity, then,... is nothing but an internal
impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our
thoughts from one object to another (T, 165)
.
Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in
the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to
form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in
bodies (T, 165-6)
.
Following his discussion of our idea of necessity, Hume
presents his two definitions of the causal relation:
We may define a CAUSE to be 'An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling
the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and
contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter.'
'A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to
another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one
determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the
other' (T, 170)
.
On either of these definitions, Hume says, "...there is
no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning
of existence shou'd be attended with such an object" (T,
172) . Much has been written concerning Hume's two
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definitions. Hume has been charged with offering definitions
that are neither intensionally nor extensionally
equivalent. Much has been written as well on the issue of
whether or not Hume presents a purely "regularity theory" of
20
causation. These questions are of both philosophical and
scholarly interest. However, I will not here enter into
the question of whether Hume's two definitions of cause are
<~>r not consistent with one another or whether Hume does
or does not hold a pure regularity theory of causation. For
whatever the truth about Hume's definitions, his skepticism
about our empirical knowledge follows from his account of
the causal relation as it is in the objects (definition 1) ,
his analysis of causal inference, and his skeptical argument
concerning induction. Even if (as seems plausible) Hume
thinks that an idea of necessity forms a part of our
pretheoretical idea of causation, Hume's view is that
necessity does not exist in the objects and in no way
justifies our causal inferences. Of course, it is important
that necessary connection is not something found in causally
connected objects themselves, for if it were, then perhaps
it would provide a rational basis for causal inference.
7
I have now given an account of Hume's reasoning with
regard to causation and causal inference that is true to
Hume's text, though somewhat superficial. With this account
as a base, I will now turn to recent interpretations of
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Hume's views on causation and causal inference. I will
argue that Hume does present an inductive skepticism, that
Hume does not hold that causal inference is rationally
justified, and that given Hume's analysis of causation and
his inductive skepticism, we can never know that we do have
a case of causal relation on the basis of which we can
infer. In establishing these particular conclusions I hope
l©nd weight to the thesis that Hume is in fact a serious
theoretical skeptic.
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Notes to Chapter II
1. In "Of the origin of our ideas" (T, I. I. I, 1-7), Humedivides "All the perceptions of the human mind" into
"impressions" and "ideas". These differ only "in the degreesof force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the
mind...," impressions being more forceful and lively, ideas
less so. Hume further classifies perceptions into "simple"
and "complex"; simple perceptions cannot be further analyzed
into more basic perceptions, but complex perceptions can be
analyzed into simple perceptions. Every simple idea, Hume
says, corresponds to a simple impression which it resembles,
and a complex idea is composed of simple ideas which
correspond to and resemble some simple impressions. Thus
our ideas correspond to and resemble some set of
simple impressions. Moreover, Hume asserts that the
impressions are the causes of their correspondent ideas:
That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are
deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to
them, and which they exactly represent (T, 4)
.
The claim that every simple idea is causally dependent on a
simple impression which it resembles is often referred to as
Hume's "Copy Principle." Hume presents two arguments for the
claim that our impressions are the causes of our ideas:
(i) We always have the impression before the idea, never the
idea before the impression. (ii) Where we lack the capacity
for receiving certain impressions, "as when one is born
blind or deaf", we lack the corresponding ideas.
2. In Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature
,
Robert Fogelin makes the point that Hume places such
importance on necessary connection largely because of his
interest in causal inference:
Why should the relation of a necessary connection be of
more importance than the relations of contiguity and
priority? The answer is obvious if we keep in mind that
Hume's main concern at this stage of his discussion is to
understand the basis of an inference from the perceived to
the unperceived. . . .A necessary connection is obviously a
better candidate for grounding this inference, for given a
perception of an object and the perception of a necessary
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connection, perhaps we will have the basis for the
transition from the perceived object to an unperceived
object (Fogelin [1985], 42).
This view of Hume's interest in necessary connectionmakes sense of the fact that though Hume initially seems toinclude necessary connection as an essential element in ouridea of causation, he eventually says, in T, I.III.XV that
constant conjunction is that "on which the"relation of causeand effect totally depends" (T, 173) . Further evidence for
this view lies simply in the fact that from the beginning ofhis discussion of the idea of causation Hume lays stress on
its important and unique role in empirical inference, and
the fact that after discussing the idea of necessary
connection in T I. I I I. XIV he says:
The necessary connection betwixt causes and effects is
the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The
foundation of our inference is the transition arising from
the accustom'd union. These are, therefore, the same (T,
165) .
Of course, at that point it is clear that necessary
connection is not the foundation of our causal inferences in
the sense that it provides a rational justification for
them. These inferences, Hume has by that point shown, have a
causal -psychological basis but not a rational justification.
Nevertheless it is clear that what Hume was seeking was the
"foundation" of these inferences, and only with the
skeptical argument of T I. III. VI does it become clear that
there is no rational foundation for these inferences.
3. In "Of relations" (T, I.I.V, 13-15), Hume distinguishes
two types of relation, "natural" and "philosophical".
Natural relations function to associate ideas, philosophical
relations are simply points of comparison between things.
Hume lists seven types of philosophical relations:
resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, degrees in
quality, contrariety, and cause and effect. Of these seven,
three are also natural relations: resemblance, spatial or
temporal contiguity, and, of course, cause and effect.
In "Of knowledge" (T, I. III. I, 69-73), Hume divides
philosophical relations into those that "depend entirely on
the ideas, which we compare together," and those that "may
be chang'd without any change in the ideas" (T, 69) . The
first are the invariable relations, resemblance,
contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity
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or number, the second are the variable, identity, situationm time and place, and causation. Only the invariable
relations "can be the objects of knowledge and certainty "
according to Hume (T, 70).
What we know, according to Hume, we know either by
intuition or demonstration. What is known by intuition is
recognized "at first sight, without any inquiry or
reasoning" (T, 70) . What is known by demonstration requires
a "chain of reasoning." Hume’s view in the Treatise is that
any proposition that is intuitively or demonstrably certain
expresses one of the four invariable relations. These
propositions are themselves necessary, for their denials
imply a contradiction and hence what they assert is
impossible (See T, 79-80, 89, and 161-2). This is the realm
certainty. It is the realm of a priori knowledge. [For
a nice discussion of Hume's view of a priori knowledge as it
relates to the analytic/synthetic distinction, see Bruce
Aune ' s Rationalism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism: An
Introduction (Aune [1970]), chapter II, part 2, 44-8.]
The realm of probable reasoning and probability
consists of our apprehension of propositions which assert
that one or more of the variable relations hold between
certain objects, and of inferences involving such
propositions. These propositions are contingent; their
denials, whether true or false, are nevertheless coherent
and hence what they assert is at least possible. This is
the realm of a posteriori knowledge.
4. Hume is correct in saying that demonstrating the causal
maxim, that everything that begins to exist must have a
cause, is equivalent to demonstrating that it is not
possible for an object to begin to exist without a cause.
Consider the following formulations of the causal maxim
(everything that begins to exist must have a cause) and
Hume's reformulation of it (it is not possible for an object
to begin to exist without a cause) , in the language of
quantified modal logic:
(1) [ ] Vx{ EtBxt --> EyCyx } (2) -<>Ex{EtBxt & -EyCyx}
The following formula, [P] , is a theorem of quantified modal
logic:
[P] [ ]Vx{ EtBxt --> EyCyx} .<-->. -<>Ex{EtBxt & -EyCyx}
According to Hume, we cannot demonstrate (2) and hence we
cannot demonstrate (1) . If Hume is correct in saying that we
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cannot demonstrate (2) , then he is correct
cannot demonstrate (1) , for (1) and (2) are
equivalent.
in saying that we
logically
Does Hume say that (1) is false as well as
undemonstrable? He thinks that Vx{EtBxt —> EyCyx} is not
logically necessary, so (1) is false if [] is taken as 'it
is logically necessary that'. Given what he says in the
Treatise and first Enquiry about necessity and
conceivability
, I believe that he would also consider ( 1 )false if [] is taken as saying that Vx{EtBxt —> EyCyx} is
necessary in a broader sense, that is, metaphysically
necessary - for then we could not conceive an object
beginning to exist without a cause, but Hume says we can
conceive this. I must admit, however, that Hume's use of
'might' in the words often quoted from the 1754 letter to
John Stewart - "...I never asserted so absurd a proposition
as that any thing might arise without a Cause..." (Letters
Of David Hume , Volume I, 187), clouds the issue.
5. Hume's view is that a state of affairs is possible if
and only if it is conceivable. Thus he writes:
'Tis an establish'd maxim in metaphysics, That whatever
the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible
existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is
absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden
mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may
actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a
valley, and therefore regard it as impossible (T, I. I I. II,
32) .
Hume also holds that a state of affairs is conceivable if
and only if it implies no contradiction.* He writes:
The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from
that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for
the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of
these objects is so far possible, that it implies no
contradiction or absurdity. .. (T, I. III. Ill, 79-80).
This is expressed more clearly in the Abstract :
What is demonstratively false implies a contradiction;
and what implies a contradiction cannot be conceived (A,
653) .
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Of course, strictly speaking, states of affairs don'timply contradictions. What Hume has in mind, I believe canbe expressed by saying that a state of affairs is
conceivable if and only if a sentence stating that itobtains neither formally nor semantically implies a
contradiction. For a sentence stating that a state ofaffairs obtains to semantically imply a contradiction is,for Hume, for that sentence to combine words that stand forideas in such a way that a person cannot combine the
relevant ideas so as to conceive the state of affairs in
question.
6.
Though Hume first and generally describes the memory as a
faculty which conveys ideas before the mind, he also speaks
of "impressions of memory." [See T, I. III. IV, 83, and "Of
the impressions of the senses and memory," T I.III.V, 84-6.]
Hume ' s point in referring to memory perceptions as
impressions is that such perceptions possess the force and
vivacity that constitute belief.
7.
Hume says that although causal reasoning allows us to
the existence of objects beyond those that are present
to the senses or memory, such reasoning must be grounded in
an impression of the senses or in ideas of the memory "which
are equivalent to impressions." Otherwise, our reasoning
would be merely hypothetical (See T, I. III. IV, 82-4).
8.
As I pointed out in chapter I, in "Of the inference from
the impression to the idea" (T, I. III. VI, 86-94), Hume
writes
:
There is no object, which implies the existence of any
other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never
look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an
inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the
absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving
anything different. But as all distinct ideas are separable,




Hume ' s argument in the Treatise that there can be no
probable argument for the principle of uniformity actually
seems to involve the claim that any attempt to rationally
support a causal inference must presuppose the uniformity
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principle, but this principle, insofar as it takes us beyondwhat is present to the memory or senses, must itself bebased on causal reasoning. Hume says that in all probablereasoning there is something present to the mind in sense ormemory and something not present to the mind which we inferon the basis of what is present. He also says that the onlyrelation that can take us beyond what's present to the mindm memory or sense is that of cause and effect. These taken
together imply that all probable reasoning is, or at least
essentially involves, causal reasoning. The uniformity
principle, since it goes beyond the present testimony of the
senses and memory and is not based on demonstrative
reasoning, must be based on probable reasoning if it has a
rational basis. But probable reasoning is or essentially
involves causal reasoning. So to attempt to justify the
uniformity principle by reference to probable reasoning is
circular, since all causal reasoning, and hence all probable
reasoning, is based on the uniformity principle. The point
of considering the uniformity principle was, of course, to
see if our causal inferences are rationally justified. But
if aii probable reasoning is or essentially involves causal
reasoning, then the attempt to support causal inference in
general by probable reasoning is viciously circular. You
justify causal inference by making a causal inference!
10. Why would Hume think that all of our beliefs about
matters of fact that go beyond the present testimony of the
senses and memory are based on inductive inference - that
is, all of our beliefs derived by probable/moral reasoning -
depend on inductive reasoning? Basically because no set of
statements wholly about the observed entails any statement
about the unobserved, and so any inference to an unobserved
matter of fact must either be inductive or be derived by a
series of inferences at least one of which is inductive. You
can't go from statements wholly about what has been observed
to a statement about what has not been observed by purely
deductive reasoning. So, for example, the inference from
"All observed As have been followed by Bs" to "All As
(observed and unobserved) are followed by Bs" is not
deductively valid nor are the examples of moral reasoning
Hume focuses on, such as "Past As have been followed by Bs;
therefore, future As will be followed by Bs .
"
Of course there can be an inference to an unobserved




All As are followed by Bs
The next observed A will be followed by a B.
But this inference is deductive only if the premise refers
to all As, including future As. But then that can't be
merely a report of what has been observed. [I haven't
observed future As
. ] We would arrive at that premise on the
basis of our observations of some As, and again, the
inference from ''Some As are Bs"/"A11 observed As are Bs" to
"All As are Bs"/'A11 As (observed and unobserved) are Bs" is
inductive
.
So whether a particular example of moral reasoning
taken by itself is inductive or deductive in either case our
justification for accepting its conclusion will involve
dependence on inductive inference. This is why all probable
reasoning depends on inductive reasoning: not because every
Particular bit of it taken in isolation is inductive but
because every bit of it is either inductive or depends on
inductive inference in having a premise that is arrived at
by inductive inference. Hume's distinction between
demonstrative reasoning and probable/moral reasoning is not
just the same as the distinction between deductive reasoning
and inductive reasoning. Among arguments involving only
propositions stating matters of fact, that is, among Hume's
"probable" or "moral" reasonings, will be some deductively
valid arguments. But those arguments will not be
demonstrative in Hume's sense.
11. One way of thinking of this circularity is this: For
inductive inference to be justified it would have to be
shown that strong inductive arguments with true premises
lead to true conclusions more often than not. But how can
we show this generally? To say that so far our reliance on
strong inductive arguments with true premises has led us to
true conclusions more often than not, therefore, it will in
general, is to presuppose the reliability of inductive
inference
12. Why do I say that all inductive inference presupposes a
uniformity principle? Consider the following forms of
inductive inference:
All observed A's are B's n/m observed A's are B's
All A's are B's n/m A's are B's
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The first form of inductive inference is simply a special
case of the second with m = n. Now, how can we provide a
general justification for inferences of the second sort? To
justify such inferences inductively, that is, by inferences
of the same sort, would be circular. But to justify them
deductively would (given that not all A's have been
observed) require the premise that the distribution of
unobserved A's that are B's is the same as the distribution
of observed A's that are B's, for variable A and B.* But
this is simply another way of stating the uniformity
principle. Thus such inferences require a uniformity
principle. This applies as well in the case of singular
inferences, that is, those inferences having conclusions of
the form "with probability n/m the next observed A will be a
B. "
13. For my discussion in section 5.3 I am indebted to Bruce
Aune, and Wesley Salmon. My discussion leans heavily on
similar discussions of probability vis-a-vis the problem of
induction found in Aune [1991] and Salmon [1967], though any
oversimplification or mistake in my text should be
attributed to my misunderstanding rather than to any fault
in their treatments of the issues.
14. Antony Flew presents the probabilistist ' s view of
reasoning from past experience as part of what it is to be
rational in Hume's Philosophy Of Belief . Flew states the
"principle of induction" as a rule for guiding our
expectations about the unobserved, and says that insofar as
all arguments from experience involve adherence to such a
rule, "...to follow it must be as paradigmatically




Trying to learn from experience, however, is
paradigmatically rational:
The man who stubbornly ignores all the lessons of
experience displays irrationality, just as much as if he
were perversely maintaining at one and the same time two
demonstrably inconsistent propositions (Flew [1961] , 80)
.
Though the details of particular treatments differ,
this app 'oach to the problem of induction basically consists
in an attempt to dissolve the problem by showing that it
rests on conceptual, semantic, or methodological confusion.
See, for example, P.F. Strawson's Introduction to Logical
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Ti^or* (Strawson [1952]), 248-63, andA.J. Ayer's Lanquaae
Truth
, and Logic (Ayer [1952]), 49-50 and 100-101.
—
15 • In Knowledge of the External World . Bruce Aune notes
that though Hume's account of probability is subjectivist in
that it identifies the probability of P for a person with
that person's actual degree of confidence or belief in P,
there are two senses in which Hume's account of probability
is objective. First, Hume thinks that observers exposed to
the same evidence for P will have approximately the same
degree of belief that P. Second, various observers can
compare notes , so to speak , and thereby move toward
agreement on P's probability. See Aune [1991], chapter III.
16.
Fogelin makes the point that though Hume is originally
interested in necessary connection as a candidate for
rationally justifying our causal inferences, following the
argument for inductive skepticism necessary connection no
longer bears the burden of justifying our causal inferences,
since nothing can bear that burden. Thus the argument for
inductive skepticism, Fogelin says, allows Hume to separate
the notions of causation and necessary connection. Fogelin
says that Hume does hold a regularity theory of causation,
and thus with the separation of the ideas of causation and
necessary connection Hume is able to give a non-circular
account of the idea of necessary connection using causal
notions. See Fogelin [1985], Chapter IV, 38-52.
17.
Hume's firm belief in the uniformity of nature and the
principle that as a matter of fact every event is caused, is
shown in, for example, "Of the probability of chances," T
I. III. XI, "Of Liberty and Necessity," E, VIII, and "Of
Miracles," E, X.
18.
In "Division of the subject" (T, 1. 1. II, 7-8) Hume draws
a distinction between two different types of impressions:
"impressions of sensation" and "impressions of reflection".
An impression of sensation "arises in the soul originally,
from unknown causes" (T, 7) . An impression of reflection
arises when ideas (which are, of course, copied from earlier
impressions) ccme to mind and give rise to new impression j
such as desires, fears, hopes, etc. Our minds make copies
of these impressions as well as of the impressions of
sensation, and so we get ideas of the various passions,
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desires, and emotions. Our ideas of impressions of
reflection represent our inner emotive states or sentiments.
According to Hume, the ultimate cause of sense
impressions is "perfectly inexplicable by human reason" (T,
I. III. IV, 84). It is impossible to decide with certainty
~
whether sense impressions arise from objects, the mind
itself, or even God, according to Hume. This impossibility
knowledge with regard to the causes of our impressions
show up later in the Treatise as the impossibility of
knowledge with regard to the existence of external objects
as the causes of our impressions. Hume's statement in T,
I. III. IV is made in a context that in no way suggests irony
or a mere preliminary suggestion to be rejected later on.
Hence I take it as prima facie evidence of Hume's
theoretical skepticism.
19.
See, for example J.A. Robinson's "Hume's Two Definitions
of 'Cause'", Thomas Richards's "Hume's Two Definitions of
Cause'", and Robinson's reply to Richards, "Hume's Two
Definitions of 'Cause' Reconsidered", all of which appear in
Hume (Chappell [1968]).
20.
For example, Norman Kemp-Smith, in The Philosophy of
David Hume (Smith [1964]), argues that Hume does not hold a
regularity theory. According to Kemp Smith, Hume's view is
that after we have observed a number of instances of the
sequence A, then B, we develop a habit of forming the idea
of an instance of B on experiencing an instance of A. The
operation of this habit produces a feeling of necessitation,
that is, we have an impression of expecting when we
experience an instance of A. This feeling is the impression
from which the idea of necessary connection is derived. This
feeling of necessitation is then projected onto the causally
related objects, leading us, Kemp Smith says, "...to affirm
the independent, and indeed universal, operation of causal
determination" (Smith [1964], 93). According to Kemp Smith,
necessary connection, though an element on the side of the
observer, is an essential element in the concept of
causation itself, for Hume. In Fogelin [1985] , Robert




For a clear statement and discussion of many of the
issues raised by Hume's definitions of causation, and the
competing interpretations that have been offered of those
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definitions, see chapter 5 of Don Garrett's Cogniti






HUME'S INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM RECONSIDERED:
INTERPRETATION
1
Hume's reputation as a skeptic has been based in large
part on those sections of the Treatise , Abstract , and
Enquiry in which he apparently presents an inductive
skepticism. I have thus far attributed an inductive
skepticism to Hume, and the attribution of inductive
skepticism is, of course, part of the traditional
interpretation of Hume. On this interpretation, according
to Hume our inductive inferences have no rational
justification whatsoever. So, for example, though my
experience has been that all observed As are Bs, the
conclusion that the next observed A will be a B has the same
degree of rational justification (that is, none) as does the
conclusion that the next observed A will be a non-B.
However, several scholars have rejected the traditional
interpretation of Hume as a proponent of inductive
skepticism as I have just stated it. One such scholar is
D.C. Stove. In this chapter, I will consider Stove's
alternative interpretation and I will argue that it is
inferior to the traditional interpretation.
2
i
In "Hume, Probability, and Induction," D.C. Stove
argues that contrary to the traditional interpretation, Hume
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did not disprove "inductive probabilism" . Inductive
probabilism, IP, is the thesis that there are inductive
arguments which, though not valid, are nevertheless such
that their premises probabilize their conclusions for any
rational person who knows those premises. Hume's refutation
^ ^- s ' according to Stove, "an entirely imaginary episode
in the history of philosophy" (Stove [1968], 189)
.
2
According to Stove, Hume has been mistakenly credited
with refuting IP in part because attention has not been paid
to Hume ' s use of "probable argument" and "demonstrative
argument." Stove says that when Hume characterizes an
argument as demonstrative, he does not mean simply that it
is deductively valid but rather that it is (i) deductively
valid and (ii) all of its premises are necessary truths (and
hence knowable a priori) . By "probable arguments" Hume
means "arguments from experience", that is, arguments which
(i) have contingent premises all of which are observational,
and (ii) are not deductively valid. Stove claims that "the
distinction between validity and invalidity is the only
distinction among 'degrees of evidence' that Hume takes
notice of..." (Stove, 198)
.
3
Stove holds that when Hume says that all arguments from
experience presuppose the Resemblance Thesis (that is, the
Uniformity Principle, UP) he has the following in mind:
. . .an argument "p, so c" presupposes that q if and only
if the argument is invalid as it stands, and it is
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necessary, in order to turn it jnto a valid argument, to add
q to its premises (Stove, 203)
.
So, according to Stove, Hume's claim that all probable
arguments presuppose that the future will resemble the past
is to be translated as: "All arguments from experience are
invalid as they stand, and in order to turn them into valid
arguments, it is necessary to add to their premises the
Resemblance Thesis" (Stove, 204)
.
Stove rejects the possibility that Hume means that
arguments from experience presuppose the Resemblance Thesis
as a rule of inference, because "...we have Hume's word for
it that what arguments from the impression to the idea
presuppose is a proposition..." (Stove, 201). I believe
that Stove's purpose in saying that for Hume arguments from
experience presuppose the Resemblance Thesis as a
proposition rather than as an inference rule is to preclude
interpretations on which the circularity Hume sees in




On the rule-circularity interpretation, Hume's argument
against probable support for the Resemblance Thesis would
not be that any argument from experience in support of the
Resemblance Thesis would contain that thesis itself as a
premise and would hence be circular. Rather, Hume's
argument would be that inductive arguments in support of
inductive inference themselves exhibit the very form of
inference the legitimacy of which is in question. On this
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interpretation, the UP would function as an inference rule
licensing inductive inferences. On the rule-circularity
interpretation, Hume does consider inductive support for
inductive inference but finds that such support would
involve rule circularity .
7
On this interpretation, even if
Hume does not disprove inductive probabilism, he at least
raises a serious philosophical problem for the proponent of
inductive probabilism. Stove denies that Hume raises any
problem for inductive probabilism, hence he does not accept
the rule-circularity interpretation.
As I said above, Stove’s object in stressing that Hume
says that arguments from experience presuppose the
Resemblance Thesis as a proposition is to rule out the rule-
circularity interpretation. How would the fact, if it is a
fact, that Hume thinks arguments from experience presuppose
the Resemblance Thesis as a proposition rule out the rule-
circularity interpretation? Though Stove doesn't make this
fully clear, I believe he may be reasoning in this way: When
we make an inference from premises to conclusion, we always
employ some inference rule. An inference rule, however, is
schematic or formal; while we may presuppose a particular
inference rule in drawing a certain inference, the rule
8
itself doesn't appear as a premise of our argument. Our
premises are propositions (sentences or statements, if you
prefer) . So to say that arguments from experience
presuppose the Resemblance Thesis as a proposition suggests
that it appears as a premise in such arguments. If this is
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so, then an argument from experience having the Resemblance
Thesis as its conclusion would be circular. So Hume's
referring to the UP as a proposition suggests that it is not
rule circularity but instead premise circularity that he has
in mind.
According to Stove, then, when Hume says that any
argument from experience for the Resemblance Thesis would be
circular, he does not mean any argument demonstrative (in
our sense) or probable (in the sense of IP) . A circular
argument could not be probable in the sense of IP, because a
circular argument has to be valid. So "any arguments from
experience" must mean "any valid arguments from experience."
Thus Hume's claim that any probable argument for the
Resemblance Thesis would be circular can be read as: "Any
valid arguments from experience for the resemblance thesis
must be circular," and given that arguments from experience
have observational premises, this may be further translated
as "The Resemblance Thesis is deducible only with
circularity from observational premises."
There is something confusing in what Stove says about
Hume. Stove says that Hume recognizes only one form of good
inference, valid deductive inference. Stove also says that
Hume recognizes two kinds of argument, demonstrative and
probable, probable arguments being non-valid arguments. But
when Stove considers Hume's skeptical argument (the argument
of T, I .III .VI , of A (651-652), and of E IV. II),
9
he
interprets Hume's consideration of the possibility of
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probable arguments in support of the UP as a search for
valid deductive arguments. So within the context of what is
usually recognized as Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism "probable argument" in effect means "valid
argument with contingent premises." So if Stove is correct,
that point in the Treatise both "demonstrative" and
"probable" characterize valid deductive arguments.
This is important because though Stove initially says
that the arguments Hume calls "probable" are inductive
arguments
, his reading of T, 1. 1 1 1.VI requires that when
Hume says the UP can be supported neither by demonstrative
arguments nor by probable arguments, by "probable argument"
Hume means "valid argument with contingent premises." But
why should Hume have switched the meaning of "probable
argument," as Stove's reading seems to require? Stove
doesn't tell us, yet his interpretation seems to depend on
Hume's having shifted the meaning of "probable argument."
A further problem is this: If, as Stove claims, Hume
divides arguments into demonstrative arguments, which are
valid and contain only necessary premises, and probable
arguments, which are non-valid and contain contingent
premises, then Hume leaves no room for valid deductive
arguments with contingent premises. Not only does that seem
implausible by itself, it conflicts with Stove's claim that
in the end Hume is considering the possibility of a valid
argument with contingent premises in support of the UP.
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3
Stove gives the following translation of Hume's
skeptical argument:
10
(1) Predictive inductive inferences are valid only if the
Resemblance Thesis is added to their premises.
1
But (2)
the Resemblance Thesis is a contingent statement, and so (3)
it is not deducible from necessarily true premises but (4)
it is deducible from observational premises if any. But -
from (1) and (4) - (5) The Resemblance Thesis is deducible
only with circularity from observational premises.
Therefore, - from (3) and (5) - (6) Predictive inductive
inferences are valid only if a premise is added to them
which is deducible neither from necessarily true premises
nor, without circularity, from observational ones. (Stove,
207)
According to Stove, then, there is no evidence for the
claim that Hume refuted IP. Further, there is independent
evidence that Hume did not even consider IP. For, (1) Hume
gives as a sufficient ground for denying that the inference
from "This is a flame" to "This is hot" is one that reason
leads us to make, the fact that it is intelligible to
suppose the premise true and the conclusion false, that is,
the fact that the inference is invalid. (2) Hume thinks it
is sufficient for establishing the unavailability of the
Resemblance Thesis for inductive arguments that it is not
without circularity deducible from premises of the type
appropriate to be evidence for it. (3) Hume intends (6) as
a criticism of predictive inductive inferences. But the
charge that such inferences presuppose the Resemblance
Thesis yet that thesis is unavailable is an effective
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criticism, Stove says, only if those inferences were
intended to be valid. For if an argument is intended to be
probable in the sense of IP it is not an effective criticism
to say that an unavailable statement is necessary to make it
valid (Stove, 208-10)
.
I believe that Stove is mistaken in his claim that Hume
did not consider probabilizing support for the Resemblance
Thesis. On Stove's view, a "probable argument" capable of
justifying the Resemblance Thesis would be circular because
any such argument would require the Resemblance Thesis as a
premise in order to be valid. Thus what Hume is really
considering is whether or not there could be a non-circular
valid argument with contingent premises for the Resemblance
Thesis. It is, however, unlikely that in the sections of the
Treatise and Abstract traditionally held to contain an
argument for inductive skepticism Hume employed the phrase
"probable argument" in the limited sense that Stove claims
he did. For:
(1) As Robert Fogelin points out, an essential
assumption of Hume's argument in "Of scepticism with regard
to reason," (T, I. IV. I) is that a set of premises can confer
a degree of probability between zero and one on a
12
conclusion. For in that section Hume argues that all
knowledge "degenerates" into probability as a result of
higher order evaluations of lower order judgments, and the
probability is "greater or less" according to various
factors. Hume's skeptical argument turns on the claim that
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higher order evaluations will gradually diminish the
probability of any first-order judgment. Hume says nothing
to suggest that he regards all of the first-order judgments
as conclusions of valid arguments. If Hume thought of all of
the first-order judgments as conclusions of valid arguments,
then the probability of those judgments, given their
premises, would be one, and this would remain true no matter
what other, higher-order judgments were added to the
premises. His argument thus presupposes that judgments can
be probabilized though not entailed by a set of premises.
This argument, moreover, comes long after the argument of
Treatise I. III. VI.
(2) As Fogelin also points out, Hume's explicit
discussions of probability in T, I. Ill, sections II-XIII are
clearly an attempt to explain, albeit in terms of
psychology, how premises can give less than conclusive
13
support to a conclusion. In "Of the probability of
chances" (T, I. I I I. XI), Hume says that "many arguments from
causation exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a
superior kind of evidence" (T, 124) . Now, Hume clearly
holds that causal arguments or inferences are not
demonstrative. The premises of such arguments are not
necessary truths, nor are their conclusions. So, given that
Hume takes the demonstrative argument/probable argument
distinction to be exhaustive, causal arguments are, for him,
probable arguments. Yet some of these arguments provide less
support for their conclusions than others do for theirs:
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By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from thecomparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which arederiv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which areentirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability,
that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty" ’ (T
,
X. III. XI, 124)
.
This suggests that Hume thinks that there are arguments
that in some sense probabilize their conclusions, for if
there is a class of arguments from experience some of which
render their conclusions free from doubt and some of which
provide less but still positive support for their
conclusions, then there are arguments that (at least in a
psychological sense) probabilize their conclusions. Now, if
all of these arguments were valid, then the probability of
their conclusions, given their premises, would be one. They
would all be on a par, which Hume says is not the case. So
it seems that Hume recognizes non-valid arguments that
probabilize their conclusions.
Of course, in T, I. I II. XI Hume speaks of causal
arguments, that is, "proofs", which are free from doubt. I
take it that he means that the conclusions are free from
doubt for a person given his belief in the premises. But
not all causal arguments are free from doubt in this way, as
Hume’s discussion in the very next section, "Of the
probability of causes," shows. So, soma causal arguments
provide a degree of support for their conclusions without
rendering their conclusions free from doubt. Again, this
suggests that Hume recognizes non-valid arguments that
probabilize their conclusions.
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I should note, however, that when I say that the
demonstrative argument/probable argument distinction is
exhaustive for Hume I do not mean that Hume recognizes only
valid arguments with necessary premises and inductive
arguments with contingent premises. The class of arguments
that Hume refers to as ’’probable" includes both valid
arguments with contingent premises and non-valid inductive
arguments with contingent premises. Of course, even valid
probable arguments that go beyond reports of the current
data of consciousness or reports of memory will involve,
according to Hume, causal inference, and so such arguments
will themselves be based on inductive inference.
Why do I say that Hume uses "probable argument" to
refer to both valid arguments with contingent premises and
inductive arguments proper? One reason is that, as I argue
in the next section of this chapter, Hume himself recognizes
and employs non-deductive argument throughout the Treatise .
Another reason is that in T, 1. 1 1 1. VI I, Hume says that
. . .we may exert our reason without employing more than
two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve
as a medium betwixt them (T, 97)
.
This suggests that our causal inferences are not made
deductively, via some third "idea" of nature's uniformity.
Yet another reason is that in discussing the "reason of
animals" (T, I. I I I. XVI), Hume says that animal causal
reasoning "is not in itself different, nor founded on
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different principles, from that which appears in human
nature” (T, 177). Yet animals, though they clearly engage in
causal inference, "...can never by any arguments form a
general conclusion, that those objects, of which they have
had no experience, resemble those of which they have" (T,
177). So animals, in inferring that a present object or
event will be followed by a certain other object or event,
do not reason deductively according to a uniformity
principle. Nor, then, do humans, whose causal reasoning is
"not in itself different."
Now, there are two obvious objections to the claim that
Hume recognizes non-valid probabilizing arguments because he
recognizes arguments that differ with regard to the degree
of certainty with which a person who believes the premises
will believe the conclusion. The first objection is this:
The distinction Hume draws is psychological or
epistemological but the distinction between validity and
invalidity is formal. The fact that Hume recognizes
arguments that differ with regard to certainty doesn't show
that he recognizes arguments that differ with regard to
validity. Even if Hume recognizes only deductive arguments
and hence thinks that any acceptable causal argument must be
valid, he might nevertheless hold that certain deductive
arguments, despite their formal validity, are such that
people who believe in their premises don't feel certain
about their conclusions. But why would Hume think that valid
arguments differ in this psychological way? He doesn't
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suggest this anywhere. Of course, if you start out with
Stove's view that Hume is a deductivist, you'll have to
interpret his distinction between proofs and probabilities
as a distinction between arguments that share the formal
property of validity. But if you don't start out with the
view that Hume is a deductivist, the supposition that Hume
thinks valid arguments differ with regard to the degree of
certainty with which a person who believes the premises
believes the conclusion seems to require some argument. I
do not know that there is no good argument, based on Hume's
texts, for this supposition. But I am not aware of any
textual support for this supposition.
Why would Hume think that proofs, arguments based on
invariable experience, differ in certainty from
probabilities, arguments based on variable experience, if he
considered both of these kinds of arguments deductive?
Consider
:
(i) m/n observed As have been Bs
(ii) UP
(iii) With probability m/n the next observed A will be a B
Let's suppose premise (ii) is some statement of the UP that
would render the above argument valid. Now, the difference
between proofs and probabilities is that in proofs m=n but
in probabilities n > m. But note that the probability of
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the next observed A being a B as stated in the conclusion
varies with the proportion of m to n. The conclusion
itself, the entire statement "With probability m/n..." is in
both cases entailed by the premises and, it seems, would be
believed by any rational person who believes the premises
with the same degree of belief no matter what A, B, m, and n
are
.
The epistemic difference between a proof and a
probability, however, is the strength with which the
statement "the next observed A will be a B" is believed by a
person who believes the premises. The objective difference
between them is captured in the premises: in one case the
major premise states that all observed As have been Bs
,
in
the other case it states only that some observed As have
been Bs . So, why would Hume think that what is basically a
difference in quantification in the premises have such
profound epistemic implications unless he considers proofs
and probabilities inductive arguments?
The second objection to the claim that Hume recognizes
non-valid probabilizing arguments because he recognizes
arguments that differ with regard to the degree of certainty
with which a person who believes the premises will believe
the conclusion is this: I am arguing that Hume is open to
the possibility of non-valid arguments the premises of which
objectively probabilize their conclusions. Yet the fact
that Hume recognizes psychological or epistemic differences
among arguments from experience doesn't show that he is open
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to objective differences among them even if he considers
those arguments inductive." One answer to this objection
is that Hume does say that there is one non-psychological
,
objective difference between proofs and probabilities.
Proofs are based on experience of invariable conjunction,
probabilities on experience of variable conjunction.
15
At
any rate, my main reasons for thinking that Hume is open to
the possibility of inductive arguments that objectively
probabilize their conclusions are stated in section 4 and so
I will defer discussion of this point until then.
4
How does my reply to Stove in the last section - a
reply involving the claims that Hume is not a deductivist
and that he does consider probabilizing support for the
Resemblance Thesis - fit with Hume's inductive skepticism?
Didn't I characterize Hume's inductive skepticism as the
view that our inductive inferences have no rational
justification whatsoever? But if that is so, they are all
on a par; all of our inductive inferences are recognized by
Hume as equally bad and so it would seem that he doesn't
really consider probabilizing, that is, inductive, support
for the Resemblance Thesis.
The claim that Hume considers inductive or
probabilizing support for the Resemblance Thesis is
compatible with the claim that Hume holds inductive
skepticism as I have characterized it. To show how these
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claims are compatible I must draw a distinction between
arguments that probabilize their conclusions in the sense
that if we believe in their premises we in fact have a
degree of confidence in their conclusions and arguments that
probabilize their conclusions in the sense that given the
truth of their premises their conclusions are objectively
probable. The first is a matter of human psychology. The
second is a matter of logic. In the second sense, belief in
the premises of a probabilizing argument rationally
justifies (a degree of) belief in the conclusion .
16
It seems clear that Hume recognizes both the
possibility and the actuality of probabilizing arguments of
the first sort. In T, I. Ill, sections XI-XIII, Hume
discusses inductive arguments that probabilize their
conclusions, and these considerations take place after his
skeptical argument occurs. But, of course, the
considerations adduced in the argument for inductive
skepticism show that there is not really a possibility of
inductive arguments that are probabilizing arguments of the
second, justificatory, sort, because the UP, which is
necessary in order to justify our inductive inferences,
cannot be supported by any form of argument.
Still, if we keep in mind the distinction between
theoretical and prescriptive skepticism, it is not
surprising that Hume should discuss our ordinary inferential
procedures (procedures which in fact we can't avoid
following, according to Hume) and draw distinctions between
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various levels of evidence, in contexts in which he isn't
raising questions of the ultimate justification of those
procedures but rather engaging in psychological explanation.
I believe, however, that Hume is initially open to the
possibility of probabilizing arguments of the second sort.
With the skeptical argument of T, I. III.VI it becomes clear
that there are no probabilizing arguments of this second
sort. So, in the later sections, Hume is discussing
probabilizing arguments of the first, psychological sort, as
the text shows. The discussion in T, I. Ill, sections XI-
XIII is clearly an attempt to explain in terms of psychology
how evidence leads us to have a degree of confidence in a
conclusion drawn from but not entailed by that evidence.
But that doesn ' t show that Hume didn ' t entertain the
possibility of probabilizing arguments of the second,
justificatory, sort, earlier on. I believe that Hume is
initially open to the possibility of a probabilizing
argument for the Resemblance Thesis, though his skeptical
considerations show that there can be no such argument.
Why do I believe that Hume is, prior to the end of his
skeptical argument in T, I. III. VI, open to the possibility
of probabilizing arguments of the second sort, and hence
open to the possibility of such an argument in support of
the UP? First, because of Hume's general method. Throughout
Book I of the Treatise Hume follows a pattern of first
considering the justification for a belief or practice and
then, having shown that a belief or practice is not
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rationally justified, giving a psychological explanation of
why we hold that belief or engage in that practice. Hume's
later psychological consideration of non-deductive
probabilizing arguments would fit this pattern only if he
had first considered these arguments from the standpoint of
justification, that is, only if he had earlier considered
the possibility of non-deductive arguments that probabilize
a conclusion in the second, justificatory sense.
My second reason for believing that Hume is initially
open to the possibility of justificatory probabilizing
arguments for the UP is that Hume himself recognizes and
employs non-deductive argument throughout the Treatise . For
example, in "Of the origin of our ideas" (T, I. I. I) Hume
argues for the "Copy Principle" - the principle that all of
our simple ideas are derived from and correspond to simple
impressions which they represent. In arguing to this
conclusion Hume infers from his experience of the constant
conjunction of his own simple ideas and impressions that
"the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon
that of the other," that is, that they are causally
connected (T, 4) . He then offers two arguments to show that
it is the impressions which cause the ideas, not vice versa.
Hume's argument for the causal dependence of ideas on
impressions which they represent cannot be composed of only
valid inferences. For even if, given Hume's later analysis
of causation, it is analytically true for Hume that
constantly conjoined objects are causally connected and that
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when two kinds of objects are constantly conjoined the prior
object is the cause of the latter, Hume produces a
counterexample to his own generalization, the "color-shade”
counterexample. This counterexample suggests that it is
not the case that all simple ideas are preceded by
resembling impressions. Yet Hume lightheartedly dismisses
this counterexample with the observation that "...the
instance is so particular and singular, that ' tis scarce
worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we
should alter our general maxim" (T, 6) .
If Hume thinks the premises of his argument for the
causal dependence of all ideas on prior impressions are true
and he thinks the inference from those premises is valid,
how can he possibly admit a counter-example? I believe that
Hume is so cavalier about the color-shade counterexample
because he is interested in and is employing inductive
inference, drawing those conclusions he regards as best




Hume's general recognition and use of probabilizing




All of our reasonings concerning matter of fact are
founded on a species of Analogy, which leads us to expect
from any cause the same events, which we have observed to
result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely
similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn
from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive .... But where
the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is
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' and thS inference is less conclusive; thoughstill it has some force, in proportion to the degree ofsimilarity and resemblance (E, ix, 104).
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Hume's claim that in the case of a "less perfect"
analogy our inference is such that still some weight is
given to the conclusion shows that he recognizes matter of
fact reasoning that involves probabilizing support for a
claim. Moreover, even in the case of "perfect" analogy, our
inferences are, of course, probabilizing, for analogical
inference is inductive, not deductive. This is so despite
the fact that the conclusion may be "regarded as certain and
conclusive.
"
Hume's commitment to analogical reasoning is not
limited to a general recognition of the analogical character
of causal reasoning. For Hume goes on to suggest that his
own theory of "the operations of the understanding" acquires
additional confirmation from the fact that it serves to
explain the same phenomena in both men and nonhuman animals.
Nonhuman animals, Hume says, infer effects from causes, but
clearly they do not do so on the basis of "reasoning and
argumentation." So, according to Hume,
Nature must have provided some other principle, of more
ready, and more general use and application; nor can an
operation of such immense consequence in life, as that of
inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain
process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful
with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with
regard to the brute creation; ,and the conclusion being once
firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption
,
from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be
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IX^^IO^
11^ admitted ' without any exception or reserve (E,
Of course, given the distinctions between theoretical
and practical skepticism and between the two sorts of
probabilizing arguments, one might say that Hume is
throughout the Treatise and the first Enquiry employing a
form of inference the character of which he never considers
an issue. Yet this seems implausible, given Hume's concern
with justification and method.
Hume's concern with method is made clear even in the
Introduction to the Treatise , where he says that in order to
make progress in the sciences "the tedious lingering method"
of piecemeal investigation previously followed must be
abandoned in favor of an investigation into "human nature
itself" (T, xvi) . He goes on to say that "the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid
on experience and observation" (T, xvi) . Hume's concern
with method is also clear in his adherence to the general
empiricist maxim that all ideas are copied from prior
impressions. This maxim guides Hume's philosophical
investigations throughout the Treatise , which is, of course,
subtitled "Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental
Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects," and throughout the
first Enquiry .
Hume's concern with justification is also evident
throughout the Treatise. Hume's Part III search for the
source of the idea of necessary connection is motivated not
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simply by the desire to carry out the "mental geography-
described in the first Enquiry
, but in large part by a
concern with the foundation of causal inference, for only
the causal relation "informs us of existences and objects,
which we do not see or feel" (T, 74)
.
Further evidence of Hume's concern with justification
is the fact that according to Hume himself one of the main
reasons for his despair, in T, I.IV.Vll, is that even after
"the most accurate and exact" reasoning, he "can give no
reason" for assenting to a conclusion, but simply feels a
strong propensity to do so <T, 265) . Why should this worry
Hume if he is not concerned with the justification for his
conclusions?
Finally, as James Noxon points out, Hume recognizes
that likelihood of truth is not simply a matter of degree of
confidence. For Hume recognizes that a high degree of
confidence often attaches to beliefs based on, for example
indoctrination or superstition, though, as Noxon correctly
says, his "...pejorative language makes it abundantly clear
that he gives no credence to these beliefs" (Noxon [1973]
,
164) .
My third reason for believing that Hume is initially
open to the possibility of justificatory probabilizing
arguments for the UP is that Hume's despair, at the close of
Book I, is a result of his having come to realize the lack
of justification for his own beliefs and procedures. Why
should he be reduced to despair by such a realization if
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from the beginning he has engaged in an inferential practice
the justification of which he never even considers a live
issue? It seems more plausible to suppose that along the way
the question of the justification of inductive inference was
raised and answered in the negative. And the place where
Hume seems most likely to have raised and answered that
question is in the argument of T, I. III. VI.
My fourth reason for believing that Hume is initially
open to the possibility of justificatory probabilizing
arguments for the UP is closely related to my second. It
seems clear that Hume recognizes, at least in some parts of
the Treatise , the possibility of arguments in which the
premises provide support but not conclusive support for the
conclusion. Stove initially says that such arguments are
those Hume refers to as probable. But since according to
Stove Hume limits contenders for supporting the UP to valid
arguments, the "probable" arguments Hume considers in T,
I. III. VI are actually valid arguments. Again, why would
Hume suddenly use "probable argument" in a very different
sense in T, 1. 1 1 1. VI, as Stove’s view requires?
5
Still, if Hume thinks that the Resemblance Thesis is
necessary to justify our empirical inferences, doesn't that
alone make Stove's point that Hume is a deductivist? Isn't
the Resemblance Thesis necessary precisely in order to make
those inferences valid? And isn't the Resemblance Thesis
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unavailable precisely because there can be no non-circular
deductive argument for it? The issue depends in part on
what Hume has in mind when he says that our probable
inferences presuppose the UP. If the only way one
proposition can presuppose another, for Hume, is that the
second is required to complete a set of premises that
deductively entail the first, then perhaps Stove is right.
But if Hume thinks that there can be no demonstrative
argument for the UP and that any probable argument for the
UP must involve inductive inference and that such inference
presupposes the UP in the sense that only our belief in the
UP gives us some reason to accept the conclusions of such
i n^erences, then his charge of circularity applies to
attempts to provide inductive arguments in support of the
UP.
Unfortunately, Hume doesn't tell us exactly what he
means when he says that all probable arguments "are founded
on" or "proceed upon" or "suppose, as their foundation" the
"supposition" that the future will resemble the past. Hume
isn't all that careful with regard to fine points of logic
and logical terminology. Still, I don't see why we should
accept that the only way the Resemblance Thesis can be
presupposed by our empirical inferences is that it is
necessary in order to render them valid. For Hume is
concerned with justification, and he often provides evidence
or justification for a claim which does not entail that
claim. His support for the principle that ideas are caused
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by resembling impressions is one example of this.
Further
, Hume says that the UP is presupposed by our
arguments from experience. It is notoriously difficult, if
not impossible, to render a statement of the UP which is
strong enough to render the kind of empirical inferences in
which Hume is interested valid without being obviously
_ .. 21
a se. It seems that Hume would have recognized that any
statement of the uniformity principle so strong that added
to the other premises of our empirical inferences it would
render a valid argument would be false and would in fact
have absurd results. This suggests that Hume thinks that
the UP is presupposed by our empirical inferences not in
order to render them valid, but in order to give us reason
to believe that their conclusions are likely to be true, and
hence in order to render our inductively derived beliefs
justified.
Stove thinks that when Hume says probable arguments
presuppose the UP he means that they require it as a premise
in order to be deductively valid. And this makes sense if
the only form of inference Hume recognizes is deductive
inference. But why couldn't Hume mean that probable
arguments require the UP in order even to probabilize their
conclusions? Hume isn't primarily concerned with deductive
logic but with justification, with providing reasons for a
conclusion, and my reason for believing P need not entail P.
Actually, Hume doesn't ever say that every probable
argument will have the UP as a premise. In the Treatise he
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says that probable arguments are "founded on the presumption
of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had
experience, and those, of which we have had none. . . (T,
I. III.VI, 90). He also asks, of course, what arguments "such
a proposition" itself may be founded upon (T, 89) . in the
Enquiry he says that probable arguments "proceed upon the
supposition that the future will be conformable to the past"
' IV . 1 1 , 35) . Hume talks more directly of our
presumptions and suppositions than of "propositions". But
in using arguments we presume or suppose the legitimacy of a
form of inference insofar as our arguments embody that form
or have premises derived from an argument that embodies that
form. We also presuppose whatever principle/s underwrite
our use of that form of inference. This does not, of
course, mean that rules of inference or principles in
support of them appear as premises in our arguments nor does
it mean that their inclusion in the set of premises of an
otherwise invalid argument would yield a valid one.
For the sake of clarity, let me distinguish valid
arguments with contingent premises from inductive or non-
valid arguments with contingent premises. I'll call
arguments of the first kind V-probable. I'll call arguments
of the second kind I -probable. I -probable arguments are
simply the kind of inductive arguments Hume is traditionally
thought to be concerned with. Of course, since Hume is
considering our justification for the UP, in what follows I
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am speaking only of justificatory arguments, whether I-
probable or V-probable.
I have suggested that Hume is open to the possibility
of I -probable arguments for the UP. But with the argument
of T, I. III. VI it becomes clear that there can be no I-
probable argument for the UP. Why? I-Probable arguments
presuppose the UP in the sense that the UP is what justifies
our belief that the conclusions of such arguments are likely
to be true. So our justification for accepting the
conclusion of an I -probable argument for the UP is that we
already believe the UP. So any attempt to construct an I-
probable argument in support of the UP must fail precisely
because it presupposes the UP and is hence a circular
deductive argument. [Note that it is not a demonstrative
argument, for the UP isn't a necessary truth.] Importantly,
this does not require that I attempt to deduce the UP but
only that I attempt to support it to some degree. So, then,
we cannot have a demonstrative argument for the UP because
it is not a necessary truth. We can't have a V-probable
argument for the UP because any such argument would be
circular. But any attempt to construct an I-probable, that
is, inductive argument for the UP must fail, for the attempt
will yield a circular deductive argument - a circular V-
probable argument. So Hume's conclusion, that we cannot
support the UP by any argument at all, still stands.
In a sense Stove is correct. Any purported I-probable
argument which supports the UP will be circular and hence
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deductively valid. If you attempt to support P and you
assume P, then you have a valid argument for P, since P
can't be true as a premise and false as a conclusion. So a
circular argument can't be I -probable. But this does not
show that Hume didn't initially consider the possibility of
I -probable, that is, inductive arguments for the UP. It is
just that any attempt to construct such an argument will
fail precisely because it will yield a valid, that is, non-
probable argument. Of course, Hume's assumption that all I-
probable arguments presuppose the UP is essential here.
The fact that an I -probable argument in support of the
UP would be circular and hence valid and hence not I-
probable at all does not mean that in ordinary I -probable
arguments our presupposition of the UP yields a valid
argument, merely that it gives us some reason for accepting
the conclusions of inductive inferences. Further, though in
our ordinary inductive arguments we use inference rules that
we accept on the basis of the UP, nevertheless neither the




Even if Stove were right that from the outset the only
arguments Hume considers as contenders for supporting the UP
are valid arguments, it would not follow that Hume has in
mind only one form of inference, deductive inference.
Suppose, with Stove, that (having rejected demonstrative
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support for the UP) what Hume is looking for to support the
UP is a deductive argument with contingent premises and
conclusion. If so, a probable argument in support of the UP
would have the following basic form:
PI . . . Pn
UP
} Contingent Premises Based on Experience
}Pl...Pn Entail UP
}
This would, of course, be the kind of argument I've
been referring to as a "V-probable argument." Consider a V-
probable argument with premises Pl...Pn having the UP as its
conclusion, call it A1 . Now, if PI. . .Pn of A1 are to
support the UP, they have to go beyond the present testimony
of the senses and memory. For the UP could not be entailed
merely by reports of what I am now perceiving directly or
remember to have perceived directly, because the UP makes a
claim about future experience. So at least one of Pl...Pn
will be based in part on inductive inference. But inductive
inference presupposes the uniformity principle. Thus A1
will be circular in the sense that the argument itself will
establish the UP only by using a premise that presupposes
it. So the circularity Hume sees in attempts to support the
UP by V-probable arguments may very well have to do with the
way the premises of such arguments are established. In
other words, the circularity Hume is pointing to may be a
result of the kinds of inferences that are used to establish
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the premises even of V-probable arguments and what those
inferences presuppose.
The strongest argument from experience we could have
for the UP would be one with contingent premises (since ex
hypothesi it is based on experience) that is deductively
valid and has the UP for its conclusion. So one could say
that Hume is just giving the supporter of the rationality of
UP the benefit of the doubt by allowing him a valid
deductive argument. But of course, any such experience-
based argument would have premises inferred inductively and
so presuppose the UP.
23
Consider A1 . At least one premise of A1 is contingent
and does more than report the present testimony of sense and
memory. Call this premise P/Al . Now, P/Al is either the
conclusion of an inductive inference or is the conclusion of
a V-probable argument (that is, a probable argument in
Stove's sense of "probable").
24
If P/Al is the conclusion
of an inductive inference, then Hume's circularity charge
applies because such inferences presuppose the UP. But if
P/Al is the conclusion of a V-probable argument (that is, is
entailed by a set of contingent premises) then that
argument, call it A2, will have premises each of which is
either a report of present testimony of sense and memory or
the conclusion of an inductive argument or the conclusion of
a V-probable argument. The premises of A2 cannot all be
merely reports of the present testimony of sense and memory,
for if so they could not entail any of Pl...Pn of A1 which
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go beyond such reports, and so could not entail P/Al. So at
least one of the premises of A2 is either the conclusion of
an inductive argument or is the conclusion of a V-probable
argument. Call this premise P/A2.
25
If P/A2 is the
conclusion of an inductive argument then A2 presupposes the
UP and Hume's circularity charge applies. But if P/A2 is
the conclusion of a V-probable argument then the same set of
cases must be considered.
The point is that either the supporter of the
rationality of the UP engages in an infinite regress to
escape use of inductive inference and so reliance on the UP,
or at some point makes an inductive inference which
presupposes the UP. Thus, since presumably justification is
finitary, Hume's circularity charge makes sense and is
directed at attempts to provide inductive support for the
UP.
The form of inference in which Hume is most interested,
causal inference, is inductive. To suppose that Hume did
not have inductive inference in mind in his skeptical
argument is to suppose that he did not see or, if he did
see, did not think it important that at least one of the
premises of a valid but nondemonstrative argument
establishing the UP is going to be derived by inductive
inference (immediately or mediately) . I simply think it is
very unlikely that Hume would have failed to see that
inductive inference must play a role in establishing the
premises of such arguments or would have regarded that fact
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as unimportant. Hence even if Stove is right that Hume's
"probable" arguments in T, I. III. VI (insofar as they are
contenders for supporting the UP) are deductive, inductive
inference receives implicit consideration in his treatment
of those arguments, as I believe I have shown above. Of
course, in one sense it is true that Hume recognizes only
one form of good inference, deductive inference. For after
his criticism of attempts to justify the UP, on which
inductive inference is based, he does not, of course,
consider such inference rationally justifiable. Why should
he, given his argument? But this does not mean that he does
not have inductive inference in mind as a target of his
skeptical argument.
7
With regard to Stove's "independent" evidence that Hume
did not even consider IP: (1) According to Stove, Hume
gives as a sufficient ground for denying that the inference
from "This is a flame" to "This is hot" is one that reason
leads us to make, the fact that the inference is invalid.
In T, 1. 1 1 1. VI Hume considers the inference from "This is a
flame" to "This is hot" before he mentions the UP and its
role in such inferences. He uses this example to explicate
the claim that it is "...by EXPERIENCE only, that we can
infer the existence of one object from that of another" and
that the experience that gives rise to such inferences
involves constant conjunction (T, 87) . He says in the next
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us to make such
paragraph but one that if" reason determined
inferences "it wou'd proceed upon" the UP (T, 89). Then
comes the argument that the UP can be supported by neither
probable nor demonstrative arguments. Hume doesn't actually
say anything in T, I. III. VI about our supposing that "This
is a flame" is true while supposing that "This is hot" is
false. He certainly doesn't say anything about needing to
find a premise which together with "This is a flame" and
"All flames observed in the past have been hot" would entail
"This is hot."
(2) According to Stove, Hume thinks it is sufficient
for establishing the unavailability of the Resemblance
Thesis for inductive arguments that it is not without
circularity deducible from premises of the type appropriate
to be evidence for it. I don't see how this claim is
independent evidence for the claim that Hume "did not even
consider IP." For the claim that Hume thinks the UP is
unavailable merely because it is not deducible without
circularity from contingent premises is only true if Hume,
in T, I. III. VI, is looking only for valid arguments with the
UP as conclusion, which is Stove's main point. Further, as
I've argued above, even if Hume is explicitly considering
only valid arguments for the UP, that doesn't show that he
doesn't have inductive inference in mind.
(3)
: According to Stove, Hume's charge that probable
inferences presuppose the Resemblance Thesis yet that thesis
is unavailable "is an effective criticism only if those
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inferences were intended to be valid." But that is not
true. If the UP is required in order to give us some reason
to believe that the conclusions of our inductive inferences
are likely to be true, then, if the UP is unavailable, we
don’t have reason to believe that the conclusions of our
inductive inferences are likely to be true. That, I take
it, is an effective criticism of our inductive inferences.
8
Barry Stroud has presented an interpretation of Hume’s
argument that captures Hume's concern with the justification
of our inductive inferences, is reasonably true to Hume's
text, and avoids attributing deductivism to Hume. In Hume
(Stroud [1977]), Chapter III, Stroud considers Hume's
argument for inductive skepticism. His analysis and
reconstruction of Hume's argument begins with the question
of what Hume means when he says that if our causal
inferences were based on reason we would be proceeding upon
the supposition that the uniformity principle, UP, is true.
Consider the statements:
(PE) All observed A's have been followed by B's.
(PI) An A is observed now.
So, (FE) A B will occur.
According to Stroud, it is clear that one thing Hume means
is this:
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. .one whose experience is correctly described bystatements of the form of PE and PI will not have reason tobelieve a statement of the form of FE unless he has reasonto believe the UP. (Stroud [1977], 55)
Why does Hume think inferences from the observed to the
unobserved are founded on the UP in the above sense? Stroud
rejects the suggestion that Hume's only reason for holding
that our inferences from the observed to the unobserved are
founded on the UP is that such inferences are invalid
without the UP. In other words, Stroud rejects the claim
that Hume is a deductivist. On the deductivist
interpretation, Hume assumes that I have reason to believe P
only if I have reason to believe some P* which entails P.
On this interpretation Hume's argument doesn't really have
any skeptical force since all he has established is that
...if no one is ever justified in believing a
proposition unless he is justified in believing something
that logically implies it, then no one is ever justified in
believing anything about the unobserved. (Stroud [1977], 56-
7)
On the deductivist interpretation, though Hume is correct in
holding that no statements about what has been observed ever
entail any statements about what hasn't, he's wrong to
assume that justifying reasons must be deductively
sufficient, for in fact they needn't be.
Stroud makes two general points against this
interpretation: First, it is unsympathetic in "...ascribing
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to Hume a quite arbitrary and unjustified assumption with no
explanation why he might have found it convincing." Second,
on this interpretation it is "...difficult to see why so
many able philosophers ... should have thought that [Hume’s]
argument
, if successful, would have just the skeptical
implications he claimed for it" (Stroud [ 1977 ] , 57)
Stroud sketches an alternative interpretation of Hume's
argument which does not attribute deductivism to Hume and
which, if successful, does support his skeptical conclusion.
The central point of this interpretation is the idea that a
reasonable or justified belief about the unobserved requires
past experience and the reasonable or justified belief that
one s past experience is a good reason to believe what one
does about the unobserved. But this latter belief, Hume's
argument shows, cannot itself be justified.
Stroud argues in this way: Given PE and PI (and my
belief that they are true) , my belief [B] in the conclusion
FE is justified only if I hold the following belief: [B]* -
PE and PI together are good reason for holding [B]
.
However, I must not simply hold [B]* but be justified in
holding it, I must have some good reason for holding [B]*.
So I must have some good reason for believing that PE and PI
are good reason for holding [B] . According to Stroud, this
potentially regressive aspect of the notion of reason or
justification may be what Hume has in mind. On this view, a
rational agent proceeds rationally at each step in the
process of belief formation:
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By concentrating on this aspect of reasonableness Hume
could find support for his claim that a reasonable belief in
something unobserved requires more than certain kinds of
past and present experiences. It requires as well that one
reasonably believe that what one has experienced is good
reason to believe what one does about the unobserved. And
then Hume's question, which he thinks leads to scepticism,
is how one can ever get a reasonable belief to that effect.
(Stroud [1977], 62)
Stroud points out that if Hume's question does lead to
skepticism it is not because he assumes that good reasons
must be deductively sufficient. Consider the premise:
(R) PE and PI are good reason to believe that a B will
occur
.
Adding the premise (R) to PE and PI still does not yield a
deductively valid argument to FE . So the skeptical force of
Hume's argument is not derived from his being a deductivist.
Stroud continues
:
In any case, it is plausible to argue that no one who
has observed a constant conjunction between As and Bs and is
presently observing an A will reasonably believe on that
basis that a B will occur unless he also reasonably believes
that what he has experienced is good reason to believe that
a B will occur. But, Hume asks, how could one ever come
reasonably to believe that? How is one to get a reasonable
belief that a past constant conjunction between As and Bs,
along with a presently observed A, is good reason to believe
that a B will occur? (Stroud [1977] , 63)
According to Stroud, Hume's skeptical argument is based
on the idea that no one can ever have reason to believe that
his past and present experience is good reason to believe
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something about the unobserved. In order to be justified in
holding a belief about the unobserved, I must be justified
in believing that past and present observations are good
reason for believing something about the unobserved. This
cannot be established by demonstrative reasoning. So it
must be established by probable reasoning, based on
observation. But believing that certain observations are
good reason to believe something about the unobserved is
itself a belief about the unobserved. Hence it can only be
established from observations if I am already justified in
believing that past and present observations are good reason
for believing something about the unobserved .
26
Where is the UP in all this? The UP is the candidate
for justifying [B]*/(R). Since the UP cannot be established
demonstratively, it must be established by observation. The
UP, however, concerns the unobserved, since it says
something about the future course of experience, so we can
only have good reason to believe the UP itself if we believe
that past and present observations are good reason for
believing something about the unobserved. But that is what
the UP was invoked to justify! Hence, we have circularity.
I believe that Stroud's reading of Hume's argument is
essentially the same as mine, though Stroud makes the role
of the notion of justification in Hume's argument more
explicit. So, not only are Stove's textual arguments
unconvincing, but there is a coherent reading of Hume's
argument that preserves its skeptical force without
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ascribing deductivism to Hume. This reading supports the
traditional interpretation of Hume as a theoretical skeptic.
For on this reading Hume shows that our ordinary inductive
practices, and so the matter-of-fact beliefs based on them,
are rationally unjustified, though he nevertheless employs
inductive inference himself.
9
According to Stove, from the beginning Hume recognizes
the possibility of only one form of good inference, valid
deductive inference. Hume is, according to Stove, a
deductivist. Thus Hume didn't produce an argument against
the possibility of arguments whose premises probabilize a
conclusion, for he doesn't even consider that as a
possibility. What Hume showed was that the Resemblance
Thesis is unavailable as a premise that will make
experience-based arguments valid. Since there can be no
non-circular deductive argument for the Resemblance Thesis,
it isn't available. In other words, on Stove's view Hume
argues that our inferences from experience are ultimately
unjustified because there can be no non-circular support for
the Resemblance Thesis, which is required to render them
valid. He doesn't argue against and in fact doesn't even
consider the possibility that there may be non-deductive but
probabilizing support for the Resemblance Thesis.
I have argued that Stove is mistaken in his
characterization of Hume as a deductivist and that Hume does
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consider probabilizing support for the Resemblance Thesis.
But even if one accepts Stove's claims about Hume's
skeptical argument he can nevertheless hold that Hume is a
theoretical skeptic with regard to our matter-of-fact
beliefs. For it is central to Stove's view that Hume thinks
all invalid inferences and hence all inductive inferences
are no good. If this is true, then the conclusions of
inductive inferences are not rationally justified by the
premises from which they are inferred, and since Hume thinks
that all of our beliefs about matters of fact that go beyond
the immediate data of sense and memory are based on causal
inference, a form of inductive inference, those beliefs are
not rationally justified. So, accepting Stove's view is
consistent with seeing Hume as a theoretical skeptic.
Stove's analysis is at odds with the traditional
interpretation only insofar as he says Hume never attempts
to refute IP; it is not inconsistent with the attribution to
Hume of a serious theoretical skepticism with regard to our
empirical beliefs and knowledge claims. Still, I believe
that consideration of Hume's texts doesn't support Stove's
analysis and that Hume does attempt to refute the view Stove
refers to as IP.
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Notes To Chapter III
1. In Hume (Chappell [1968]), 187-212.
2. All citations to Stove are to Stove [1968] unless
otherwise noted.
3.
Stove is not alone in claiming that the only distinction
Hume draws between acceptable arguments is between those
that are valid and those that are invalid. As David Owen
points out,
The characterization of the model of probable reasoning
that Hume was attacking [in what is traditionally recognized
as his argument for inductive skepticism] as a deductive
model has almost become orthodoxy, replacing the older view
that Hume's demonstrative/probable distinction is equivalent
to the deductive/inductive distinction (Owen [1995], 145),
For some examples of the almost orthodox view, see Flew
[1961], 80-2 and 85, and MacIntyre [1968], 244.
4
.
Throughout this dissertation I will refer to one and the
same principle as the "uniformity principle," the "principle
of uniformity" the "UP," and, in the present chapter, the
"resemblance thesis."
5.
Stove acknowledges that Hume does not himself use the
word "presuppose . " Rather , Hume uses a number of phrases to
describe the relationship between our empirical inferences
and the UP. Such inferences, Hume says, are "founded on the
presumption" of the UP, "proceed upon the supposition" of
the UP, "suppose, as their foundation" the UP, and so on. I
have adopted Stove's practice of using "presuppose" to
express what Hume has in mind in such phrases.
Nevertheless, I disagree with Stove's claim that Hume uses
"presuppose" in the deductivist sense Stove attributes to
him.
6.
For a clear discussion of rule circularity, see Wesley
Salmon's The Foundations of Scientific Inference (Salmon
[1967]), Chapter II, 12-17. What follows is a simplified
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example of rule circularity taken from a more detailed
example given by Salmon.
Consider the inductive inference rule R:
R: From "Most observed As have been B" infer "Probably, the
next observed A will be B."*
Now consider the following argument AR in support of R:
Most observed uses of R have been successful
.
Therefore, probably the next observed use of R will be
successful
.
Now, AR conforms to rule R. The conclusion of AR, however,
does not appear as a premise in the argument that
establishes it. So AR does not exhibit what can be called
"premise circularity." Nevertheless, the argument is
circular in that in conforming to R it employs the very
rule, R, whose reliability is presumably in question. Thus
the argument exhibits rule circularity.**
* For the sake of simplicity I have left out qualifications
that would be made in any seriously proposed inductive
inference rule, such as the requirement that the observed As
constitute a random sample.
** There is debate about just what does constitute the
supposed circularity. My purpose, however, is not to argue
that all inductive attempts to support induction must be
circular, nor am I arguing for a particular interpretation
of rule circularity.
7. Actually, the rule circularity version of the problem of
induction is more accurately described as a reconstruction
rather than an interpretation of Hume's argument. Hume
doesn't discuss inference rules per se, and I don't know of
any Hume scholar who thinks that Hume himself had rule
circularity in mind.
8. For the classic argument that every inference must
conform to some inference rule yet the inference rule can't
itself appear as a premise see Lewis Carroll's "What The
Tortoise Said to Achilles" (Copi and Gould [1972], 117-19).
The central point is that the demand that the inference rule
itself appear as a premise leads to an infinite regress.
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9.
Stove focuses mainly on the Abstract version of Hnmo'c
argument. “
10.
In Stove's statement of Hume's argument, to say that a
statement P is "from" a set of statements Sl...Sn is not to
say that P deductively follows from Sl...Sn, but only that
SI. . . Sn are offered by Hume as evidence for P.
11.
A predictive inductive inferences" is simply an
inference in which we infer from observed past conjunctions
to the occurrence of an object or event in the future.
12 • See Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature
(Fogelin [1985]), 155-6.
13.
See Fogelin [1985], 155.
14.
In order to be open to the possibility of non-valid
arguments that objectively probabilize their conclusions
Hume doesn't need to have an idea of just what formal
properties are essential to such arguments. One could see
that in fact certain arguments are such that people who
believe their premises have a degree of belief in their
conclusions (without being certain of them) and one might
think it an open question whether this fact depends on some
property of these arguments that makes their premises
objectively probabilize their conclusions, without having
any idea of what that property is. In fact, just how good
inductive arguments render their conclusions objectively
probable, that is, what objective properties such arguments
have (other than lack of validity) , is a matter of debate
and, it seems to me, a mystery.
15. Though I have stressed Hume's talk of probabilities as
evidence that he does consider probabilizing inductive
arguments, both the arguments Hume calls "proofs" and those
he calls "probabilities" are in fact inductive arguments
and, I believe, were recognized by Hume as inductive.
16. I think the following passage from Stove expresses the
justificatory sense of "probable argument":
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There exist arguments which, although not
valid. . .necessitate, for any rational being of limited
knowledge who knows their premises, belief, rather than
disbelief or the suspension of belief, in their conclusions-
which, nevertheless, a degree of assurance
attaches, less than that (maximal) degree which a valid
argument necessitates (Stove [1968] , 188) .
17.
See T, pages 5-6. Hume also presents the color-shade
counterexample in the first Enquiry (See E II, 20-1), and
this suggests that his admission of it in the Treatise is
not simply a slip on his part.
18.
Hume has been criticized on the grounds that he both
treats the Copy Principle as a contingent generalization and
uses it polemically to discount alleged counter-examples to
the principle itself, as if the Copy Principle were a
necessary truth. See, for example, Flew [1962], 25-6.
According to James Noxon in Hume's Philosophical Development
(Noxon [1973]), Hume's Copy Principle is neither an
empirical generalization nor an arbitrary definition but is
instead a prescriptive methodological principle (Noxon
[1973], 144). Noxon minimizes the polemical use Hume makes
of the principle, and on this point I think he goes too far.
But he also overlooks the fact that even if Hume's principle
is intended as a prescriptive methodological principle, Hume
explicitly supports it by reference to empirical evidence.
Hume, if not Noxon, seems to recognize that the Copy
Principle, even as a prescription, requires some support,
and the support he offers involves inductive argument. So
the point that Hume himself employs inductive arguments
still stands. For a defense of Hume's use of the Copy
Principle as an empirical generalization see chapter 2 of
Garrett [1997].
19.
Hume also shows his recognition and reliance on
analogical reasoning in the Treatise and in Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion . In Noxon [1973], 100-108, James
Noxon offers a clear and careful treatment of Hume's views
on analogical reasoning. Noxon offers various examples of
Hume's use of analogical reasoning and writes,
Although no formal presentation of the logic of analogy




alo9Y ln the Treatise
, in the first Enquiry, andn the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. All of theseentries reaffirm the simple principles of analogical
inference formulated in Newton's first three Rules ofReasoning in Philosophy (Noxon [1973] , 102)
.
20.
Noxon writes, "Evidently Hume did not suppose that
strength of conviction was an index to the probable truth ofa belief" (Noxon [1973], 164). Hume's recognition of the
distinction between degree of confidence with which a
proposition is believed and the likelihood that the
proposition believed is true fits Noxon ' s reading of Hume, areading according to which, contrary to the claims of many
Hume commentators, Hume came to recognize, at least in
practice, the distinction between philosophical and
psychological issues, between describing/explaining the
genesis of a belief and judging its epistemic status.
21.
In Hume (Stroud [1977]), Barry Stroud points out that it
would be absurd to suggest that in our empirical inferences
we are committed to the principle that the future will be
exactly like the past in all respects or that every





I have said that in our ordinary use of arguments the
inference rules we employ and the principles that underwrite
them do not appear as premises of the argument. But in the
case of attempts to support the UP by I -probable arguments
it is relevant that the UP itself justifies our acceptance
of such arguments. The point is that in this case
circularity is evident when the reasoning by which we're
attempting to justify the UP is made explicit. So, though I
don't accept the rule-circularity interpretation of Hume's
argument against the possibility of probabilizing support
for the UP, that is, I don't believe the UP itself functions
as an inference rule, I also don't accept Stove's
interpretation, on which the UP is added as a premise to our
causal inferences. Rather, in terms of inference rules, the
UP is a principle that we presuppose in using inductive
inference rules in the sense that our belief in the UP is
itself what justifies our acceptance of such rules.
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23.
Actually, any such argument needn't have premises
themselves inferred inductively but will either have
premises inferred inductively or will have premises such




P/Al cannot be the conclusion of a demonstrative
inference because it is contingent. But it must be the
conclusion of some inference if it is contingent, rationally
justified and goes beyond reporting the present testimony of
sense and memory. It is important that we're supposing
justification of whatever premises are involved in
supporting the UP, otherwise the case argument doesn't work.
25.




Since having observed a constant conjunction between As
and Bs and being presently confronted with an A does not
logically imply that one has reason to believe that a B will
occur, any support for that conclusion must consist of a
reasonable inference from observed instances to the truth of
observed instances provide good reason to believe that a B
will occur'. But every inference from the observed to the
unobserved is such that it is reasonable or justified only
if one has reason to believe that observed instances provide
reason to believe a certain statement about unobserved
instances. And therefore in particular the inference from
observed instances to the conclusion 'observed instances
provide reason to believe that a B will occur' is
reasonable or justified only if one has reason to believe
that observed instances provide reason to believe a certain
conclusion about unobserved instances. But... that would be
'evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted,
which is the very point in question' (E, p.36). So no one
could ever have any reason to believe that observed
instances provide reason to believe that a B will occur. And
since that in turn was seen to be a necessary condition of
having a reasonable belief about the unobserved, it follows
that no one ever has a reasonable belief about the




Suppose I infSr ^ fr°m PE and PI • 1 need to believehat PE and PI are good reason to believe FE. I also needreason to believe that PE and PI are good reason to believeFE. But why do I need to have good reason to believe ingenerai that past and present experiences are good reason tohold beliefs about the unobserved? Why can't I simply have ajustified belief about this one case? In other words,
granted that a reasonable belief in the UP would be
sufficient for justifying my belief that PE and PI are goodreason for believing FE , why is it a necessary condition?
Well, suppose I believe FE on the basis of PE and PI
and I also believe that PE and PI are good reason for
holding FE . How can I justify this particular inference’
Let's say I justify this particular inference with a
restricted uniformity principle, UP*: The future will
resemble the past with respect to A's and B's. How can I
justify belief in UP*? I can't justify it demonstratively,
for no contradiction is implied by the proposition that the
future will not resemble the past with respect to As and Bs
.
So if it is to be justified it must be justified by probable
inference, on the basis of past and present experience of As
and Bs. But past and present experience of As and Bs can
justify my belief in UP* (or anything about future As and
Bs) only if I have reason to believe that the future will
resemble the past with respect to As and Bs, or in other
words, only if I already have reason to believe the UP*.
This argument, however, will apply to any particular
inference from the observed to the unobserved (including of
course, inferences from past and present experience to the
future) . Since no particular inference from the observed to
the unobserved can be justified, we get the general result





HUME'S INDUCTIVE SKEPTICISM DENIED: THE BEAUCHAMP AND
ROSENBERG INTERPRETATION AND THE GARRETT INTERPRETATION
1
I believe, as I argued in chapter III, that D.C. Stove
is mistaken in denying that Hume presents the argument for
inductive skepticism traditionally attributed to him. To
some extent, however, this issue is secondary to my main
project of arguing for the thesis that Hume is a serious
theoretical skeptic. Stove himself admits that Hume is in
fact a skeptic regarding our beliefs concerning contingent
matters of fact. So, Stove's particular interpretation of
what is usually taken to be Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism, though at odds with the traditional
interpretation of Hume that I in part accept, is not
directly a threat to my main thesis.
There are other interpretations of what is
traditionally taken to be Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism that are a direct threat to my thesis. One of
these is the interpretation that Tom L. Beauchamp and
Alexander Rosenberg present in their book Hume And The
Problem Of Causation . According to this interpretation, Hume
"...is not a sceptic concerning inductive inference and the
claims of reason generally" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg [1981],
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"Hume ' s
33). Rather, according to Beauchamp and Rosenberg,
only major complaint" about causal reasoning or inductive
inference generally "...is that rationalists have
misunderstood the nature of causation and inductive
inference" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 33)
.
Beauchamp and Rosenberg state the outline of their
interpretation as follows:
Hume is sceptical about rationalist claims concerning
the power and scope of causal reasoning, but not sceptical
about causal reasoning itself.... In those passages commonly
said to exhibit scepticism about induction, Hume's
intentions have been misinterpreted. He is concerned to show
that inductive reasoning can provide neither self-evident
certainty nor the logical necessity that uniquely
characterizes demonstrative reasoning (a priori reasoning)
,
and also that demonstrative reasoning cannot prove matters
of fact by its own resources alone. Thus, the problem of
induction, as that problem is conceived today, is simply not
to be found in Hume's philosophy" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg,
36-7) .
2
According to Beauchamp and Rosenberg, the traditional
interpretation, according to which Hume is an inductive
skeptic, is based on one or both of the following
reconstructions of Hume's arguments:
Argument I
(1) All factual beliefs are based solely on instinct and
not on justifying reasons.
(2) If all factual beliefs are based solely on instinct
and not on justifying reasons, then all factual beliefs are
irrational
.
So, (Ci) All factual beliefs are irrational.
(4) All inductively derived beliefs form a subset of the
set of factual beliefs.
(5) If all factual beliefs are irrational and all
inductively derived beliefs form a subset of the set of
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factual beliefs
, then no inductive conclusion can berationally justified.
So, (C 2 ) No inductive conclusion can be rationallv
justified.
Argument II
(1) The entire institution of inductive reasoning cannotbe rationally justified.
(2) If the entire institution of inductive reasoning
cannot be rationally justified, then no inductive conclusion
can be rationally justified.
So, (C) No inductive conclusion can be rationally justified.
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 39)
Arguments I and II share the conclusion that no
inductive conclusion (that is, no conclusion which is
derived through inductive inference) can be rationally
justified, and according to Beauchamp and Rosenberg the
weakness of each of I and II as an interpretation of Hume
lies in its first premise. Hume holds, that is to say,
neither that all factual beliefs are based solely on
instinct and not on justifying reasons, nor that the entire
institution of inductive reasoning cannot be rationally
justified. And in attributing these premises to Hume the
traditional view mistakenly presupposes that Hume's
treatment of inductive reasoning is a demand for a general
justification of inductive reasoning, that is, that it calls
into question "the whole institution of inductive procedures
and standards" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 39-40)
.
Beauchamp and Rosenberg refer to the problem of
justifying the whole enterprise of inductive reasoning as
the "external problem". The external problem is to be
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distinguished from "internal problems", that is, demands for
justifications of particular inductive inferences made
within a context where the rational justification of
inductive reasoning in general is assumed. According to
Beauchamp and Rosenberg
,
...Hume expressly advocates standards for the
resolution of internal problems. He quite clearly believes
some inductive conclusions rational and others irrational as
assessed by a set of appropriate inductive
standards. . . . (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 40)
.
Beauchamp and Rosenberg say that if in fact the
traditional view of Hume's position on the external question
were correct - that if he in fact holds either premise (1)
of Argument I or premise (1) of Argument II - he would
undermine his own inductive methods and would thereby be
inconsistent. Thus the main burden of their argument is to
show that neither the claim that all factual beliefs are
based solely on instinct and not on justifying reasons
(premise (1) of Argument I) nor the claim that the entire
institution of inductive reasoning cannot be rationally
justified (premise (1) of Argument II) should be attributed
to Hume. This will be to show in effect that Hume simply
does not raise the external problem he has traditionally
been held to raise.
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3
Beauchamp and Rosenberg first address Argument II.
According to Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume cannot be held to
have asserted that the entire institution of inductive
reasoning cannot be rationally justified. For it was simply
never Hume's intention "...to question the entire
institution of inductive procedures and standards"
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 41) . In fact, say Beauchamp and
Rosenberg
,
His argument is a frontal attack on rationalist
assumptions that at least some inductive arguments are
demonstrative; it is not a demand for a wholesale
justification of induction and a fortiori not a sceptical
assault on induction (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 41)
.
According to Beauchamp and Rosenberg, commentators have
been misled into thinking that Hume holds that no inductive
inference can be rationally justified in part because they
have misunderstood Hume's use of "reason" and "rational
justification". In fact, they say, in what appears to be his
attack on the reasonableness of our belief in the uniformity
principle and beliefs based on inductive inference, Hume
uses 'reason' and related terms in a narrower sense than is
common today. In those passages Hume is showing merely that
reason as the rationalists construed it cannot license our
belief in the uniformity principle and so cannot give our
inductive inferences and the matter of fact beliefs based on
them the logical certainty that rationalist thinkers would
like to claim for factual assertions:
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ration,
Critique is directed specifically against thealistic conception of reason, it is not an
unrestricted scepticism concerning what today we often callreason and "rational justification." Hume sometimes usesthe word "reason" and its analogs in a narrower way than iscommon today...” (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 41)
.
3
Regrettably, Hume's selectively restricted use of "reason"
and related terms to refer to rationalistic conceptions has
led commentators to misinterpret "...his claim that no
inductive inference can be supported and hence justified
rationally, in the narrow a priori sense" as "...the far
^^erent claim that no inductive inference can be justified
rationally, in the broader contemporary sense of
"rationality"" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 41) .
Why should we think Hume's use of "reason" and related
terms is restricted in the way that Beauchamp and Rosenberg
claim it is? Beauchamp and Rosenberg stress historical
context:
In Hume's era pure reason was often considered capable
of deriving sweeping factual conclusions ... .Because such
views were then flourishing, a broad use of the term
"reason" was anathema to eighteenth-century
empiricists .... The single most important rationalistic view
under scrutiny in his work is the Cartesian (and even
Lockean) belief that there can be synthetic a priori
knowledge about the world derived from self-evident first
principles .... Far from being a sceptical challenge to
induction, then, Hume's "critique" is little more than a
prolonged argument for the general position that Newton's
inductive method must replace the rationalistic model of
science (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 42-3)
.
So, when Hume says that we have no reason for our
belief in the UP and hence no justification for our beliefs
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based on inductive inference, he means merely that we cannot
reason deductively from principles recognized a priori to
claims about the actual world. He does not mean that we have
no reason or justification for our reliance on inductive
reasoning and the beliefs it yields in our "broader
contemporary sense" of 'reason' and 'justification'. In
response to D.C. Stove, Beauchamp and Rosenberg go so far as
to say that in various passages of the Treatise and first
Enquiry traditionally held to express inductive skepticism
Hume "...is not discussing or critically evaluating
inductive reason" at all , but rather is criticizing a
certain rationalistic conception of reason and reasonable




Beauchamp and Rosenberg interpret the sections of the
Treatise and first Enquiry traditionally thought to contain
Hume's argument for inductive skepticism in the light of his
allegedly restricted use of 'reason' and related terms.
According to them, Hume does not raise the external problem
suggested by Argument I but only argues that a priori
deductive reasoning cannot justify empirical conclusions:
Hume's "sceptical doubts" center solely on the scope
and powers of the understanding (the faculty of a priori
reasoning) , not on the justifiability of inductive reasoning
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 48) .
Beauchamp and Rosenberg offer the following reconstruction
of Hume's alleged argument for inductive skepticism:
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Neither demonstrative nor inductive reasoning can beemployed successfully to provide a proof of the supposition
that the future will be conformable to the past. Since thissupposition cannot be proved, it cannot legitimately serve
as an intermediary that certifies the understanding to
arrive at inductive inferences characterized by logical
necessity. There also seems to be no other logical
connecting medium that so certifies the understanding.
Accordingly, inductive reasoning is not a product of the
understanding and cannot provide the logical necessity that
uniquely characterizes demonstrative reasoning (Beauchamp
and Rosenberg, 48). [Italics in original]
What do Beauchamp and Rosenberg say about the passages
in which Hume says that inductive reasoning cannot be used
to justify itself without circularity? In spite of such
passages, they say, "it must not be thought that Hume is
requesting a rational justification of the entire
institution of inductive reasoning" (Beauchamp and
Rosenberg, 50). Instead, Hume is "simply requesting a
justification of the supposition that the future will
conform to the past," and he makes this request "not in
order to question the institution of induction" but to
question the rationalistic view that factual claims can be
proven a priori through deductive reasoning (Beauchamp and
Rosenberg, 50). Hume is, in effect, questioning an
assumption - the UP - that rationalists would require as a
premise in order to establish causal inferences deductively:
"Hume is merely arguing that this assumption is unwarranted,
not that the institution of induction is unwarranted"




It is Beauchamp and Rosenberg's contention that in
Hume's time Cartesian rationalism was flourishing and that
its defeat was Hume's primary concern in the passages
traditionally taken to express skepticism on Hume's part.
In an unpublished paper, "Hume's Skepticism," Kenneth
Winkler points out that the Cartesian belief as Beauchamp
and Rosenberg state it (that is, as the view that by purely
deductive reasoning from self-evident principles we can
derive factual knowledge of the world) was simply "...not a
live presence at the time Hume wrote" (Winkler [3]
,
3) .
Winkler's contention is supported by Mary Shaw Kuypers
'
Studies in the Eighteenth Century Background of Hume's
Empiricism . Kuypers writes that
...by Hume's time... it was the common opinion that the
a priori method of Descartes had reversed the proper order
of investigation and that Newton had shown the only true way
to validate scientific results (Kuypers [1966] , 7)
.
Winkler also points out that in Hume's time interest in
the justification of experimental or inductively derived
conclusions was exhibited by other broadly empiricist
thinkers. One notable example is Joseph Butler, a thinker
for whom Hume had great respect, who suggests in his Analogy
of Religion, Natural and Revealed (published in 1736) that
our only reason - that is, justification - for many of our
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beliefs is a presumption of the uniformity of nature. In the
passages Winkler cites, Butler certainly seems to use
'reason' not in a restricted rationalist sense but in the
broader sense in which we today would use the term. For
example, Butler says that "...our only natural reason for
believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow,
as it has done..." is the "presumption" that "all things
will continue as we experience they are." This presumption
likeness or "analogy" is the foundation of many of our
convictions and yet, Butler says, it is a topic which "has
not yet been thoroughly considered" (Quoted in Winkler [3] ,
4-5)
. [Italics added]
As Winkler notes, if Hume uses 'reason' and related
terms in the broad sense in which Butler does , then we get a
natural skeptical reading of Book I of the Treatise and of
the first Enquiry . Winkler refers to passages in which Hume
does seem to use 'reason' not just to refer to some
rationalistic conception. For example, at two points in the
Treatise where Hume in footnotes contrasts reason with the
imagination, he speaks of reason as including both our
demonstrative and our probable reasoning and he also refers
to "the understanding" as inclusive of both kinds of
reasoning:
When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the
faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose
it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our
demonstrative and probable reasonings (T, I.III.X, 118).
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To prevent all ambiguity, I must observe, that where Ipagination to the memory, I mean in general theacuity that presents our fainter ideas. In all otherplaces, and particularly when it is oppos'd to the
understanding, I understand the same faculty, excluding onlyour demonstative and probable reasonings (T, II.II.VTI,
37 ^ ) «
Recall the passage from T, I.IV.VH that I quoted in
chapter I in which Hume says
,
After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I
can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel
nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly
in that view, under which they appear to me (T, 265) .
also that this was one of the "desponding
reflections" that nearly drove Hume to despair. Why should
his inability to give a "reason" for his conclusions bother
Hume at all if, as Beauchamp and Rosenberg claim, he is
using 'reason' in a restricted sense?
Another especially suggestive passage occurs in the
Abstract . After saying that Adam, a person of full
intellectual capacity, "...would never have been able to
demonstrate, that the course of nature must continue
uniformly the same..." (for a change in the course of nature





Nay, I will go farther, and assert, that he could not
so much as prove by any probable arguments , that the future
must be conformable to the past. All probable arguments are
built on the supposition, that there is this conformity
betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never
prove it. This conformity is a matter of fact, and if it
must be proved, will admit of no proof but from experience.
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expe“®nce in the Pa=t can be a proof of nothing fore future, but upon a supposition, that there is a
can^??
C%betW1Xt them - ThlS therefore 1S a Pomt, whichan acteuit of no proof at all, and which we take for grantedwithout any proof (A, 651-2) y
This would seem to be intended to preclude inductive
attempts to support the uniformity principle, unless one
insists that 'proof' be read as referring only to
deductively valid arguments from self-evident premises. For
if Hume is using 'proof' to refer to deductively valid
arguments with contingent premises, then, as I argue in
chapter III, his argument contains implicit consideration of
inductive support for the UP.
As Winkler points out, however, in the eighteenth
century a proof was often distinguished from a demonstrative
argument, the former being a non-demonstrative argument. In
fact, in "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," in a
passage not mentioned by Winkler, Hume begins a footnote in
support of his explanation of the role that constancy or
resemblance plays in producing our belief in an external
world with the following sentence:
This reasoning, it must be confest, is somewhat
abstruse, and difficult to be comprehended; but it is
remarkable, that this very difficulty may be converted into
a proof of the reasoning (T, I. IV. II, 204-5). [Italics
added]
Hume goes on to offer such a "proof" for his claim that the
resemblance between numerically distinct but qualitatively
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similar perceptions and a single uninterrupted perception
leads us to mistake the first for the second. The proof that
Hume goes on to give consists in pointing out that the
resemblance that ’’the act of the mind in surveying a
succession of related objects bears to that in surveying an
identical object" easily leads us to confuse these two acts
of the mind and thus makes it difficult for us to
^ stinguish the objects of these resembling acts (T, 205)
Whatever one thinks of Hume's explanation of our belief in
an external world or his proof in support of that
explanation, it is clear that this proof is not and is not
intended to be a demonstrative argument. Neither premises
nor conclusion are propositions expressing relations of
ideas, nor, as far as I can tell, is the argument intended
to be deductive.
In addition, note that Hume says that Adam could not
support his belief in the UP by any "probable arguments."
But Hume uses "probable argument" to refer to both valid
arguments with contingent premises and inductive arguments
proper
.
Further evidence that Hume's skeptical arguments are
not restricted to attacking rationalism comes from the first
Enquiry . In Section XII, when Hume sets out the
considerations that will give the skeptic reason for
"triumph," it is his own view of causation and his own
argument for inductive skepticism to which he refers:
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The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within hisproper sphere, and display those philosophical objections,which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems tohave ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, thatall our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond
t e testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from
the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea
relation than that of two objects, which have been
frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience,
been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other
instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing
leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct
of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but
which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and
deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he
shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our
weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all
assurance and conviction (E, XII. II, 159).
Contrary to the claim that Hume is not really
questioning the justification of inductive inference, the
possibility that the ’’custom or instinct" which leads us to
make an inductive inference may be "deceitful" strongly
suggests that what is being considered is precisely the
justification of such inferences.
5
Note also that in the
above quotation, Hume does not say that we have no
demonstrative argument to support the UP, but simply that we
have "no argument." This is especially important given that
Beauchamp and Rosenberg claim that empiricists of Hume's
time were careful to distinguish between negative claims
about justification in a broader sense and such claims about
justification in a narrower, rationalistic sense in which a
6
justifying argument must be a demonstrative one. Hume
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seems to be making precisely the "no-argument argument" that
Fogelin attributes to him.
Recall the distinction I drew in chapter III between V-
probable arguments and I-probable arguments, both of which
are nondemonstrative. I also showed there that even if Hume,
in the sections of the Treatise , Abstract , and first Enquiry
traditionally held to contain an argument for inductive
skepticism was only explicitly considering V-probable
arguments (that is, deductively valid arguments with
contingent premises) for the UP, his discussion can be seen
as containing an implicit rebuttal of attempts to support
the UP with I-probable arguments, that is, ordinary
inductive arguments. Remember that I suggested there that it
would be very unlikely that Hume, who himself employs I-
probable arguments, would have been unaware of the fact that
his consideration of attempts to support the UP would apply
to them. I repeat that suggestion here.
Against those who would still press Hume's apparent
skepticism concerning induction, Beauchamp and Rosenberg
argue that it would be paradoxical if Hume, "the most
influential and consistent figure in modern empiricism,"
whose Treatise both extols and employs empirical methods,
were to adopt and recommend a procedure (inductive
reasoning) that he regarded as rationally unjustified. To
suppose that Hume did regard inductive reasoning as
rationally unjustified while himself employing it and
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recommending it is, according to Beauchamp and Rosenberg, to
attribute inconsistency to Hume.
The response here is straightforward: the distinction
between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive/practical
skepticism makes it unnecessary for one who reads Hume as an
inductive skeptic to attribute inconsistency to Hume due to
his use and espousal of inductive procedures.
5
Beauchamp and Rosenberg now turn to Argument I,
specifically to its first premise. They claim that this
premise, that all factual beliefs are based solely on
instinct and not justifying reasons, seriously misrepresents
Hume's view. The first part of their argument consists in
stressing "...Hume's commitment to standards for the
resolution of internal problems of justification..." and his
commitment to the inductive procedures of empirical science
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 52) . They make five main points
which are intended to show this:
(1) Hume's espousal of general rules for making causal
judgments, the rules stated in "Rules by which to judge of
causes and effects" (T, I. Ill, XV) are "...expressly designed
to provide inductive methods for justifying or eliminating
causal beliefs" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 52)
.
These rules
provide "warranting conditions" for causal statements and
thus
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...indicate that the correctness of causal inference isa matter of objective support and does not depend on animalfaith or observers who acquire feelings of determination
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 53)(2)
Hume’s discussion in "Of the probability of chances" (T,
I. III. XI) indicates his belief that "...inductive arguments
attain different degrees of evidence, some being superior to
others" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 53) . Also, his
distinguishing between knowledge, proofs and probabilities
suggests that for Hume,
...there are two kinds of certainty--knowledge derived
from the understanding through deductive reasoning and
empirical proofs derived from the inductive inferences of
the imagination (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 53)
.
(3)
Hume's discussion in "Of the probability of causes" (T,
I. I I I. XI I) indicates Hume's commitment to the assumption of
causal uniformity even in cases in which we might be




Hume's distinction between "...inductively well-grounded
beliefs and those that are purely artificial or
associational" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 54)
.
Experience,
assisted by general rules for forming judgments, enables us




(5) Hume's distinction between beliefs based on "education",
that is, beliefs based on uncritical acceptance of the
assertions of others and those based on rational inquiry,
that is, on rule-guided inference from experience.
The second part of Beauchamp and Rosenberg ' s argument
involves distinguishing two claims that, they say, are often
both taken to be expressed by premise (1) of Argument I and
to be attributable to Hume. The two claims are:
(A) All factual beliefs are based solely on instinct.
(B) No factual beliefs are based on justifying reasons.
According to Beauchamp and Rosenberg,
Adherents of the received view generally attribute (B)
to Hume because they hold that he argues for (A) . But never
does Hume argue that factual beliefs are based solely on
instinct. He does indeed maintain that all factual beliefs
are based on instinct, but he also regards some factual
beliefs as additionally based on what are today commonly
called "justifying reasons" (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 52) .
Such beliefs are those formed on the basis of proper methods
of inquiry involving sufficient experience and rule-guided




So, Hume artxculates and endorses normative standards
for inductive inference, distinguishes between better and
worse inductive inferences, and takes a favorable view of
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beliefs based on appropriate methods of inductive inference
as opposed to those based purely on instinct or
indoctrination. How, then, can he possibly be taken to be a
skeptic about induction? Shouldn't an inductive skeptic see
all inductive inferences and all beliefs based on inductive
inference as on a par? After all, if Hume holds that all
inductive inferences, and hence all beliefs based on such
inference presuppose the UP and he also holds that the UP
cannot itself be justified, should he not also hold that all
inductive inferences are equally bad and all inductively
derived beliefs equally unjustified? We can refer to this
problem as the "problem of discrimination."
Kenneth Winkler raises this very problem, though he





If I am right, Hume is an inductive skeptic. But it is
also clear that Hume wants to rank instances of inductive
reasoning . He wants to be able to say that some inductive
arguments are better than others .... The problem is this:
shouldn't an inductive skeptic take all inductive arguments
to be equally bad? (Winkler [2], 9)
Beauchamp and Rosenberg's external /internal distinction
can itself, however, be used to answer the problem of
discrimination. I believe that the texts of the Treatise
and the first Enquiry support the view that Hume is raising
precisely the external question he has traditionally been
credited with raising: "What is the rational justification
for our inductive inferences and inductively derived
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beliefs?" I believe that by now it is clear that Hume's
answer to this question is the following: "There is no
rational justification for our inductive inferences or our
inductively derived beliefs."
There are, however, other questions that we can and do
ask about particular inductive inferences or even general
kinds of inductive inference. These are internal questions.
I may ask of a particular inductive inference, whether it is
strong or weak, whether its premises do give a sufficient
amount of support to its conclusion so that if I believe the
premises I "ought" to believe the conclusion. And we can and
do answer such questions by reference to what we take as
normative standards (as the 'ought' in the previous sentence
suggests) . So we can and do distinguish, among our instinct-
based beliefs, between those which do and those which do not
conform to certain standards, or between those which in a
sense are based on justifying reasons and those which are
8
not.
What does our answering internal questions by reference
to normative standards show? Does it not show that we
presume a positive answer to the external question? That
depends. Perhaps as a practicing scientist a person has
never even entertained the external question. In a sense she
hasn't presumed a positive answer to the external question
if by "presuming" we have in mind some sort of conscious
belief or presupposition. But she might be said to presume a
positive answer to the external question in this sense:
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Insofar as she believes that her inductive conclusions are
rationally justified period, she presumes a positive answer
to the external question. For to be rationally justified
period is to be rationally justified not simply in the sense
of conforming to a set of norms of inference that are
(merely) in fact accepted but in the sense of conforming to
norms of inference that ought to be accepted - that are
themselves rationally justified.
Now, suppose a person - perhaps a "scientist of human
nature" - does raise the external question and answers it in
the negative. Does this mean he can no longer raise and
answer internal questions? Not in the least. For he may
continue to raise and answer internal questions but without
thinking that a positive answer with regard to a particular
inference or belief means that the inference or belief is
rationally justified period. In other words, he simply
raises and answers internal questions qua internal.
Further, insofar as he is inclined to "forget" his negative
answer to the external question, he may find himself
answering internal questions and also tacitly presuming a
positive answer to the external question.
Why would such a thinker do any of these things? Why
would he "forget" his negative answer to the external
question and slip back into presuming that positive answers
to internal questions are positive answers period? Why would
he continue to raise internal questions after having given a
negative answer to the external question? I believe that the
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basic answer to both of these questions is, for Hume,
instinct or "human nature".
We as nonphilosophers instinctively engage in inductive
inference and hence (insofar as we ordinarily presume that
our inductively derived beliefs are rationally justified
period) instinctively presume the UP on which such inference
is based. We ordinarily distinguish between better and worse
inductive arguments and we ordinarily tend to think that our
inductively derived beliefs are rationally justified period.
The philosopher who has raised the external question and
answered it in the negative is also often operating as
nonphilosopher. He will then instinctively engage in
inductive inference and hence instinctively presume the UP
on which such inference is based. He too will ordinarily
distinguish between better and worse inductive arguments and
will ordinarily tend to think of his inductively derived
beliefs as rationally justified period.
But suppose the philosopher has not forgotten his
negative answer to the external question. He is operating as
a philosopher. Why would he continue to raise and answer
internal questions and espouse norms according to which they
should be answered? Again, I think the basic answer, for
Hume, is instinct, though a more complete answer must refer
to instinct, experience, and philosophical reflection.
I believe that for Hume a factual claim may be
"justified" in a secondary sense insofar as it is formed in
accordance with our natural, instinctive inferential
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practices when those practices have been reflected on and
perhaps refined, as in scientific investigation, though
those practices themselves and hence that claim too are
ultimately without rational justification. When, on the
basis of experience and reflection, we develop and follow
norms for inductive reasoning we are doing the best we can.
But the fact that we're doing the best we can doesn't entail
that we get knowledge as a result.
Certain beliefs are "justified" from within the context
of our instinctive practices, that is, presupposing the
legitimacy of those practices, while others are unjustified
even if we presuppose the legitimacy of our instinctive
practices. When we hold beliefs based on observation-based
inductive inference we're doing what we must given that we
have choice but to hold beliefs and draw conclusions
about the world in order to live. Such beliefs, though
ultimately unjustified, are "justified" relative to the
inferential procedures that are instinctive to us and hence
unavoidable . 9 But this is not a form of justification which
10
supports a nonskeptical interpretation of Hume.
My reasons for thinking that for Hume a factual claim
may be justified in the secondary sense I have just
described are these: First, Hume seems peculiarly
undisturbed by what I 've referred to as the problem of
discrimination, yet it seems highly unlikely that he would
have simply failed to recognize the tension between his
argument for inductive skepticism and his espousal of
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certain forms of reasoning about matters of fact. It seems
reasonable to suppose that Hume had in mind some method of
distinguishing between the inferences characteristic of
empirical scientific investigation and those inferences
concerning matters of fact that he found unacceptable.
Second, Hume does in fact suggest a plausible way of
drawing this distinction. The inferences he accepts are
those that exemplify our natural instinctive inferential
practices, duly examined and refined. Some of the principles
that result from such examination and refinement of our
ordinary practices appear in T, I. III. XV, ’’Rules by which to
judge of causes and effects."
11
Toward the end of Section XII of the first Enquiry ,
Hume asks, rhetorically,
While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we
believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will
fall or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning
any determination, which we may form, with regard to the
origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to
eternity (E, XII, III, 162)?
Note that in this passage Hume says that we can give no
"satisfactory reason" for holding even ordinary beliefs
derived by causal reasoning. In speaking of a "satisfactory
reason" here, Hume clearly has justification in mind, for of
course he thinks we can give a causal explanation of how we
come to hold such beliefs. So our ordinary beliefs and our
metaphysical beliefs about the "origin of worlds" are
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equally lacking in justification in one sense of
justification', that is, the sense in which providing a
justification for a belief is providing a satisfactory
reason for supposing that belief is true.
Hume, however, suggests this parity between ordinary
and highly theoretical beliefs in the context of prescribing
a limitation of our inquiries to ”... common life, and to
such subjects as fall under daily practice and
experience ... M (E, 162). According to Hume,
This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is,
in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make
the slightest examination into the natural powers of the
human mind... in order to recommend it to us (E, 163).
So, then, we should engage in and only engage in those
philosophical researches that concern "common life." Yet in
pursuing these investigations we are freed from "the force
of the Pyrrhonian doubt" only by "the strong power of
natural instinct" (E, 162) . Why, then, should we continue
our inquiries? What distinguishes those investigations we
should continue from those we should not? The fact that
"philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of
common life, methodized and corrected" (E, 162) . Thus the
methods embodied in our legitimate inquiries are an
12
outgrowth of our instinctive inferential practices.
149
7
I argued, in chapter III, that Hume is not a
deductivist. Yet in chapter II and in the present chapter
I've argued that he is an inductive skeptic. There would
seem to be an inconsistency here. Am I not, in denying that
Hume is a deductivist, saying that it is not the case that
Hume recognized only one legitimate form of inference while
iri holding that he is an inductive skeptic, saying
that it is the case that he recognized only one legitimate
form of inference?
As I argued in chapter III, the claim that Hume
considers inductive or probabilizing support for the
Resemblance Thesis is compatible with the claim that Hume
holds inductive skepticism as I have characterized it. A
similar approach must be taken to the apparent inconsistency
involved in denying that Hume is a deductivist while
asserting that he is an inductive skeptic. To show how these
claims are compatible I must again draw a distinction
between arguments that probabilize their conclusions in the
sense that if we believe in their premises we in fact have a
degree of confidence in their conclusions and arguments that
probabilize their conclusions in the sense that given the
truth of their premises their conclusions are in some sense
objectively probable. In the second sense, belief in the
premises of a probabilizing argument rationally justifies (a
degree of) belief in the conclusion.
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In chapter III, I cited passages from Hume which show
that Hume recognizes both the possibility and the actuality
of probabilizing arguments of the first sort. But, I said,
the considerations adduced in the argument for inductive
skepticism show that there is not really a possibility of
inductive arguments that are probabilizing arguments of the
second, justificatory, sort, because the UP, which is
necessary in order to justify our inductive inferences,
cannot be supported by any form of argument.
I believe, however, that Hume is initially open to the
possibility of probabilizing arguments of the second sort.
With the skeptical argument of T, I. III. VI it becomes clear
that there are no probabilizing arguments of this second
sor>t. So, in later sections, Hume is discussing
probabilizing arguments of the first, psychological sort, as
the text shows. The discussion in T, I. Ill, sections XI-
XIII is an attempt to give a psychological explanation of
how we come to have a degree of confidence in a conclusion
drawn from premises that do not entail it. But that doesn't
show that Hume didn't entertain the possibility of
probabilizing arguments of the second, justificatory, sort,
earlier on. Again, I believe that Hume is initially open to
the possibility of a justificatory probabilizing argument
for the UP, though his skeptical considerations show that
there can be no such argument.
In section IV of chapter III I gave my reasons for
believing that Hume is, prior to the end of his skeptical
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argument in T, I. III. VI, open to the possibility of
probabilizing arguments of the second sort. I will not
restate them here. But the central point is that Hume does
not antecedently preclude the possibility of justificatory
inductive arguments - that's why I say he is not a
deductivist - but he does consequently show that inductive
arguments are without rational justification - that's why I
saY he is an inductive skeptic.
One might, however, object that even if the above
considerations are adequate as a reply to Stove's claim that
Hume never even considers inductive support for the UP, they
are not adequate as a reply to the charge of inconsistency
that is here at issue. For, one might ask, how do we
characterize Hume's position consequent to the argument for
inductive skepticism? Must we not, following that argument,
say that Hume is in fact a deductivist, that is, that he
recognizes only one legitimate form of inference?
There are several different responses available here.
The first is simply to admit that Hume is, consequent to but
only consequent to the argument for inductive skepticism, a
deductivist. With the appropriate distinctions made, that
admission creates no problem for my interpretation. Consider
the external /internal distinction of Beauchamp and
Rosenberg. One might say that Hume does, qua philosopher,
answer the external question concerning the legitimacy of
inductive inference in the negative and the external
question concerning the legitimacy of deductive inference in
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the affirmative. So, from the external point of view,
Hume is a deductivist consequent to his arguments for
inductive skepticism. But from the internal point of view
Hume is not a deductivist even consequent to the argument
for inductive skepticism. For he recognizes, employs, and
discriminates among inductive inferences. The point can also
be made by using Fogelin's theoretical/prescriptive
distinction in a slightly different way than I have so far.
Consequent to the argument for inductive skepticism Hume is
a theoretical but not a prescriptive or practicing
deductivist. But prior to that argument he is not even a
theoretical deductivist.
Hume's discussion in "Of sceptiaism with regard to
reason" (T, I. IV. I, 180-87), however, may create a bit of a
problem for one who holds that Hume is, consequent to but
only consequent to the argument for inductive skepticism, a
deductivist. For that section may be seen as suggesting that
Hume does not, from the external point of view, recognize
even our deductive inferences as rationally justified.
Perhaps Hume is not a deductivist consequent to that
section. Perhaps it is not true that Hume ultimately
recognizes one and only one form of inference as rationally
justified because, at least from the external point of view,
he doesn't recognize even one form of inference as
rationally justified. Fine. Then I don't need to say that
Hume is, even consequent to the argument for inductive
skepticism, a deductivist. From the external point of view
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he recognizes no form of inference as rationally justified,
while from the internal point of view he recognizes and
employs both deductive and inductive inference. Again, the




Beauchamp and Rosenberg stress that Hume holds a
correspondence theory of truth. A belief is not true just
because we are caused to have it but because of the logical
relations of ideas or the way the actual world is. Further,
though initially caused to believe P, which is false, I can,
on the basis of appropriate experience and inferences, come
to believe ~P and thus come to have a true belief. With this
I fully agree. But according to them Hume does consider
factual beliefs formed in accordance with appropriate
inductive standards and experience to be warranted, that is,
rationally justified, and hence to constitute knowledge.
With this I disagree. For I hold and have argued that Hume
is an inductive skeptic and that he both raises the
"external" question and answers it in the negative.
Correcting our beliefs in accord with further experience and
inductive canons of inference is the best we can do given
that we instinctively assume the UP and engage in the
practice of inductive reasoning which presupposes it. Making
that assumption we can answer "internal" questions according
to standards of induction. We have, then, what might be
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called a pragmatic" justification of our inductive
inferences and inductively derived beliefs.
14
But that does
not change the fact that the assumption on which those
inferences and beliefs are based is itself neither intuitive
nor supportable by argument of any kind. Hence from the
external point of view our inductively inferred factual
beliefs are without rational justification and hence cannot
constitute knowledge.
9
What is this external point of view, the point of view
from which one questions the whole enterprise of inductive
reasoning? I can't describe it precisely. It is, I believe,
precisely the point of view Hume assumes in his chamber,
before dinner and backgammon with friends. It is the point
of view Hume assumes when, as he tells us, he is
. . .uneasy to think that I approve of one object and
disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful and another
deform'd; decide concerning truth and falsehood, reason and
folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed (T,
I. IV. VII, 271)
.
The external point of view is the point of view of the
theoretical skeptic. It is also, I think, the point of view
one assumes when one wonders which of two metaphysical
theories which perhaps serve our explanatory purposes
equally well really describes the way the world is. It is
the point of view from which we question the objective truth
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of our beliefs . It is the point of view Descartes assumes
when he introduces the unsettling specter of the evil
demon .
16
Why should a person be concerned with this external
point of view? If Hume thinks we must and should presuppose
the UP and inductive inference and that presupposing these
things we can distinguish between better and worse inductive
arguments and pursue empirical science according to
normative standards, so what if from some "external" point
of view he is a skeptic? First, Hume is doing many of the
things Beauchamp and Rosenberg suggest he is. The
establishment of the inductive method in the study of human
nature was an important development in science. It is often
said that Descartes' distinction between extended
nonthinking substance on the one hand and unextended
thinking substance on the other was intended to leave the
human mind to the theologians and philosophers, rather than
to the empirical scientists. Hume's espousal of the methods
of empirical science for investigating human mental
functioning thus represents a move beyond Descartes. Second,
Hume ' s observations on the weakness of human reason should
also serve the practical service of curbing dogmatism and
precipitate judgment.
I think, however, that the best answer to the "So
what?" response is simply this: The claim that much of what
we think we know does not in fact constitute knowledge,
because the relevant beliefs cannot be rationally justified
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® dsim which Hume makes
, as we will see, ah>out much of
our alleged knowledge and which is based in part on his
inductive skepticism - is simply of intrinsic philosophical
interest. If a person responds to that claim with "So
what?", all one can say is that she is not a person
interested in philosophical, theoretical questions. She is
not sufficiently motivated by the "love of truth," that
passion that is, according to Hume, ". . .the first source of
all our enquiries" (T, II. III. X, 448). For my part, I find
the thesis that much of what we think we know we in fact do
not and cannot know - and in fact cannot be rationally




Of course, Hume scholars who disagree with Beauchamp
and Rosenberg's interpretation of what is traditionally
interpreted as Hume's argument for inductive skepticism may
still find reason to deny Hume's inductive skepticism. In
Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy , (Garrett
[1997]), Don Garrett rejects the traditional interpretation
of Hume as an inductive skeptic. According to Garrett,
...Hume's conclusion. . .is not a direct denial of the
evidentiary value of inductive inferences on any conception
of them but is instead a straightforward negative
conclusion, within cognitive psychology, about the causes of
the mechanism of inductive inference (Garrett [1997] , 78) .
157
Garrett points out the familiar reasons for doubting
the traditional skeptical interpretation of Hume: Hume's own
use of inductive reasoning, his espousal of certain
standards for causal reasoning, and his distinguishing among
inductive reasonings. He also points out that these facts
"are not decisive by themselves" (Garrett, 78) . For one
might reconcile them with the skeptical interpretation by
appeal to Hume's view that inductive inference of certain
kinds is inevitable, as is our approval of those unavoidable
forms of inference and our disapproval of others. Still, any
such reconciliation of Hume's inductive skepticism with his
use and espousal of inductive inference is irrelevant unless
Hume does present an inductive skepticism.
Garrett himself offers two main objections to the
interpretation of Hume as an inductive skeptic and the
proposed reconciliation of Hume's inductive skepticism with
his use and espousal of inductive methods:
(1) Though the proposed reconciliation can account for
the mere fact of Hume's use and espousal of inductive
inference, "...it cannot so easily account for its manner"
(Garrett, 80). According to Garrett, Hume's actual
discussion of inductive inference does not involve any
expression of skepticism. It is only in his consideration of
a different set of arguments - one of which is the argument
concerning our belief in the existence of a mind-independent
17
world of objects - that Hume expresses skeptical worries.
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According to Garrett, passages that are often taken as
expressing Hume's inductive skepticism in fact express
either his emotional reaction to his reflections on the
psychological-instinctive basis of inductive inference, his
recognition that that basis is problematic, or his
recognition of the limits and imperfections of human
understanding. But in none of these passages does Hume say
or suggest that he has shown that all inductive inference is
without evidentiary value" or "carries no epistemic weight"
(Garrett, 81)
.
(2) There is, in fact, "...no reason why Hume should
regard the famous argument as itself sufficient to establish
that inductive inferences lack evidentiary value" (Garrett,
81-2). After setting out Hume's "famous argument," Garrett
writes
,
The general strategy is clear: to argue (i) that
"determination of" inductive inferences "by reason" requires
that a certain proposition (the Uniformity Thesis) be
"founded" on some argument, an argument that must be of one
of two kinds-demonstrative or probable. . .and then to argue
(ii) that neither kind of argument can do the job required
(Garrett, 82)
.
Garrett offers an alternative interpretation of Hume's
argument. According to Garrett, Hume's argument is intended
to show only that our inductive inferences are not caused by
the operation of reason, i.e., they are not caused by that
part of the imagination that engages in inference. Thus
considered, Hume's conclusion that our causal inferences are
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not the result of reason is a claim in cognitive psychology,
not an epistemological claim about the worth or
justification of such inferences. In fact, Garrett says,
"...Hume is not claiming that the reliability of induction
demands justification by argument..." (Garrett, 95).
11
To begin with Garrett's claim that Hume's discussion of
inductive inference does not involve any expression of
skepticism: The very title of section IV of Hume's Enquiry ,
in which he presents his definitive statement of the
argument in question, - "Sceptical Doubts concerning the
Operations of the Understanding" - suggests that Hume does
have skepticism in mind. Moreover, the very next section
contains Hume's "sceptical solution" to these doubts, as its
title tells us. Surely Hume needn't announce, "I am a
skeptic" or "The previous considerations express skepticism"
directly after each skeptical consideration he presents in
order for those considerations to be taken as expressions of
skepticism. The very title of section IV suggests that Hume
thinks the considerations presented there are in some way
skeptical. Why shouldn't that be taken as an expression of
skepticism, unless one already holds that the argument
contained in that section is not intended to have skeptical
consequences? But in that case, the occurrence or lack
thereof of expressions of skepticism would be beside the
point.
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Further, within section IV itself Hume at least
suggests that he is presenting an inductive skepticism. He
begins part II of that section by reviewing two questions
that arose in part I and the answers made to them. These
are, What is the basis of our reasonings about matters of
fact?" Answer: They are based on our beliefs in causal
connections. "What is the foundation of our beliefs in
causal connections?" Answer: Experience. But then Hume goes
on to ask, "What is the foundation of all conclusions from
experience?" (E 32) . This question, he says suggestively,
may be more difficult. Hume goes on to say that for a
philosopher to prevent himself from being forced to "some
dangerous dilemma" he had best discover "the difficulty"
himself and so "make a kind of merit" of his "very
ignorance" (E, 32) . This is said before Hume presents his
argument about the possible bases of support for the UP.
Now, if Hume doesn’t present an inductive skepticism, but
merely a forceful argument in cognitive psychology, as
Garrett holds, exactly what would be the ignorance of which
he would "make a kind of merit"?
A bit after Hume's consideration of possible sources of
support for the UP, he says:
Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so
regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference,
proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In
vain do you pretend to have learned the secret nature of
bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and
consequently all their effects and influence, may change,
without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens
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sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not
happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic,
what process of argument secures you against this
supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But
you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am
quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has
some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want
to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no
enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give
me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do
better than propose the difficulty to the public, even
though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution?
We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our
ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge (E IV. II, 38).
Note that Hume asks what logic or argument secures us
against the supposition that the course of nature may
change. He then goes on to say that he wants to learn the
"foundation" of the inference supporting the UP. It seems to
me that Hume isn't using the language of causal explanation
but rather that of justification. In fact, Hume generally
uses the language of justification rather than causal
explanation throughout his discussions of the "foundation"
of inductive inference. He says that proposing "the
difficulty" will at least make us "sensible of our
ignorance" (E, 38) . Again, where is the ignorance of which
we are to become sensible if what has occurred is only the
establishment of a principle of cognitive psychology? In
that case it would seem that rather than revealing our
ignorance we have augmented our knowledge and displayed our
sagacity. So, both before and after Hume's "famous
argument", appear expressions that seem to be expressions of
inductive skepticism.
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It is true that when Hume focuses more fully on
skepticism in section XII of the Enquiry , he discusses not
only the argument traditionally interpreted as an argument
for inductive skepticism, but other arguments as well. But
he never suggests that the earlier argument gains skeptical
force from those other arguments. As I pointed out earlier,
when Hume sets out the considerations that will give the
skeptic reason for triumph it is his own view of causation
and his own argument for inductive skepticism to which he
refers. Moreover, he presents that argument on its own; he
does not refer to the argument concerning an external world
or suggest that the former argument gains skeptical force
only in conjunction with the latter. Indeed, while the
skeptic presses his point about our inductive inferences,
. . .he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and
our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy
all assurance and conviction (E, XII. II, 159).
With regard to Garrett's claim that Hume shouldn't
regard his own argument as showing that our inductive
inferences are rationally unjustified but instead as
establishing only the claim - a claim purely of cognitive
psychology - that our inductive inferences are not caused by
the operation of reason: First, as I pointed out in response
to Garrett's first objection, Hume generally uses the
language of justification, rather than that of causation,
throughout the relevant passages.
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Garrett attaches great weight to Hume's use of
"determination" and to his saying, in the Treatise version
of the argument, that the UP cannot be derived by probable
argument because the same principle "cannot be both cause
and effect of another" (T I. III.VI, 90). But
determination," it seems to me, is ambiguous. If I ask,
"What determined you to study philosophy?", I'm not asking
for the efficient causes of your studying philosophy - such
things as neuron firings, for example - but for your reasons
for studying philosophy. And though Hume does use 'cause' in
the passage quoted from the Treatise , it seems to me that
that one use of (possibly) unambiguous causal language does
not weigh equally with Hume's use of the language of
. .
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justification. Further, Hume does not express himself in
that way in the Enquiry , which suggests at least that the
search for causes wasn't his only object in searching for
the foundation of our inductive inferences. In the Enquiry
Hume argues explicitly that we cannot support the UP by
probable arguments because that would involve "...going in
a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very
point in question" (E IV. II, 35-6).
Second, Hume regards himself in part as refuting the
views of the rationalists with regard to the foundation of
our matter of fact inferences. But the rationalists' weren't
primarily concerned with the causal basis of matter of fact
inferences but with their security and justification.
Further, to suppose that Hume is not considering the
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justification of our beliefs is to suppose that despite
Hume's concerns with issues of knowledge, belief, and
method, his consideration of the basis of our only form of
matter of fact inference, causal inference, takes place in
isolation from those concerns.
Third, it is unclear how the claim that reason can't
cause our belief in the UP follows from the claim that the
UP can't be supported by probable or demonstrative
reasoning. For the latter seems to be an epistemic fact - a
fact about our lack of evidence or support for our belief in
a certain proposition - not a causal one.
Fourth, if the UP, on which inductive inference
depends, is neither intuitive nor supportable by any form of
reasoning - which, Garrett admits, is Hume's position - then
it would seem the UP is without justification. Garrett
denies this. But the only plausible reason for denying this
would be that one thinks Hume holds inductive inference to
be justified in some other way or to be without need of
justification
.
The claim that Hume thinks inductive inference is
justified in some other way is, I think, implausible. For
what would that other way be? Inductive inferences can't be
justified in the way that, perhaps, ordinary perceptual
judgments can be - by appeal to the immediate data of
consciousness - for those inferences are more than reports
of such data. Perhaps inductive inference can be justified
in terms of reliability? I think not. For justification of
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inductive inference by appeal to its reliability would take
as its data the experienced reliability of inductive
inference. Yet projecting that experienced reliability into
the future itself presupposes the legitimacy of inductive
inference. Perhaps inductive inference can be justified in
the way of the Scottish common-sense philosophers: our
inferential faculties are the endowment of a benevolent
Creator and hence are reliable and hence our inductive
inferences are justified. It need hardly be noted, however,
that Hume would have none of this.
Garrett himself thinks Hume holds inductive inference
to be without need of justification. I find this
implausible, for Hume's concern with justification, and in
Par“ticular the justification of our causal/inductive
inferences, is, I believe, evident throughout the Treatise
and Enquiry .
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Notes to Chapter IV1.
Hereafter all references to Beauchamp and Rosenberg
confined to Beachamp and Rosenberg [1981] unless otherwise
2.
Note that Argument II is in essence a piece of the no-




Nicholas Capaldi takes a similar view of Hume's talk
about the limitations of reason. In David Hume: The
Newtonian Philosopher (Capaldi [1975]), he writes,
Hume's continuing and unrelenting attack on "reason" is
frequently to be viewed as an attack on the notion that we




The conception of reasonable inference at issue is in
deductivism , tnat is, the view that only deductively
valid arguments lend any support to their conclusions. This
is, of course, a view which Stove attributes to Hume and
which Beauchamp and Rosenberg do not. Beauchamp and
Rosenberg do, however, agree with Stove's view that Hume is
an inductive fallibilist (that is, that he thinks no
inductive argument is such that its premises confer a
probability of 1 on its conclusion) and with his claim that
"Hume's 'refutation of I.P. [inductive probabilism] is an
entirely imaginary episode in the history of philosophy',"
though their reasons for accepting those claims are at
variance with Stove's (See Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 75).
5.
Though Hume's use of "fallacious" is consistent with his
comments being directed only at deductivism (that is, if we
take 'fallacious' to mean invalid), his suggestion that our
instincts may be "deceitful" suggests a broader target.
6.
Beauchamp and Rosenberg write that, because rationalistic
views were then flourishing,
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...a broad use of the term "reason" was anathema to
eighteenth-century empiricists, and Hume was understandable
hesitant about employing the term in any way that might haverationalistic associations It is thus easy to see why
Hume restricts "reason" to a priori reason in those contextswhere he directly discusses the nature of
induction. . . (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 42-3)
It seems to me that if Hume were carefully confining his use
of terms such as 'reason', 'justification', and so on, in
those contexts in which he discusses inductive inference, he
would be careful about his use of 'argument' in such
contexts as well.
7.
Bruce Aune raises the same problem with a dash of humor.
In Knowledge of the External World . Aune writes,
course of reasoning is to be followed if no view
of the world is satisfactory and experimental inferences
(arguments from experience) are not rationally justifiable?
. . . [The skeptical] outcome is not troublesome merely
because it seems to call our reasoning about matters of fact
into question - the reasoning of, we believe, the wisest and
most enlightened people. Worse than this, the outcome puts
our reasoning about such matters on the same level with the
reasoning of superstitious fanatics, astrologers, and, as
Hume liked to say, ignorant and stupid barbarians who are
ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. Having devoted
much of his Treatise to criticizing the arguments of
philosophical opponents, Hume would be in a very
embarrassing position if he had to admit that his reasoning
is really no better, no more acceptable, than the reasoning
he criticized (Aune [1991], 81-2).
The problem has been pointed out by numerous other Hume
commentators. See, for example, Flew [1961], 79-80, 90, 211-
12, 246, 264-5, and 267-8, Passmore [1968], 10 and 42-64,
and Noxon [1973], 180.
8.
Of course, such reasons are not "justifying" reasons from
the external, philosophical point of view.
9.
Aune makes a similar point, expressed in terms of Hume's
distinction between those principles of association and
inference that are "permanent, irresistible, and universal,"
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and those that are "changeable, weak, and irregular"
According to Hume,
The former are the foundations of all our thoughts and
actions, so that upon their removal human nature must
immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither
unavoidable to mankind nor necessary, or so much as useful
in the conduct of life...(T I. IV. IV, 225).
Aune says
,
The basic consideration is that, owing to the evident
nature of the human mind, people invariably employ arguments
from experience in everyday life, and they agree about their
cogency in that domain. The principles they assume in these
arguments ... are "permanent, irresistible, and universal." No
one but a philosopher ever disputes them, and philosophers
actually employ them even if they dispute them (Aune [1991],
Essentially the same point was made earlier by James
Noxon . Noxon argues that Hume distinguishes first between
those beliefs which are formed naturally and inevitably,
such as the belief that the future will resemble the past,
and those beliefs that are a result of "caprice and
ar“tifice." The former are distinguished from the latter by
their greater stability, influence on behavior, and
usefulness or even indispensibility in the affairs of life.
Second, Hume distinguishes between those beliefs based on
inferential practices which are or are a refinement of the
practices necessarily used in everyday life and beliefs
based on procedures inconsistent with the former practices.
Noxon writes,
[Hume's] most distinctive doctrine. .. is that there can
be no rational proof, no ultimate intellectual
justification, of any of the beliefs which men hold, nor of
their ways of acquiring them. Against this background of
epistemological insecurity, however, decisions must be made,
and, of course, they are constantly made without demur by
men whose souls are untroubled by metaphysical scruples. But
these decisions are not all equally wise, and some ground
for distinguishing between them must be found. Hume found it
in those elementary beliefs which men acquire unreflectively





Methods of science develop out of techniques devised
for solving the practical problems of everyday life, and
they bear the marks of their ancestry. .. .Although the rules
of method to which empirical scientists subscribe acquire no
absolute authority by virtue of their lineage, they are
r®^-^tively immune to challenge by those who choose to work
by other rules or, perhaps, not consistently by any rules at
all (Noxon [1973], 184-5).
10.
I will give further support for the claim that Hume's
recognition of relative or internal justification does not
support a nonskeptical interpretation of his works in
chapters VI and VII.
11.
Hume had a model for such rules in "Rules Of Reasoning
In Philosophy," the first section of Book III of Newton's
Mathematical Principles Of Natural Philosophy .
12.
Nicholas Capaldi makes much the same point, though his
overall interpretation of Hume differs from mine on the
point of Hume's skepticism. Capaldi writes,
Hume asserts that the rules of scientific procedure are
the same as our natural mode of thought when the latter is
done self-consciously and consistently in order to avoid the
carelessness of the imagination (Capaldi [1975] , 42)
.
13.
I aim not claiming that Hume explicitly raises the
external question about the justification of deductive
inference. With the exception of T, I. IV. I and the possible
exception of E XII. II, Hume's discussions suggest that he
assumes that deductive inference is rationally justified
period. Thus in Hume Terence Penelhum writes that Hume's
view generally seems to be that in abstract disciplines such
as mathematics "...certainty is possible and common"
(Penelhum [1975] , 24) . According to Ruth Weintraub, Hume's
distinctive contribution to the problem of induction was
"...the supposition that the justification of induction is
not analogous to that of deduction" and the accompanying
assumption that deduction is epistemologically privileged
(Weintraub [1995] , 464)
.
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14 . In suggesting that Hume has in mind a "pragmatic"
justification of induction I do not mean to imply that he
had in mind anything like the recent pragmatic
justifications of induction proposed by people such as
Herbert Feigl and Hans Reichenbach. I am not suggesting that
Hume had in mind anything as sophisticated or mathematically
technical as, for example, what Reichenbach offers in "On
the Justification of Induction."
15. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Stroud
[1987]) , Barry Stroud does a nice job of developing and
^e^eri<:iing the external point of view as a perspective from
which much of our alleged knowledge can coherently be
tioned . Especially useful in this respect are chapters I
- Ill and chapter V.
16.
Hereafter on all references to Garrett are to Garrett
[1997] unless otherwise noted.
17.
The argument concerning our belief in a mind-independent
world of objects occurs in "Of scepticism with regard to the
senses" (T, I. IV. II) and "Of the acedemical or sceptical
philosophy" (E, XII. I).
18.
I say that Hume uses possibly unambiguous causal
language because a case can be made for the ambiguity of his
use of 'cause’. Suppose I ask, "What caused you to study
philosophy?" In spite of my use of 'cause' it seems that I'm
asking for your reasons for studying philosophy. Also
remember that in his "Advertisement" Hume referred to the
Treatise as a "juvenile work," (some of) the reasoning and
expression of which are corrected in the Enquiry . I noted
above that in the Enquiry Hume discusses the impossibility
of supporting the UP by probable arguments in terms of
circular reasoning rather than in terms of the impossibility
of one principle being both cause and effect of another.
Perhaps this is no accident, but one of the corrections that




HUME'S SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON AND THE SENSES
1.1
In "Of scepticism with regard to reason" (T, I. IV. I,
180-87)
, Hume argues that all knowledge "degenerates" into
probability, and then argues that the probability of any
probable judgment, when subjected to rational evaluation,
will reduce ultimately to nothing. According to Hume, if we
"wou'd closely pursue our reason" each judgment will be
subjected to examination in its turn, and this series of
examinations will in the end reduce the initial probability
to nothing (T, 182-3) .
An example will make Hume's point clearer: Suppose I
work out an equation and I form the judgment that x>3. This
judgment, because it asserts an invariable relation, that
is, "proportion in quantity or number," is an example of
"knowledge", according to Hume's characterization of
knowledge in "Of knowledge" (T, I. III. I, 69-73). Though the
rules of algebra are "certain and infallible," we are
subject to error in applying them. So, if I would proceed
in accord with the dictates of reason, I must consider the
probability that I have erred in working out the equation.
Now, this being an empirical question about my tendency to
make mistakes, there is always some probability that I have
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in fact erred. Thus the probability that my initial judgment
is correct is less than 1. So I estimate that there is, say,
a .99 probability that my first judgment is correct. In this
way, according to Hume, all knowledge reduces to
probabi 1 i ty
.
Now, every probable judgment, Hume says, is also
subject to evaluation. So now I must consider the
probability that I have correctly estimated the probability
that I erred in judging that x>3. This new judgment, Hume
says, reduces the initial probability further, by adding a
new doubt. And so on, until in the end there occurs a "total
extinction of belief and evidence" (T, 183) .
1.2
There are obviously problems with Hume's argument.
Suppose I judge that x>3 and I assign this proposition a
probability of 1 . If I then I make a higher-order judgment
about my capacity to solve equations, this doesn't change
the initial probability assignment. I may regard it as less
than certain that I was correct in assigning a probability
of 1 to the first judgment, but nevertheless the first
assignment remains what it was. What Hume may be thinking is
that if I engage in reflex evaluation my belief becomes






and so on are my reflex judgments, I believe
J&J*&J**&J*** and so on. Then, since J* , J**, and so on
consist of probable judgments, the conjunction has a
173
probability of P ( J) xP ( J*) xP ( J**) . . . , by the restricted
conjunction rule. However, this rule doesn't apply here
because it applies only to independent events, and my
successive judgments of my capacity to judge correctly are
not independent. Further, even if the rule did apply, the
initial probability would not reduce to nothing; it would
approach zero as a limit.
So what is Hume's point here? I think that perhaps what
Hume has in mind is that when I make a judgment, part of my
justification for that judgment is my belief in the
reliability of my judgment-making faculties when properly
exercised. So when I judge that J, part of my justification
for believing that J is my belief that I can reliably make
true judgments of the kind that J is and that I have
correctly exercised my capacity to make such a judgment on
this occasion. But part of my justification for this latter
judgment is that I can reliably estimate my ability to make
judgments such as J and that I have correctly done so on
this occasion. Hume's point, I think, is simply that if we
are purely rational, there is no point at which the process
2
of justification comes to an end.
Hume's target here seems to be at least in part the
Cartesian notion of rationality, according to which each
judgment should either be known by intuition or supported by
justifying reasons. This is a misguided notion of
rationality because even if I seem to intuit P with
certainty, it is possible that I am wrong to think that P (I
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don t really intuit it or my intuiting faculty is
unreliable)
, and so I must, if I would be rational, justify
my belief that I intuit P and that my intuition is reliable.
But once the process of justification begins there is no
rational end-point. The chain of justifications is endless,
and hence ultimately there is no justification provided at
all.
According to Hume, then, if our beliefs were based
purely on reason, we would have no beliefs at all. But we do
^ave beliefs. Therefore, our beliefs are not based purely on
reason. Rather, ". . .belief is more properly an act of the
sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T,
183 ) .
1.3
Now, putting aside for the moment the possibility that
Hume's argument is directed solely against rationalistic
conceptions of reason, Hume seems to have produced a serious
skeptical argument in this section. It seems to be an
argument of unrestricted scope, that is, it seems to be
intended to show that all of our beliefs are ultimately
unjustified and hence none of them can constitute knowledge.
However, Hume also says that neither he nor anyone else was
ever "sincerely and constantly" convinced of skepticism and
that he has presented the arguments "of that fantastic sect"
only in order to show that our causal inferences are the
effect of custom, and that belief is a product of feeling
175
and instinct rather than of purely rational processes. Hume
writes
:
Shou'd it here be ask'd me, whether I sincerely assent
to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to
inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics,
who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not
in any thing posses t of any measures of truth and falsehood;
I shou'd reply, that this question is entirely superfluous,
and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely
and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and
uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well
as to breathe and feel ; nor can we any more forbear viewing
certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account
of their customary connexion with a present impression, than
we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are
awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our
eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the
pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has
really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour'd by
arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has
antecedently implanted in the mind and render'd unavoidable.
My intention then in displaying so carefully the
arguments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader
sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our
reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from
nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act
of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures
(T, 183)
.
This suggests that Hume himself is not a skeptic and that
his argument is not intended to support skepticism but is
indeed intended only to undermine a mistaken conception of
reasonable belief, that is, the rationalist conception.
However, what Hume is responding to, I believe, is the
question of whether he himself is a prescriptive or
practicing skeptic. The total skepticism that it is
pointless to refute is a skepticism that is contrary to the
fact that nature has determined us to judge as well as to
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breathe and feel. Such a skepticism is prescriptive, and one
who followed its prescriptions would be a practicing
skeptic. But following these prescriptions is not possible
for us. So the prescriptive skeptic tells us to do what we
cannot do and hence it is futile to bother refuting him.
Nature refutes the prescriptive skeptic; we needn't bother.
[As Hume puts the point in the first Enquiry , "Nature will
always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any
abstract reasoning whatsoever" (E, V.I, 41).] But note that
the fact that nature determines us to judge is consistent
with the theoretical skepticism that Hume's argument seems
to lead to.
When Hume responds to the objection that on his own
system there should also be a total extinction of belief he
does not say that we should not engage in reflex evaluations
of the kind involved in his seemingly skeptical argument.
Rather, he says that after the first few reflex judgments
the action of the mind becomes forced and the reflex
judgments influence the imagination less forcefully than do
our "common judgments and opinions" (T, 185) . This too
suggests that the argument is not directed solely at a
Cartesian conception of rationality. We continue to have
beliefs not because reflex judgments are no longer demanded
by reason or because our ordinary judgments have been
justified and theoretical skepticism refuted, but merely
because of the mind's inability to invest sufficient force
in reflex judgments. It is merely a happy fact that "nature
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breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time..." (T,
187) .
Of course, even though Hume's argument is not directed
solely against the rationalist conception of belief, it is
opposed to that conception, both for the reasons given above
and because on that conception skepticism can be refuted and
reason vindicated, while for Hume theoretical skepticism
cannot be refuted. But Hume's opposition to rationalism
shouldn't obscure the fact that the text of T, I. IV. I
strongly suggests that for Hume, reason left to itself is





In "Of scepticism with regard to the senses" (T,
I. IV. II, 187-218) Hume considers why we suppose that the
ordinary objects we perceive by means of our senses -
objects such as tables and chairs - have an existence
distinct from and independent of our minds. In Hume's
discussion, the terms 'object' and 'perception' are both
applied to the things of which we take ourselves to be aware
in ordinary sense perception - tables, chairs, elephants,
etc., that is, what Berkeley referred to as "sensible
objects .
"
Hume's answer to the question of why we suppose
sensible objects to have a distinct and independent
existence is, in outline, this: According to Hume, the
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sensible objects to which we attribute a continued existence
are those which display a "constancy" of appearance and a
coherence in their changes. For example, I consider the tree
outside my window a continuously existent object even though
the various perceptions which I regard as perceptions of the
tree are interrupted and, as perceptions, numerically
distinct. The different perceptions I regard as perceptions
of the tree generally resemble one another closely, and
where they do not they undergo changes in a regular manner.
Thus I am led to feign a continuous object, the tree, to
explain the resemblance and regularity among my perceptions:
Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as
something real and durable, and as preserving its existence,
even when it is no longer present to my perception (T, 197) .
Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu'd
existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity
arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it
bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or in other words, makes
us believe the continu'd existence of body (T, 209).
2.2
Hume prefaces his discussion of our belief in an
external world by noting that it is pointless to ask whether
or not there is such a thing as "body", that is, independent
and continued sensible objects, or as Hume also puts it,
"external existences", for nature has not left this to our
choice. Yet though we have no choice but to believe that
body exists, we "cannot pretend by any arguments of
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philosophy" to support or justify this belief, according to
Hume (T, 187) .
Hume begins his discussion by drawing a distinction
between the question of why we attribute a continued
existence to objects when they are not present to our senses
and the question of why we attribute a distinct and
independent existence to objects. The latter is the question
of why we believe some objects to exist distinct from and
independent of minds and their perceptions . Though these are
distinct questions, they are, Hume says, "intimately
connected," for objects have a continued existence if and
only if they have a distinct and independent one. Hume
seems to presuppose that if a person believes one side of
this biconditional he will also believe the other, so that
explaining how the belief in continued existence arises is
sufficient for explaining how the belief in distinct and
independent existence arises, and vice versa. In attempting
to answer the question of what causes us to believe in the
continued and independent existence of objects Hume will
look at three faculties - the senses, reason, and the
imagination - as possible sources of this belief.
2.3
Hume first considers the senses as a possible source of
the belief in the continued and independent existence of
objects. The senses, he says, cannot give rise to the notion
of the continued existence of their objects after those
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objects no longer appear to the senses, so if the senses
produce this belief they must do so by producing a belief in
the distinct and independent existence of objects.
In order for the senses to produce the belief in the
distinct and independent existence of objects, they must
either present sense impressions as representations or as
the distinct and independent external objects themselves.
According to Hume, the senses cannot present sense
impressions as representations or images of something
distinct, for "they convey to us nothing but a single
perception, and never [by themselves] give us the least
intimation of anything beyond" (T, 189) . Nor can the senses
present sense impressions as the distinct objects
themselves. In order to do this the senses would themselves
have to be able to distinguish between external objects and
the self. But the self is not, Hume says, an object of the
senses
:
Now if the senses presented our impressions as external
to, and independent of ourselves, both the objects and
ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise they
cou’d not be compar’d by these faculties. The difficulty,
then, is how far we are ourselves the objects of our senses.
'Tis certain there is no question in philosophy more
abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of
the uniting principle, which constitutes a person. So far
from being able by our senses merely to determine this
question, we must have recourse to the most profound
metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it; and in
common life 'tis evident these ideas of self and person are
never very fix’d nor determinate. 'Tis absurd, therefore, io
imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves
and external objects (T, 189-90)
.
181
Hume turns from the question of whether it is possible
for the senses to present our perceptions as distinct from
ourselves, that is, as external to and independent of us, a
question which he has answered in the negative, to the
question of whether the senses do in fact deceive us in this
way . Though the answer to the latter question must be
negative given that the answer to the former was negative,
Hume wants to show that even if it is possible for the
senses to represent their objects as distinct from us, they
do not in fact do so. For (1) the senses do not themselves
represent their objects as external existences, and (2) the
independence of the immediate objects of sense is not itself
an object of the senses but must be determined from
experience and observation, which in fact suggest the
dependence of those objects on us. Hume concludes that
"...the opinion of a continu'd and of a distinct existence
never arises from the senses" (T, 192)
.
2.4
Hume next considers reason as the source of our belief
in an external world. He quickly rejects this alternative.
In fact, he says, most people believe in the continued,
distinct, and independent existence of objects without
consulting reason or understanding any philosophical
arguments in support of that belief. Philosophy informs us
that all we are directly aware of is perceptions and that
these are interrupted and dependent on minds, but "the
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vulgar" nevertheless suppose that the objects of which they
are immediately aware are the external objects themselves.
This belief is unreasonable, so it must arise from a source
other than reason. Further, reason is incapable of
supporting the belief in continued, distinct, and
independent objects even if we follow the philosophers in
distinguishing the immediate objects of perception,
perception contents, from the external objects which cause
our perceptions and which they supposedly represent. So
reason neither does nor can assure us of the continued and
distinct existence of body.
2.5
Since neither reason nor the senses give rise to our
belief in an external world, this belief "must be entirely
owing to the IMAGINATION ..." (T, 193). Hume says that
because "all impressions are internal and perishing
existences and appear as such," the notion of the continued
and distinct existence of some of the objects of sense
perception must arise from a concurrence of qualities
peculiar to certain impressions with certain qualities of
the imagination (T, 194)
.
Hume thinks that in fact the belief in the continued
existence of objects comes first, and the opinion of their
independence then follows. According to Hume, what makes us
attribute a continued and hence a distinct existence to the
objects of certain impressions is neither the
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involuntariness nor the superior force and vivacity of the
impressions. Our pains, pleasures, and passions are
themselves involuntary and forceful, yet we don't ascribe
continued and distinct existence to them. Rather, "...the
opinion of the continu'd existence of body depends on the
COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain impressions..." (T, 195).
The objects to which we attribute a distinct and continued
existence are those which are marked by a certain degree of
constancy in their appearance and a coherence in their
changes
.
How do the qualities of coherence and constancy give
rise to "so extraordinary an opinion" as that of the
continued existence of body? With regard to coherence, Hume
says that our observations would often contradict the
beliefs in causal regularities we've come to hold on the
basis of past experience unless we suppose that the objects
of sense continue to exist and operate when not perceived.
Hume gives the following example:
. . .1 hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon
its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances
towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflexions and
reasonings. First, I never have observ'd, that this noise
cou'd proceed from any thing but the motion of a door; and
therefore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a
contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which
I remember on t'other side the chamber, be still in being.
Again, I have always found, that a human body was possest of
a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from
mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive
at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not
annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a
letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the hand-writing
and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is
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two hundred leagues distant. 'Tis evident I can never
account for this phaenomenon, conformable to my experience
in other instances, without spreading out in my mind the
whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the
effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries,
according to my memory and observation. To consider these
phaenomena of the post and letter in a certain light, they
are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded
as objections to those maxims, which we form concerning the
connexions of causes and effects. I am accustom'd to hear
such a sound and see such an object in motion at the same
time. I have not receiv'd in this particular instance both
these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I
suppose that the door still remains, and that it was open'd
without my perceiving it. . . (T, 196-7)
.
According to Hume, at almost every moment we find
ourselves compelled to suppose the continued existence of
objects in order to "connect their past and present
appearances" and to preserve the regularities that we have
"found by experience to be suitable to their particular
natures and circumstances" (T, 197) . Thus I aim "naturally
led to regard the world, as something real and duraible, and
as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer
present to my perception" (T, 197)
.
But this conclusion from the coherence of appearances
to the continued existence of objects differs from our
ordinary causal reasoning derived from custom based on past
experience of regularities. For all that is present to the
mind is its perceptions. [Hume clearly places weight on the
theory of ideas here.] Hence any degree of regularity in
these perceptions "can never be a foundation for us to infer
a greater degree of regularity in some objects, which
are
not perceiv'd..." (T, 197). Why, then, do we make this
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leap? Because of a feature of the imagination akin to
inertia
:
. . .the imagination, when set into any train of
thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it,
and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its
course without any new impulse (T, 198)
.
In other words, once the mind has observed a uniformity in
the objects of sense experience, it renders that uniformity
as complete as possible by the supposition of their
continued existence.
Hume thinks, however, that the partial coherence of the
objects of sense and the inertial character of the
imagination will not by themselves explain our belief in the
existence of external physical objects. We must also take
into account the constancy displayed by certain sense
objects. I will discuss the role that constancy plays in
producing our belief in an external world in section 2.7.
First, however, I will discuss Hume's view that
"perceptions" are the immediate "objects" of our awareness.
2.6
In his discussion of the genesis of our vulgar belief
in the continued and independent existence of sensible
objects, Hume refers neutrally to sensible objects as
"objects" and as "perceptions." Hume says that since the
vulgar do not distinguish between sense perceptions and
objects of sense perception, in accounting for the vulgar
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belief in the continued and independent existence of
sensible objects he will
. . .at first suppose ; that there is only a single
existence
, which I shall call indifferently object or
perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my
purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man
means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression,
convey'd to him by his senses (T, 202)
.
On Hume's theory of ideas all that we are immediately
aware of are our own perceptions, and so sensible objects,
insofar as we are immediately aware of them, must be
perceptions. Though Hume expresses his theory of ideas by
saying that all that we are immediately aware of are our own
perceptions (and that hence sensible objects, insofar as we
are immediately aware of them, must be perceptions) , I think
that Hume means that all that we are immediately aware of
are perception contents. Hume generally uses 'perception' to
refer to the content of perception, rather than to the
mental act of perceiving or the psychological vehicle
(whatever that might be) that somehow conveys a content
before the mind.
Why do I say that it is the content of the perception
that Hume generally refers to simply as a "perception"? In
part because of Hume's stress on limitations in the ideas we
can possess and his polemical use, in attacking various
philosophical concepts and theories, of the principle that
our ideas are copies of impressions. Hume's genetic account
of our ideas is much more concerned with the what with which
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we can think than with how we come to have the what. Hume's
conceptual attacks on, for example, the notion of a
propertyless substance and the notion of a unified self are
based on his beliefs about limitations in content. Hume's
about such limitations also drive his attempts to
explain various important ideas, such as the idea of causal
necessity, in terms of the limited resources of perception.
It is because we are immediately aware of perception
contents that we can
, according to Hume , never conceive
anything specifically different from perceptions - not
because we are limited to thinking of mental entities or
acts as such, but because all of the content with which we
think comes from perception contents. In other words, all of
the (simple) qualities we can conceive a thing as having
must be qualities we have at some point perceived.
Hume is concerned with the genesis of our ideas almost
entirely insofar as that genesis has a bearing on what ideas
we can possess. As soon as Hume thinks that the question of
genesis no longer has such a bearing, he leaves off pursuing
it, with the observation that "The examination of our
sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural
philosophers than to moral..." (T, 1. 1. II, 8).
But setting aside the question of whether Hume
generally uses 'perception' to refer to perception content,
if Hume, in the context of the argument of T, I.IV.Ix,
really meant to speak of perceptions as mental acts of
perceiving or as vehicles of content, then the claim that
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our perceptions of what we ordinarily take to be continuing
objects are in fact numerically distinct would be rather
unsurprising. Obviously any two different acts of perceiving
or any two psychological vehicles of content are just that -
two. The observation that two such acts or vehicles are not
identical need not lead to worries about the continued and
independent existence of physical objects. For perhaps two
different acts of perceiving can be directed upon the same
object even though they are two acts, just as two different
acts of touching can both be directed upon the same object -
my coffee mug, say. And two different vehicles might convey
contents that are related to a single enduring object. Those
contents, though carried by numerically distinct vehicles
and themselves numerically distinct, might nevertheless bear
features that allow one to recognize that one is perceiving
a single enduring object. Further, the mere fact that the
vehicles are numerically different doesn't even entail that
their contents are. I, one and the same human being, have
ridden in buses, trains, elevators, automobiles, and boats,
just to mention a few of the vehicles that have carried me
as content. So, merely observing that perceptions as acts or
vehicles are distinct would be rather jejune. It is because
Hume believes that in perceiving sensible objects we are in
fact immediately aware of numerically distinct mental
contents - contents which themselves bear no features that
demonstrate their connection with the same enduring object -
that the problem of the external world arises for him.
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There is, however, a problem with what I've just said
about Hume ' s focus on the content of sense perceptions : Hume
does seem to think that one and the same intentional content
can be present to the mind in different ways. For according
to Hume the difference between an idea believed and an idea
merely entertained is simply that an idea believed feels
different than an idea merely entertained .
4
It is not clear, however, that in Hume's view identity
of content holds for the contents of sense perceptions
.
According to Hume ' s theory of ideas , ideas are copies of
impressions. So, two ideas that differ as mental acts or
vehicles may nevertheless be copies of a single impression
content and thereby have the same content. But the contents
of sense perceptions are not copies and hence cannot be
identical by virtue of being copies of the same thing. If
Hume thinks identical contents can be present in different
perceptions why does he speak only of the similarity of
perceptions and why does the problem of the external world
arise for him? Why should the fact that I only
intermittently perceive certain contents be worrisome if I
believe on reflection that the content I perceive at various
times is a single identical thing? Finally, even if Hume is
committed to the view that two different sense perceptions
can have literally the same content, what he says about the
problem of the external world seems to commit him to the
view that even qualitatively identical sense contents are
nevertheless different and hence we are not in sense aware
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of independent, continuous objects. If Hume does commit
himself to both the view that two different sense
perceptions can have literally the same content and the view
that even qualitatively identical sense contents are
nevertheless different, then the problem lies in Hume's lack
of consistency rather than in my interpretation of him.
Now, having made the point that by "perception" Hume
usually means to refer to perception content, in the
interests of simplicity I will mainly use Hume's own word,
'perception
' , to refer to perception contents, except where
I think the more accurate phrase will make things clearer.
2.7
In sum, Hume ' s explanation of the vulgar belief is
this: We find a constancy in certain perceptions, for
example, in our impressions of the sun. This constancy
consists in the fact that the perceptions we regard as
perceptions of the sun closely resemble one another. This
constancy leads us to consider the interrupted perceptions
as "individually the same", that is, identical (T, 199). Yet
their interruption also leads us to regard the resembling
perceptions as different. In order to remove this
contradiction, Hume says, we remove the interruption "by
supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected
by a real existence, of which we are insensible" (T, 199)
.
This supposition acquires force and vivacity from the memory
of the preceding similar impressions and the consequent
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propensity we have to consider them identical. Hence it
becomes a belief.
According to Hume, four features of this account
require explanation: (1) the principle of identity, (2) the
reason the resemblance of interrupted perceptions induces us
to attribute an identity to them, (3) the propensity this
"illusion" of identity gives to unite the interrupted
perceptions by the supposition of a continued existence, and
(4) the force and vivacity of the conception that results
from the propensity.
(1) What is the notion of identity involved in our
belief in the continued and independent existence of
sensible objects? Identity, Hume says, is the invariableness
and uninterruptedness of an object through time:
We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say, that an
object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that the
object existent at one time is the sarnie with itself existent
at another. . .
.
Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the
invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a
suppos'd variation of time. . . (T, 201)
.
(2) How does the resemblance or "constancy" we find
among our perceptions lead us to judge them identical? The
constancy of our perceptions makes us consider them
identical in spite of their being interrupted because we
confuse (i) the action of the mind when it contemplates a
single, unchanging, uninterrupted object with (ii) the
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action of the mind when it considers a number of numerically
different but resembling objects. We confuse these actions
of the mind due to their similarity to one another. We
confuse the objects of these different acts as well, for
whatever objects put the mind in similar dispositions are
apt to be mistaken for one another. Hume writes:
We find by experience, that there is such a constancy
in almost all the impressions of the senses, that their
interruption produces no alteration on them, and hinders
them not from returning the same in appearance and in
situation as at their first existence. I survey the
furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open
them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly
those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is
observ'd in a thousand instances, and naturally connects
together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the
strongest relation, and conveys the mind by an easy
transition from one to another. An easy transition or
passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these
different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same
disposition of mind with that in which we consider one
constant and uninterrupted perception. 'Tis therefore very
natural for us to mistake the one for the other (T, 204)
.
(3) How does the attribution of identity to our
resembling but interrupted perceptions lead us to the
supposition of continued and independent objects? According
to Hume, the natural or vulgar view is that the perception
or image is the external body. Hume's point is simply that
our natural view is that we are directly aware of external
objects themselves; we don't naturally hold the
philosophical "double existence theory," that is, the theory
of indirect realism. On the vulgar view the theoretical
distinction between perception and external object is not
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explicitly drawn; we naturally consider only sensible
objects. Hence Hume must consider how we come to attribute
continued existence to these objects in spite of their
interruptedness
.
Again, in our vulgar state we regard perception and
object as one, that is, we only consider sensible objects.
Now, certain perceptions display a constancy or resemblance
which makes us consider them identical . Yet their
interruptedness leads us to deny that they are identical
.
This conflict gives us an uneasiness which we overcome by
"feigning" a continued being (which in Hume's account of the
vulgar belief is the perception-content itself) to fill up
the gaps which otherwise militate against the ascription of
identity to resembling but undeniably interrupted
perceptions. Hume writes:
The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas
of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a
perfect identity. The interrupted manner of their appearance
makes us consider them as so many resembling, but still
distinct beings, which appear after certain intervals. The
perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a
propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction
of a continu'd existence. .. (T, 205).
(4) Why do we believe in the feigned continued object?
Because the propensity to feign the continued existence of
"all sensible objects" arises from "lively impressions of
the memory" and can thus transfer enough force and vivacity
to the idea of a continued object to render that idea a
belief. Hume writes:
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Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances
o perceptions perfectly resembling each other, that return
at different distances of time, and after considerable
interruptions. This resemblance gives us a propension to
consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also
a propension to connect them by a continu’d existence, in
order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction,
in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions
seems necessarily to involve us. Here then we have a
propensity to feign the continu'd existence of all sensible
objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively
impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that
fiction; or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd
existence of body (T, 208-9) .
2.8
So, according to Hume we are quite naturally led to
attribute a continued existence to "...sensible objects or
perceptions which we find to resemble each other..." (T,
210) . Yet "a very little reflection and philosophy is
sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of that opinion"
(T, 210) . By a propensity of the imagination we come to
believe in the continued existence of the objects of
perception. But objects have a continued existence if and
only if they have an independent existence. Hume says,
however, that "the doctrine of the independent existence of
our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest
experience" (T, 210) . For by a variety of simple experiments
we come to see that the sensible objects of which we are
aware are dependent for their existence and qualities on
factors such as our constitution and situation. So the
objects of sense perception have neither an independent nor
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a continuous existence. Our vulgar or ordinary belief in the
continued and distinct existence of sensible objects is a
fiction , " that is, the fiction of continued existence,
built on a "falsehood," that is, the false belief in the
identity of resembling but in fact distinct perceptions (T,
209) .
Philosophers, recognizing the above reasoning, develop
the "double existence" theory: the theory that there are
objects that are not themselves perceptions but which cause
our perceptions and are represented by (some of) them. These
supposed objects are thought to exist continuously and
independently, though our perceptions of them are
interrupted and dependent. The philosophical theory is the
theory of indirect realism. John Locke, for example,
expresses the basic points of this theory in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding . Locke writes,
Our Senses, conversant about particular sensible
Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct
Perceptions of things , according to those various ways
,
wherein those Objects do affect them. .. (Locke [1975], 105).
By real Ideas , I mean such as have a Foundation in
Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and
Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes ... .Not that
they are all of them the Images or Representations of what
does exist.... For these several Appearances, being designed
to be the Marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish
Things, which we have to do with; our Ideas do as well serve
us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing
Characteu, whether they be only constant Effects, or else
exact Resemblances of something in the things themselves:
the reality lying in that steady correspondence, they have
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with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings (Locke
[1975] , 372-3) .
When-ever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing
extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true
or false. Because the Mind in such a reference, makes a
tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that Thing. .. (Locke
[1975] , 385) .
Unfortunately, Hume says, the philosophical theory
suffers from the weaknesses of the vulgar view and others
besides. According to Hume, there are no principles of
reason or imagination which lead us directly to this theory;
we arrive at the double existence theory only by first
accepting the vulgar view. Moreover, the former gets its
influence from the latter.
Why is the double existence theory not supported by
reason? The only things of the existence of which we are
immediately aware, Hume holds, are perceptions. The only
means we have for concluding that something exists of which
we are not immediately aware (by sense or memory) is causal
reasoning. But causal reasoning is based on experience of
regular conjunction. Since the only things ever present to
the mind are perceptions , we can only observe constant
conjunctions between perceptions, not between perceptions
and extra-mental objects. Thus, Hume says,
" 'tis impossible,
therefore, that from the existence or any of the qualities
of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning
the existence of the latter..." (T, 212). We cannot support
the supposition that external objects exist by causal
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reasoning; a fortiori, we cannot support the supposition
that there are external objects that resemble and cause our
perceptions by causal reasoning.
This seems strong support for a skeptical
interpretation of Hume. Causation is constant conjunction.
We maintain the supposition of particular such conjunctions
only by presupposing the external world. But we can't prove
that such a world exists by causal or any other reasoning.
So our belief in causal connections, that is, invariable
conjunctions, can't support our belief in the external
world, since in the relevant cases it presupposes it. Nor
can our belief in the external world support our belief in
causal connections, since the only way of arguing to the
existence of an external world is by using causal inference,
which in this case is not only circular but impossible, for
we never experience the objects themselves in conjunction
with our perceptions.
The double existence theory is also not supported by
the imagination, according to Hume. What exactly Hume means
by this is not fully clear. I take him to mean that the
belief in the double existence theory is not one of those
beliefs that we naturally and inevitably form. It is
important for Hume's skepticism that the theory of double
existence isn't supported by the imagination, for this shows
that it is not just Cartesian reason that comes up short.
How and why do we come to formulate and hold the double
existence theory? What happens is this: The initial conflict
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between our attribution of identity to resembling
perceptions and our recognition of their interruptedness is
overcome on the vulgar level by the view that perceptions
have a continuous existence. On reflection, however, we see
that perceptions can have a continuous existence only if
they have an independent existence, which they clearly do
not. Hence there is a second conflict, a conflict between
what we naturally believe (the continued existence of our
perceptions) and what on philosophical reflection we see to
be true. To set ourselves at ease we contrive the double
existence theory, which seems to accommodate the beliefs
arising from both imagination and reason. We regard our
resembling perceptions as interrupted and dependent and the
objects as continuous and independent. Hume writes:
The imagination tells us, that our resembling
perceptions have a continu'd and uninterrupted existence,
and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells
us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in
their existence, and different from each other. The
contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of
reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities
to different existences; the interruption to perceptions,
and the continuance to objects (T, 215)
.
But again, the double existence theory is not supported
by reason. It is in principle rationally unjustifiable. Even
if the notion of justification is expanded to include
beliefs resulting from the regular operations of the
imagination, the double existence theory remains
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unjustified. Further, so does the vulgar belief, for by
ordinary empirical reasoning we can see that our perceptions
are dependent and hence that the vulgar belief is false.
2.9
Hume ends the section by saying that though he
initially thought we should trust implicitly in our senses
he is at this point inclined to repose no faith in his
senses or imagination rather than place full trust in them.
He tells us that he
...cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the
fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead
to any solid and rational system. They are the coherence and
constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of
their continu'd existence; tho' these qualities have no
perceivable connection with such an existence (T, 217) .
The philosophical system is not only unjustified but, Hume
adds, it both denies and asserts the vulgar position. The
philosophical system arises in part from a recognition of
the interruptedness and dependency of our sense perceptions.
But the philosophical system arbitrarily supposes a second
set of perceptions as the uninterrupted and independent
objects, for we can distinctly conceive objects only insofar
as they are "the same with" perceptions:
Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be
identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so
great a propensity to believe them such, that they
arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they
attribute these qualities . I say, a new set of perceptions:
For we may well suppose in general, but 'tis impossible for
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us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any
thing but exactly the same with perceptions (T, 218) .
Hume asks, "What then can we look for from this
confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error
and falsehood? And how can we justify to ourselves any
belief we repose in them?" (T, 218) . The skeptical doubt,
Hume says, can never be radically cured, and this doubt
Mar>i ses naturally from a profound and intense reflection" on
reason and the senses: "'Tis impossible upon any system to
defend either our understanding or senses and we but expose
them farther when we endeavor to justify them in that
manner" (T, 218) . According to Hume, the only remedy for
skepticism, the remedy that he himself relies on, is
"carelessness and in-attention" (T, 218)
.
Now, it is possible that Hume thinks that our senses
and reason do provide the knowledge which the skeptic denies
they do and that it is the attempt to justify them that we
must avoid. But what he actually says strongly suggests
otherwise. Our natural belief in the external world as a
world of continued and independent perceptions is clearly
false. The philosophical supposition of a world of continued
and independent objects of which our perceptions are
representations is in principle unjustifiable. [It seems
that the double existence theory is either without content
(if it purports to posit something essentially different
from perceptions) or else it's absurd (for insofar as it
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Posits objects which are essentially the same as perceptions
it both denies and affirms the vulgar theory) .
]
I think that belief in the existence of an external
world is a prime example of a belief that for Hume is both
unjustifiable and, for any extended period, unavoidable. It
is thus an example of Hume's implicit recognition, in the
Treatise , of the theoretical skepticism v. prescriptive
skepticism distinction. Note that Hume is not denying the
existence of an unobserved external world. Hume does not
make a knowledge claim with regard to the existence or non-
existence of an external, material world. Such a claim
would, as Galen Strawson points out, be at odds with Hume's
5
theoretical skepticism. Hume's skeptical claims about what
we can know must not be mistaken for nonskeptical claims
about what exists. Hume makes many important claims of the
former kind but few claims of the latter kind. It also seems
that Hume is not limiting the inability to justify this
belief to rationalist approaches to justification. There is
no sign of such limitation in these passages.
Hume says that conflicting beliefs arise from the
imagination and that reason and the imagination conflict. It
is significant that the natural workings of the imagination
lead to a conflict of beliefs which is overcome only as a
result of "trivial qualities of the fancy" operating in
conjunction with false suppositions. This suggests that
imagination is not a source of justification and is not
itself to be trusted implicitly.
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The upshot is that Hume presents a powerful theoretical
skepticism with regard to all beliefs and knowledge claims
the truth of which requires that sensible objects have a
continued and independent existence or that there exist some
other independent material objects of which the sensible
objects we directly apprehend are the effects and
representations. This, I take it, qualifies as a serious
theoretical skepticism with regard to knowledge of the
external world.
3
Unfortunately, a serious interpretive problem exists
with regard to my characterization of Hume's views in T,
I. IV. II, a problem which is directly relevant to the issue
of Hume’s skepticism. I have presented Hume as a theoretical
rather than a conceptual skeptic with regard to our beliefs
about the external world. But this requires that he hold,
with regard to a certain class of statements, that belief in
those statements is rationally unjustified (and hence cannot
constitute knowledge) . But this seems to require that those
statements at least be meaningful . To be a theoretical
skeptic with regard to a matter of fact statement S is to
hold that S may be true and S may be false but we cannot be
rationally justified in believing or asserting S or in
believing or asserting ~S. But if S can be true or false
then S must be meaningful. So, if statements about the
existence of external material objects are meaningless, then
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they cannot be either true or false. Hence they cannot be an
appropriate target of theoretical skepticism.
In T, I. IV. II Hume says that the "vulgar"
...confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a
distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or
see (T, 193)
.
Hume also says that ordinary people do not distinguish, as
the philosophers do, "betwixt the objects and perceptions of
the senses" (T, 202) , but instead "suppose their perceptions
to be their only objects" (T, 205) and "suppose that the
very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the
real body or material existence" (T, 206)
.
What Hume means is that the vulgar believe that they
are, in perception, immediately aware of external objects as
they are in themselves. So the vulgar believe that the
immediate objects of perception are continued and
independent. It is this that philosophy shows to be false -
according to the philosophers, the immediate objects of
perception, sensible objects, are mental contents or
intentional objects, which are dependent for their existence
and nature on the minds that perceive them.
But when we compare experiments, and reason a little
upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the
independent existence of our sensible perceptions is
contrary to the plainest experience (T, 210)
.
Now, if Hume holds that the immediate objects of
perception are mental contents and that these cannot exist
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independently of us, then it would seem that he is not
skeptical about the issue - for he holds that we can know
that the immediate objects of perception do not constitute
an ’’external world".
According to Hume, the philosophers hold an alternative
theory, the theory of "double existence". According to the
double existence theory", though the immediate objects of
perception are mental contents, these contents are caused by
and (at least in some of their features) represent
independent objects having only primary qualities. Since
objects having only primary qualities are inconceivable, the
claim that such objects exist is conceptually empty. [See
"Of the modern philosophy," T, I. IV. IV, 227-231.] So here
too there is no theoretical skepticism, though there is a
conceptual skepticism.
I think, however, that in "Of Scepticism with regard to
the senses" Hume actually has in mind at least one other
alternative theory, a theory that the philosophers
inadvertently share with the vulgar. [He also considers a
further candidate for continued and independent object in
"Of the antient philosophy", T, I. IV. Ill, 219-25.]
To begin with the ordinary person's view: I said that
Hume thinks the ordinary person draws no distinction between
perception and object, but simply regards himself as being,
in sense perception, immediately aware of independent
objects as they are in themselves. But that is not a fully
accurate statement of Hume's view. It can't be fully
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accurate because Hume says things that show that his view is
more complicated and more true to our ordinary way of
thinking than my initial statement of it suggested.
In T, I. IV. II, discussing the distinction between
primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities, Hume says, "Both
philosophers and the vulgar. . .esteem the third [that is,
tertiary qualities] to be merely perceptions; and
consequently interrupted and dependent beings" (T, 192) .
This clearly suggests that the vulgar draw some distinction
between objective and purely subjective elements in sense
perception. Hume also says, in dismissing philosophical
arguments as the source of our ordinary belief in an
external world, that it is not by these arguments that
ordinary people "are induc'd to attribute objects to some
impressions, and deny them to others" (T, 193)
.
I believe that such statements as those quoted in the
last paragraph show that Hume does allow the ordinary person
a more sophisticated view than some of his other statements
suggest. Hume's view is not that the ordinary person thinks
that in sense perception he is immediately aware of
independent objects as they are in themselves period. The
ordinary person recognizes, of course, that he sometimes
dreams, that he sees things from different perspectives as
having properties that are not consistent with one another,
that he sometimes drinks too much (or, perhaps, too little)
and sees pink elephants that don't really exist, and so on.
Hume could be charged with grossly overestimating the
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ordinary person's naivete and credulity if he didn't allow
that we recognize that sometimes things are not as we
perceive them, and I think it unlikely that Hume would be so
unaware of how we ordinarily think.
I believe that the view that Hume attributes to the
vulgar is the view that in at least some cases of sense
perception - cases of ordinary, non-hallucinatory
,
perception - we are immediately aware of independent objects
as they are in themselves. And of course this is denied by
those philosophers who hold the double existence theory, for
according to that theory we are never immediately aware of
independent objects in this way. The double existence
theory, insofar as it denies that we are ever immediately
aware of independent objects, is not the contrary but rather
the contradictory of the vulgar view.
Now, according to Hume the immediate objects of
perception are mental contents (what he calls "perceptions")
which in fact are mind-dependent. The vulgar do not believe
that perceptions so conceptualized, possess an independent
existence. This would be an absurd view. Rather, the vulgar
believe of these immediate objects of perception, which are
in fact dependent and interrupted, that they continue to
exist when not perceived. And it can be shown that this is
in fact false. The objects of which we are immediately aware
are dependent on us for their existence. The vulgar,
however, can also be said to believe that there are objects
which have the kinds of properties - colors, smells, etc. -
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of which we are immediately aware in perception and that
these objects have a continued and independent existence.
This belief is both meaningful (the idea of such an object
has impression-content, unlike, say, the idea of a
propertyless substance) and such that we cannot know it to
be true or false (that there are such objects is a matter of
fact to which we have no access, immediate or inferential).
We can call this belief the "vulgar theory." It is this
belief or theory, which I think we ordinarily do hold, that
is the appropriate object of Hume's theoretical skepticism.
What about the philosophical double existence theory?
This theory , if taken as including the view that the objects
which cause our perceptions are bare substances or
substances having only primary qualities, lacks determinate
content and so is the appropriate object of Hume's
conceptual skepticism. However, Hume seems to think that
this theory often is held in a form in which it is virtually
identical with the vulgar theory I described above. Why do I
say this? For one thing, at the end of the section, Hume
writes
:
Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be
identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so
great a propensity to believe them such, that they
arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they
attribute these qualities. I say, a new set of perceptions:
For we may well suppose in general, but 'tis impossible for
us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any
thing but exactly the same with perceptions (T, 218) . [Also
see "Of the idea of existence and of external existence", T,
I. II. VI, 66-68.]
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If the theory of the philosophers is to have any
content, that content must come ultimately from perceptions,
thus if they believe in the existence of independent
objects, then insofar as that belief has determinate content
those objects must have the kinds of qualities of which we
are aware in perception. But the view that there are
independent objects having the kinds of qualities of which
we are immediately aware in perception is the "theory" of
the vulgar.
Why should we think Hume does allow determinate content
the double existence theory? Well , besides his words
quoted above, to the effect that philosophers invent a new
set of perceptions to play the role of independent and
continued objects, there is the fact that he presents a
skeptical argument to show that we cannot infer the
existence of independent objects from our perceptions
because (i) the existence of such objects is a question of
fact, and (ii) we cannot causally infer that such unobserved
objects exist because we never experience the conjunctions
of independent objects with perceptions necessary for causal
inference to get going. Now, if Hume thinks that the theory
of double existence is, in all its forms, meaningless, why
would he say that the existence of its objects is a question
of fact and why would he bother producing an argument to
show that we cannot have knowledge of the existence of such
objects?
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So, I think there are really three main views Hume is
considering in "Of scepticism with regard to the senses" and
that he has a different attitude toward each:
(i) What Hume considers false is the view that in sense
perception we are immediately aware of independent objects
as they are in themselves
.
(ii) What Hume considers unintelligible and what is hence
the object of conceptual skepticism, is the view that there
are objects that are specifically different from the
immediate objects of perception (and which cause them)
.
(iii) What is the object of theoretical skepticism is the
view that there are mind-independent objects specifically
like the immediate objects of perception (and which cause
them) . This is the vulgar theory, which is also
inadvertently held by the philosophers.
4
There is, however, still a problem. I have said that
Hume would be attributing an absurd view to the vulgar if he
did attribute to them the view that mental contents can
exist independent of a mind. But does not Hume himself say
that a perception can exist apart from any mind? There are
several passages in which Hume suggests this, but he
explicitly states this possibility in T, I.IV.II itself:
. . .we may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing
but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united
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together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely,
to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now asevery perception is distinguishable from another, and may be
consider'd as separately existent; it evidently follows,
that there is no absurdity in separating any particular
perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its
relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which
constitutes a thinking being (T, 207)
.
But the ordinary person can think coherently of
sensible objects as existing independently of any mind just
insofar as he conceives physical external objects as the
immediate objects of perception, that is, just insofar as he
the mistaken theory of direct realism. The ordinary
person, insofar as he considers his perceptions as non
veridical, as hallucinations or dreams, say, cannot
coherently believe that those perceptions can exist
independently, for in distinguishing dreams, etc., from
ordinary cases of perception we ordinarily conceptualize
dream-objects as mind-dependent in contrast to the
supposedly mind-independent objects of ordinary sense
perception. It is Hume himself, employing the theory of
ideas, who can conceive of dream-objects existing
independently of any mind, for Hume sees that in all cases
of perception we are immediately acquainted with a mental
content. Hume as a philosopher can assume an ontologically
neutral stance with respect to sensible objects that the
ordinary person does not. Hume announces his assumption of
the neutral stance when he says that he will refer to a
sensible object indifferently as either an "object or
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perception"
, depending on which best suits the purpose of
our ordinary belief in continued and independent
objects (T, 202)
.
Still, Hume is explaining how the vulgar themselves
come to believe in continued and independent existence. So
shouldn ' t his claims about the independence of perceptions
be ascribed to the ordinary person? I think not. The
possibility Hume is considering when he talks about the
distinguishabili ty and separability of perceptions is
logical /conceptual possibility. It is logically/conceptually
possible that the content of a perception exist apart from
any mind. Because the content of a perception is
logically/conceptually independent of a mind it is possible
for the ordinary person to conceive that content
independently of conceiving a mind. But in fact, Hume says,
we find that such contents, as far as we can know, are
dependent on our minds: "...our conclusions from experience
are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the
independency of our perceptions" (T, 191) . As Hume
explicitly (over) states the point, an "infinite number
of .. .experiments" show that "...our sensible perceptions are
not posses t of any distinct or independent existence" (T,
211) . Or, as he puts it somewhat more moderately,
But when we compare experiments, and reason a little
upon them we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the
independent existence of our sensible perceptions is




' the logical /conceptual independence of perception
contents allows the ordinary person to conceive the actual
independence of such a content and to believe, mistakenly,
in that actual independence.
Consider the following:
X believes that:
(B) : Perception p is mind-dependent and mind-independent.
(B) would be an absurd belief, and insofar as the ordinary
person considers certain of his perceptions mind-dependent




(B*) : Perception p is mind independent.
It is possible for the ordinary person to hold (B*) without
absurdity even when p is in fact mind-dependent. For it
might be that he simply does not recognize p's mind-
dependence. The ordinary person's belief that mind-dependent
perceptions are mind-independent must, in other words, be
interpreted de re, not de dicto. While it is often true that
there is some mind-dependent perception content such that
its perceiver believes it to be mind-independent, it seems
it would seldom if ever be true that a perceiver believes
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that there is some mind-dependent perception content that is
mind-independent
.
The fact that the logical /conceptual independence of
perception contents allows the ordinary person to conceive
the actual independence of such a content and to believe,
mistakenly, in its actual independence, does not mean that
the ordinary person explicitly grasps the logical /conceptual
possibility of the content existing by itself, though it is
that logical /conceptual possibility that allows him to
mistakenly believe in the actual independence of the
immediate objects of perception, that is, sensible objects.
So neither an absurd belief such as B nor the sophisticated
philosophical belief in the logical/conceptual independence
of perception contents need be ascribed to the vulgar.
I said that the ordinary person's belief that mind-
dependent perceptions are mind-independent must be
interpreted de re, not de dicto. One might object that
reading a de re/de dicto distinction into Hume is not only
anachronistic but misleading, given Hume's theories of idea
formation and belief. For on Hume's view belief is vivid
conception rather than an "attitude" toward a proposition.
Hence, one might say, there is no room for the distinction
between de re and de dicto belief. For me to have a belief
of some in fact mind-dependent mental content that it is
mind-independent would be for me to vividly conceive (that
is, have a vivid idea of) that content as mind-independent.
So I would have to be able to represent its mind-
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independence, which is something that Hume's theory of idea
formation would seem to preclude. For what feature of the
idea of what is in fact a mental content could represent
mind- independence
?
I think, however, that (i) to make sense of what Hume
says in T, I. IV. II we must employ the de re/de dicto
distinction even at the risk of anachronism, and (ii) we can
employ that distinction in a way that fits with Hume's
theory. Consider again an ordinary person's belief that a
certain sensible object has an independent existence. For
Hume, that belief consists in a vivid conception of that
object (a conception that in addition is involuntary and may
have behavioral consequences) . That object is in fact mind-
dependent. But the ordinary person's belief that it is mind-
independent consists in a vivid conception of that object
that does not include a conception of a mind or perceiver.
This is the de re belief. No extra element is required to
represent mind-independence. Recall that I said the ordinary
person's belief should be interpreted de re, not de dicto. I
did not say that there had to be a de dicto interpretation
of the belief. On Hume's theory, there could be no de dicto
version of such a belief. For a de dicto version of the
belief in mind-independent sensible objects would be
contadictory and hence not a possible vivid conception
because not a possible conception at all
.
Still, one might say, in order for me to have a belief
in the existence of an object X independent of something Y
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it is not sufficient that I have a vivid conception of X
that does not include a conception of Y. That is, I think,
true. But that points to a problem with Hume's theory of
itself rather than my interpretation of T, I. IV. II.
Generally, Hume's official theory of belief lacks a
recognition and account of what is sometimes called the
"logical structure" of thought. For example, the belief that
an apple exists at a specific time differs from the simple
conception of an apple in ways other than its
phenomenological "force", but Hume's official theory of
belief doesn't adequately account for or even explicitly
6
recognize those differences. Again, however, this is a




Notes To Chapter V
1.
The Restricted Conjunction Rule is a rule of the
probability calculus. It states:
RCR: Where P and Q are independent, Prob(P&Q) = Prob(P) x
Prob(Q)
2.
Fogelin suggests this point in saying that if we reject
Hume's mistaken claim that all probabilities ultimately
reduce to nothing, Hume's argument becomes simply a version
an anci®nt skeptical regress argument. See Hume's




Fogelin makes the same point. He writes,
Hume is thus uncompromising in saying that
understanding - when it acts alone - is thoroughly self-
destructive. Understanding is not self-correcting (Fogelin
[1985] , 21.)
.
Fogelin notes that Hume's explanation of how we nevertheless
have beliefs refers to the "balancing of causal factors"
(p.21) , not to any solution to the skeptical problem which
would show our beliefs to be rationally justified. According
to Fogelin,
...even if Hume's argument does not show what it is
supposed to show, his intentions are plain. He holds that
there is no rational response to the skeptical argument he
has produced. He accepts a theoretical skepticism that is
wholly unmitigated (Fogelin [1985] , 22)
.
4.
The claim that for Hume the difference between an idea
believed and an idea entertained is a matter of feeling must
be qualified. As I said in chapter I, though Hume officially
characterizes belief as vivid conception, he also
characterizes belief in terms of its fixedness and its
influence on behavior. Recall that in the "Appendix" to the
Treatise Hume says that the manner in which the ideas
composing a belief are conceived.
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...gives them more force and influence; makes them
appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and
renders them the governing principles of all our actions (T,
Hume states the point in virtually identical language in E
V.II.
5 * See The Secret Connection (Strawson [1989]), especially
11-14, and 275-84. This point is made also by David Fate
Norton, in David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical
Metaphysician (Norton [1982]). Norton writes that in Hume's
skepticism
. . .doubting and denying are not only thought to be
quite different activities, but fundamentally antithetical
activities as well (Norton [1982], ix)
.
6. Though Hume's official theory of belief doesn't
adequately account for the kind of reference to particular
times and places that often is essential to a belief, he
does recognize that such reference is involved in many of
our beliefs. In the first Enquiry , Hume discusses his belief
that a person is presently in the next room. Though he
doesn't observe the person, he infers that he is currently
there from the sound of his voice. Hume writes,
This impression of my senses immediately conveys my
thought to the person, together with all the surrounding
objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at




HUME AS METASKEPTIC: THE BAIER INTERPRETATION
1
In A Progress of Sentiments (Baier [1991]), Annette
Baier argues that the only skepticism that can truly be
attributed to Hume is "metascepticism", that is, "scepticism
turned on itself, diffidence about the sceptic's
conclusions" (Baier [1991], 302). Baier rejects Fogelin's
a ^^-r -Lkution to Hume of a theoretical but not prescriptive
skepticism with regard to causal inference:
The theoretical sceptic takes all causal inferences to
be without warrant, but, unlike the prescriptive sceptic,
continues to make them. This sounds like the hypocritical
rather than the true sceptic, and I do not see Hume as
having any toleration for such a split between habits and
acknowledged norms (Baier, 57)
.
According to Baier, Hume's "true" skeptic prescribes
diffidence but nevertheless attempts to find "habits that
are endorseable . " Hume, as a true skeptic, does not abandon
norms of reasoning but rather finds and adheres to new norms
- endorseable habits: "Hume's eventual true "sceptic"
is... one who is attempting to bear his own survey, to find
habits that are endorseable" (Baier, 58)
.
Baier puts great weight on the fact that Hume employs
causal inference and explanation throughout the Treatise .
She says that "...if Hume really distrusts causal inference,
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and the inductions on which, if he is right, it rests, then
he must distrust his own Treatise " (Baier, 55). Baier also
puts great weight on -Rules by which to judge of causes and
effects (T, I. III. XV), in which Hume presents rules to
guide us in making causal judgments. Noting that Hume refers
to these rules as a "Logic," Baier asks, "Can this be
scepticism?" It can be, she answers, "Only if the whole of
section XV can be treated as a piece of particularly
sustained and heavy irony" (Baier, 56)
.
In fact, Baier says, in T, I. III. XV Hume seems to be
"...endorsing eight rules and telling us that by using them
we can find out what really causes what" (Baier, 59)
.
According to Baier, Hume is giving an account of how custom
and the associative unions it forms in our imaginations "can
have 'equal weight and authority '.. .with the 'arguments' of
'reason'" (Baier, 59). Again, Baier puts emphasis on the
fact that Hume continues to engage in causal reasoning after
T , 1 . 1 1 1 . VI . She wri tes
:
Th® true sceptic must wonder what sort of reasoning it
be that can continue without implicit deference to
norms of reasoning, without any inference warrants. Hume
seems to take himself to be able, in good faith, to continue
(Baier, 59)
.
For Baier, then, Hume does not deny that causal
inferences are warranted or rationally justified; rather,
"Hume's be Id and interesting question is what a warrant is
like when it comes from sources other than the human
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2
According to Baier, though Hume eventually uses
"reason" to refer to various "endorseable thought
transitions," Hume’s argument in T, I.m.vi and his
argument in T, I. IV. I, are directed only against reason as a
tracer of intelligible connections or relations of ideas:
If we read Section VI of Part III carefully, we willfind that the negative conclusions concern "intelligibility"
in the narrow sense in which it means what we would call
interdeducibility. The "reason" whose limits Hume draws in
Section VI is the tracer of "intelligible" connections
(Baier, 61)
.
Baier argues that Hume, having shown that causes do not
imply their effects, argues further in Section VI that
...it is only experience, not deductive reason even when
that is helped by experience" that is responsible for our
belief in the conclusions of causal inferences (Baier, 64)
.
According to Baier, Hume is merely trying to show, in T,
I. III. VI, that it is experience and the associative
principles of the imagination, rather than reason "as the
rationalists construe it" that produce our causal
inferences . Baier claims that when Hume says we have no
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says
reason to determine us to make causal inferences, that
should not be taken to mean that we have no varrant for
those inferences. On Baier 's interpretation, when Hume
we have no reason to make these inferences he means only
that deductive reason is not the cause or part of the cause
of our making them. Hume's supposed skeptical argument
concerning induction, Baier writes,
...is introduced by the causal question, "Whether
experience produces the idea by means of the understanding
or of the imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason
to make the transition, or by a certain association and
relation of perceptions" (T. 88-89). The "idea" here is the
lively idea that is the conclusion of the causal inference.
It is already established that the transition to this idea
is "founded on past experience" and on some sort of memory
of the constant conjunctions we have experienced. Now the
question is how this memory influences or determines our
inference. Is it by some explicitly formulated
generalization, along with deductive inference from that to
a conclusion about the current case? It is to this question
that Hume gives us a negative answer. It is no more
sceptical an answer than that given to the parallel question
Section III, namely whether we can get a sound deductive
inference to the conclusion that every event has some cause
(Baier, 67)
.
Hume refers to probability in the supposedly skeptical
argument of T, 1. 1 1 1. VI, Baier says, only in order to see
whether rationalist reason "can get assurance of the
principle of induction by other means" (Baier, 67)
.
According to Baier, the appeal to probability violates only
the rationalists' demand for non-circular justification: "It
is reason that needs a "principle," spelled out and ready to
serve as part of a demonstration" (Baier, 68)
.
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Baier, like Stove, sees Hume's argument in T, I. III. VI
as directed solely against attempts to provide deductive
support for the uniformity principle:
...the argument here concerns the evidence, or rather
the lack of evidence, for an explicit principle that is
needed, or thought to be needed, for a valid demonstrative
argument whose conclusion would be, "This fire will burn my
hand painfully, if I put it in the fire." It is not an
argument about the presuppositions of inferences not
purporting to be demonstrative (Baier, 68)
.
Baier, however, differs significantly from Stove in
that while Stove saw Hume as committed to a
rationalist/deductivist notion of justification according to
which my belief in Q justifies my belief in P only if Q
entails P, Baier sees Hume as rejecting such a notion.
According to Stove, Hume from the outset thinks there is
only one form of good inference, deductive inference.
According to Baier this is one of the rationalist views to
which Hume is explicitly opposed. Still, the interpretations
of Baier and Stove are similar in that both see Hume's
argument of T, I. III.VI as directed only against the
possibility of deductive support for the uniformity
principle. According to Baier, Hume's conclusion is simply
that
Reason , using reason ' s rules of evidence and proof
,
cannot establish the "principle" that reason needs, to





Baier emphasizes that T, I. III. VI occurs as part of a
larger project of analyzing causal inference. She also
emphasizes Hume's use of causal inference to explain our
causal inferences and how causal association differs from
other forms of association in producing "constancy in our
mind set" after we've had "constancy in past experience"
(Baier, 73) . The project of analyzing causal inference will
result, in Section XV, in an endorsement of rules for making
causal inferences, according to Baier. Baier denies that
Hume is a skeptic with regard to causal inference. She
claims that even in discussing probabilities Hume shows a
"resolute adherence to faith in that familiar maxim that a
cause is always necessary" (Baier, 84)
.
According to Baier, Hume considers causal inference
justified by its reflexivlty. Causal inference is reflexive
in that we can successfully provide causal explanations for
our causal inferences themselves. This is, of course, just
what Hume does in the Treatise . Hume explains causal
inference as the effect of a present impression, experience
of regular conjunction, and a habit of association involving
transfer of vivacity, which together cause a person to form
a certain vivid idea.
According to Baier, Hume's much-discussed and often-
criticized double definition of 'cause' itself captures the
reflexivity of causal reasoning. How? By itself displaying a
"meta-causal" relation between the "foreign objects" of the
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first version of the definition, previously experienced
conjunctions, and the "foreign object" of the second version
of the definition, the union of the ideas of the conjoined
objects in the human mind. The causal relation between the
"foreign objects" of the first version of the definition and
the foreign object of the second version has been traced
throughout Part III, as Hume has shown how experience of
constant conjunction, together with the mind's habits of
association and vivacity transfer and the occurrence of a
new appropriate impression determine the mind in causal
inferences. The impression of this determination itself
gives rise to the idea of necessity which forms a part of
our concept of cause. This idea of cause can then be used in
giving a causal explanation of its own genesis, as Hume has
done in the Treatise Part III. In this way , the concept of
cause captured by Hume's double definition is successfully
reflexive:
Hume can be confident that his definition does present
the truth about our concept of cause, precisely because the
definition displays how the concept, under this analysis,
can successfully be turned on itself. It is a self-
demonstrating and self-verifying real definition, arrived at
by a causal investigation into our concept of
cause. . . (Baier, 91)
.
Baier, like Beauchamp and Rosenberg, makes much of
Hume's presentation, in "Rules by which to judge of causes
and effects" (T, I. III. XV, 173-6), of rules for judging when
seemingly causally related objects "really are so."
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According to Baier, Hume regards these rules as having
normative force precisely because reasoning that conforms to
them is successfully reflexive:
The acceptability of the definition of cause depends
upon its reflexivity, and that encapsulates the reflexivity
of the reasoning leading up to it. The rules that Hume
enunciates and endorses in the following section also get
their normative force from the fact that reasoning
conforming to them has just been demonstrated to be capable
of being turned successfully on itself (Baier, 93)
.
In fact, Baier claims, Hume has shown that this is so in the
previous sections of the Treatise , for he has himself been
following these rules in his reasoning. Importantly, Hume
has followed these rules in arriving at and confirming
"...his hypotheses concerning what causes our ideas, our
inferences, and our degrees of belief and disbelief" (Baier,
93). In other words, the rules for causal reasoning which
Hume espouses in T, 1. 1 1 1. XV have been followed in Hume's
investigation of causal reasoning itself, an investigation
which culminates in his endorsement of those very rules as
normative.
For Baier, the whole Treatise is a search for "mental
operations that can bear their own survey," a search for
"norms with the sort of grounding that a reflective
naturalist can accept" (Baier, 97)
.
According to Baier, Hume
has not abandoned normative principles but has articulated
new normative principles based on endorseable habits of
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belief formation. Beliefs formed through the operation of
such habits are rationally justified. Baier says that Hume
...in Part III ,... thinks he has found mental causes
that do not "shoulder aside reasons," indeed that he has
discovered which mental causes are good reasons. They are
those which exhibit the workings of habits of belief-
formation which can "bear their own survey". . . (Baier, 96) .
The inferences or mental transitions that we can endorse
are "the ones that can become successfully reflexive.
Successful reflexivity is normativity" (Baier, 99-100) . So,
since causal inference (in accord with certain norms) is
successfully reflexive, it is endorseable, and beliefs
formed through causal inference are rationally justified.
4
I will begin my response to Baier with a few minor
points. Baier states the issue as if those who interpret
Hume as a skeptic must say that he "distrusts" causal
inference. But that is silly. You show that you trust a form
of inference by being willing to use it. Hume is willing to
use causal inference; he thinks we can't help using it. In
fact, on Hume's view our trust in causal inference is
instinctive. That does not mean, however, that he thinks it
is rationally justified.
Baier says Hume only distinguishes "true" from "false"
and "smiling" from "unsmiling" skepticism in the Treatise . I
don't think that's true. In "Of the antient philosophy" (T,
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I. IV. Ill, 219-25) Hume distinguishes the true philosophers,
who are marked by their "moderate skepticism," from those
philosophers who take refuge in meaningless terms such as
"faculty and occult quality" and from "the people," that is,
the non-philosophical majority of mankind (T, 224). Hume's
words here explicitly suggest a distinction between moderate
and immoderate skepticism. What are these two types of
skepticism? It is not clear exactly what distinction Hume
has in mind, but the moderate skepticism of the true
philosopher is at least in part a result of his having
recognized that terms such as "occult quality" and
"substance" are "...wholly insignificant and unintelligible"
(T, 224) . So it seems that the moderate skeptic holds a
conceptual skepticism with regard to statements containing
certain philosophical terms. Now, Hume does seem to think
that we can refrain from engaging in the use of meaningless
philosophical jargon. So the contrast between the immoderate
skeptic and the moderate skeptic is not that one is a
conceptual skeptic and the other is a prescriptive skeptic
with regard to claims involving terms such as "occult
cjuality." The immoderate skeptic, it seems plausible to
suppose, would either be a person who proposes to extend the
conceptual skepticism which is correct with regard to
certain bits of philosophical terminology to ordinary
discourse or a person who holds a prescriptive skepticism
with regard to our ordinary beliefs and claims.
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Beyond the moderate/immoderate distinction in T,
I. IV. Ill, Hume, in T, I. IV. VII, strongly suggests the
distinction between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive
skepticism. As I noted in Chapter I, the skepticism which
Hume says we ought to preserve "in all the incidents of
life," the skepticism which is displayed in "blind
submission" to human nature, cannot be a prescriptive
skepticism. For Hume says that he has no choice but to act
and judge even after his skeptical ruminations. So the
skepticism displayed in submission to human nature must be
theoretical. In contrasting his true skepticism with a vain
attempt to refrain from judging, Hume employs the
distinction between theoretical and prescriptive skepticism,
though he does not himself use the terms "theoretical
skepticism" or "prescriptive skepticism."
Baier also says that Hume sees it as a manifest
contradiction to live by habits when we can't establish that
we ought to live so. On this basis she rejects the
attribution to Hume of a theoretical but nonprescriptive
skepticism, which she regards as hypocritical. Baier
supports this claim by reference to T, I. IV. VII, where Hume
says
Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence
upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a
rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which
implies a manifest contradiction (T, 268) .
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But Hume says this as a response to and rejection of
the suggestion that skepticism can be avoided by
distinguishing between the "trivial" and the "more
establish d" properties of the imagination. His conclusion
in the paragraph in which he speaks of a "manifest
contradiction" is that we have "...no choice left but
betwixt a false reason and none at all" <T, 268). it seems
to me that Hume's words here can hardly be taken as
suggesting the possibility of endorseable habits. Rather, he
seems to be pointing out the inescapable epistemological
predicament we humans are in.
The distinction between theoretical and prescriptive
skepticism not only allows us consistently to hold that
certain views and practices are not rationally justified
without prescribing their abandonment, it also allows us
consistently to prescribe policies for which we can provide
no rational justification. This does, perhaps, sound
uncomfortably close to hypocrisy. But in what way is Hume
(or a person who accepts Hume's skeptical conclusions and
also prescribes following the rules for causal reasoning
that Hume espouses) a hypocrite so long as he himself is
doing as he says should be done? In no way, as far as I can
see
.
Baier notes that Hume says it is superfluous to disavow
total skepticism since no one could be such a skeptic. But
this total skepticism that is impossible for us and hence
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superfluous to disavow is practical skepticism. In the
relevant passage Hume writes:
Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has
determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor
can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a
stronger and fuller light, upon their customary connexion
with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from
thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding
bodies, when we turn our eyes toward them in broad sunshine.
Whoever has taken pains to refute the cavils of this total
scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and
endeavour'd by arguments to establish a faculty, which
nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render'd
unavoidable. (T, I. IV. I, 183).
Hume's response here is clearly to the suggestion that we
should "forbear" judging, but that suggestion is made by the
prescriptive skeptic, not the theoretical skeptic. The fact
that Hume says this kind of skepticism is impossible doesn't
support the claim that he disavows the kind of theoretical
skepticism that Fogelin and I attribute to him.
5
Baier, like Stove, Beauchamp, and Rosenberg, claims
that the argument usually identified as Hume's argument for
inductive skepticism is in fact not directed at inductive
inference at all. Baier seems to think it significant that
Hume introduces his argument with a "causal question." For
if Hume is seeking the cause of our inferences, perhaps he
is not constructing a skeptical argument concerning causal
inference. But this is really just the same old issue of how
Hume can engage in causal inference throughout the Treatise
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if he is a skeptic about inductive and hence causal
inference. It is easily answered in terms of the distinction
between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive skepticism,
and by reference to Hume's determinist theory of belief.
Baier, like Stove, and Beauchamp and Rosenberg, sees
Hume's argument as directed only against deductive arguments
for the UP. So, many of the same considerations that applied
to their interpretations apply to hers as well. Two that
seem especially relevant to Baier are the following.
(1) Throughout Hume's texts we see a concern with
arguments which are "probable" in the sense that their
premises do not entail their conclusions - what I've called
"I -probable" arguments. Further, causal inference, the only
form of inference which can take us outside the confines of
present perception and memory, is probable in this sense.
So, it seems implausible that Hume is not concerned with the
legitimacy of causal inference and is not considering the
possibility of I-probable arguments in T, I. III. VI.
(2) Even if Hume is only explicitly considering valid
arguments for the UP, inductive support for it is excluded
by the fact that at least one premise of any valid argument
having the UP as its conclusion will either itself be a
conclusion of an inductive inference or will be such that
somewhere in the chain of justification leading to it a
statement derived by inductive inference occurs. Such an
inference will, on Hume's view, presuppose the UP. Hence any
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such attempt to justify the UP by an I-probable
will be question begging.
argument
6.1
Perhaps because Barer, unlike Stove, sees Hume as an
anti-deduct!vist, she insists that Hume's argument is
directed only against "rationalist" reason, reason as a
tracer of intelligible connections." In fact, throughout
Progress of Sentiments
, Baier reads Hume's seemingly
skeptical arguments and claims as directed solely against a
rationalist position. So, according to Baier, when Hume says
that "reason" cannot justify a belief or practice, he does
not mean that no warrant or rational justification can be
provided for it, but only that no warrant can be provided on
a rationalist basis.
What Baier seems to have in mind as the rationalism
that she thinks is the target of Hume's attack is a view
such as this: Knowledge must be based on a foundation of
statements which are "seen” to be true by intuition. An
acceptable knowledge claim must concern either an intuited
statement or statements or a statement or statements
inferred from intuited statements via a valid form of
inference. Of course, on this view not all acceptable
knowledge claims need be directly inferred from intuited
statements, but the set of intuited statements provides the
point and foundation of knowledge, and the only




according to Baier, Hume's seemingly skeptical arguments in
the Treatise and the first Enquiry are actually directed
only against the rationalist view I've just sketched and are
intended to show only that rationalism does not provide the
support for various beliefs or knowledge claims that its
adherents claim it does.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that Hume's skepticism
is not restricted to showing the inadequacies of rationalism
is his consideration of our belief in the continued and
distinct existence of material objects, in "Of scepticism
with regard to the senses" (T, I. IV. II, 187-218). Skepticism
concerning the external world perfectly fits Hume's analysis
of causal inference combined with his view that "...nothing
is ever present to the mind but perceptions" (T, I.IIVI,
67) . We can make causal inferences only on the basis of
exPeri©nced conjunctions. We don't experience the
conjunctions of perceptions with independent objects
necessary for causal inference to apply; we directly
experience only perceptions. Therefore, we have no way of
knowing that an independent world of material objects
corresponding to our perceptions exists. So, even if Hume
did not hold an inductive skepticism and did hold that
causal inference, being self-reflexive, is rationally
justified, given his view that we directly apprehend only
perceptions, we cannot have any basis to infer the existence
of an independent world of material objects. We simply lack




In the first Enquiry, Section XII, Part I, Hume
says there is no argument from experience to support the
existence of objects corresponding to our impressions and
ideas. This too tells against Baier's claim that Hume's
skeptical pronouncements are directed only against
rationalism, not those ways of inferring, such as causal
reasoning
, that can "bear their own scrutiny."
Further evidence is provided by the argument in "Of
scepticism with regard to reason" (T, I. IV. I, 180-87), which
applies to both probable and demonstrative reasoning. It is
an argument concerning the understanding considered as "the
general and more establish’d properties of the imagination,"
as Hume himself describes it later, in T, I. IV. VII. When
itself the understanding undercuts itself:
For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when
it acts alone, and according to its most general principles,
entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree
of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or
common life (T, I. IV. VII, 267-8).
But if we don't limit our reasonings to those resulting from
the most general features of the imagination, we are led to
error and absurdity, Hume argues in T, I. IV. VII:
Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of
the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more
mistakes among philosophers (T, 267)
.
We either do or do not so limit our reasonings, and in
either case we get a skeptical result.
235
Baler dismisses T, I. IV. I as evidence of any real
skepticism on Hume's part. What Hume is doing in this
section, Baier says, is once again merely showing the limits
of rationalism. According to Baier the reflexive probability
judgments Hume considers in this section are only minimally
experience-informed, unlike the probability judgments of the
experience-informed Humean reasoner. In developing the
notion of the process of reflex evaluation, however, Hume
writes
, ,
'^1S certain a man of solid sense and long experienceought to have, and usually has, a greater assurance in his
opinions, than one that is foolish and ignorant, and thatour sentiments have different degrees of authority, even
with ourselves, in proportion to the degrees of our reason
and experience. In the man of the best sense and longest
experience, this authority is never entire; since even such-
a-one must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must
still dread the like for the future (T, 182)
Thus it seems that the "man of solid sense and long
exPerience " is as vulnerable to the skeptical argument to
follow as any rationalist philosopher shut up alone in his
stove-heated room. Of course, one might say that such an
experience-informed reasoner is vulnerable to the skeptical
argument only on the rationalist view of reason and that
Hume's purpose here is precisely to show that rationalism
cannot provide a sound basis for such a reasoner. However,
Hume himself says that his point here is
... to make the reader sensible of the truth of my
hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and
effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom ; and that belief
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IS more properly an act of
cogitative part of our natures
the sensitive , than of the
(T, 183)
.
Hume's mam point has been to show that belief is not "...a
simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of
conception, or the addition of a force and vivacity...", but
is instead precisely a particular manner of conceiving ideas
- with force and vivacity (T, 184)
.
Now, for Hume to have shown that belief is a matter of
force and vivacity of conception "which 'tis impossible for
mere ideas and reflections to destroy" may be for him to
have shown that the rationalist conception of belief as mere
"clear and distinct perception" is mistaken. Even so, this
does not support the claim that the skeptical argument of
this section applies only to rationalists. One can employ a
skeptical argument to show that one theory of belief is
incorrect and another is correct without thereby showing
that the correct theory avoids the skeptical implications of
the argument. On Hume's theory, belief differs from mere
conception in force and vivacity; belief is not mere clear
conception. Further, on Hume's theory, our beliefs, being
perceptions, are caused by other perceptions. But this does
not suggest that on Hume's theory our beliefs are rationally
justified nor does it show that we are not vulnerable to the




An alternative to Baier's reading is available. In a
prior chapter
, I said that Hume's own (consequent) notion of
probability is subjective probability - degree of
confidence. Now, according to Hume, if we follow reason,
which he later refers to as simply the more general and
established features of the imagination, we engage in a
reflex evaluation of our judgments which at each step
diminishes the probability of our first-order judgments,
eventually reducing that probability to zero. So, if we
follow reason, eventually our confidence in our initial
judgment will be extinguished - we will no longer believe
whatever it was we started out believing. But this "total
extinction of belief and evidence" does not in fact occur.
Why? Because we don't follow reason! Hume writes:
. . .after the first and second decision; as the action
of the mind becomes forc'd and unnatural, and the ideas
faint and obscure; tho' the principles of judgment, and the
of opposite causes be the same as at the very
beginning; yet their influence on the imagination, and the
vigor they add to, or diminish from the thought, is by no
means equal (T, 185)
.
So, it is just a lucky fact about us - that we run out
of psychological steam when we engage in reflex evaluations
- that saves us from total doubt. Note, however, that the
reflex evaluations are demanded by the most general features
of the imagination and that Hume never says they are not so
demanded. It is not merely that on some unrealistic view of
238
reason reflex evaluation should occur; it is in our nature
to require such evaluation. Fortunately for us, it is also
m our nature to be unable to invest the same amount of
psychological force in extended reflex evaluations as we do
in our lower-order judgments. But that fact does not, as
far as I can see, mean that we have somehow solved the
problem raised by Hume's argument nor does it show that that
problem is not a problem for the non-rationalist, Humean
thinker
.
Of course, it would be easier to decide whether or not
Hume's seemingly skeptical arguments really are skeptical if
we could be sure of what he means by 'reason' in each case
in which he uses the term. If we had a general principle we
could apply in order to decide just what Hume means by each
particular use of 'reason', we could apply it to those
passages traditionally taken to present Hume's skeptical
views and arguments to determine whether or not they do
present skeptical arguments. Baier follows Beauchamp and
Rosenberg in claiming that in the arguments that are usually
interpreted as skeptical Hume's target is rationalist
reason. Baier claims that as the Treatise continues Hume
moves from using 'reason' to refer to rationalist reason to
using it to refer more broadly to the human capacity for
making inferences and gaining knowledge. This capacity,
Baier says, involves sentiment, and Hume's conception of
this capacity is a corrected conception of reason. Hume
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reaches this enlarged conception of reason through showing
the insufficiency of the rationalist conception of reason.
It seems to me, however, that there is no general
principle by reference to which we can determine just what
Hume does mean by 'reason* in the many different places he
uses the term. In "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from
Reason" (T, III. 1. 1, 455-70) , Hume speaks of "reason, in a
strict and philosophical sense" as including causal
reasoning, that is, reason insofar as ". . .it discovers the
connexion of causes and effects..." (T, 459). In the same
section Hume also says:
If the thought and understanding were alone capable of
fixing the boundaries of right and wrong, the character of
virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of
objects, or must be a matter of fact, which is discovered by
our reasoning (T, 463)
.
Baier would, I think, take this as evidence of Hume's having
by this point reached his enlarged and corrected conception
of reason. Yet it seems just as reasonable to take such
passages as evidence that Hume's earlier seemingly skeptical
arguments are not simply directed against a rationalist
conception of reason but rather are directed against reason
inclusive of experience-informed causal reasoning (as the





I believe that Baier 's claim that Hume regards causal
inference as rationally justified because successfully
reflexive is not supported by Hume's texts. Though Baier
presents a compelling reconstruction of Hume, her new and
improved Hume is, I believe, not the historical Hume. Baier
lays great stress on T, I. III. XV as evidence of Hume's
nonskeptical view of causal inference. It is true that
Hume's apparent endorsement of the rules in T, I. III. XV
raises a problem for the traditional interpretation of Hume
as a skeptic. But there are reasons for thinking that Hume's
endorsement of these rules does not mean that he is not a
theoretical skeptic. For one thing, if Hume regards the
rules of T, I. I I I. XV as normative epistemological
principles
, then why do these rules for causal reasoning not
appear in the first Enquiry , the work which Hume himself
wished to be taken as presenting his mature views on topics
in metaphysics and epistemology? 3 Baier cautions against
reading into the Treatise the ''preoccupations” of the Hume
of the first Enquiry . But since the first Enquiry is a
reworking of those parts of the Treatise that Hume thought
of most worth and it is his later statement of his
philosophical views, it seems the first Enquiry is a good
source of evidence for deciding whether or not Hume was a
4
serious skeptic.
Baier seems to think that the only choice for those
who see Hume as a skeptic is to read T, 1. 1 1 1. XV as ironic.
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But there is another interpretation open to those who
attribute a theoretical skepticism to Hume. The rules
propounded in this section may present in systematic form
the inferential practices of experienced reasoners who have
set aside the "external” questions about induction with
which the philosopher is (at least sometimes) concerned.
Experienced reasoners will follow certain general rules for
causal reasoning. Why? For at least two reasons. First, from
the definition of cause and effect we can lay down certain
rules which will help prevent error in certain
circumstances. These rules are negative tests for the cause-







The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and
The cause must be prior to the effect (T, p.173).
Thus from these rules we know that when two event types El
and E2 are related in such a way that tokens of E2 sometimes
occur without being preceded by spatially or temporally
contiguous tokens of El, El tokens do not cause E2 tokens.
Second, we can lay down rules the actual following of
which has in the past led to success. Hume's sixth rule is
an example of such a rule:
The difference in the effects of two resembling objects
must proceed from that particular, in which they differ (T,
174) .
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Does the past success of inferences made according to these
rules show that the rules themselves and the inferences made
m accordance with them are rationally justified? No! The
argument for inductive skepticism precludes such
justification of general rules. In other words, there is no
positive test for the cause-effect relation. Further, in "Of
unphilosophical probability" (T, I. III. XIII, 143-55) Hume
says that the general rules we form to guide our inquiries
themselves conflict. So the formation of such rules doesn't
provide a way out of skepticism. He writes:
The following of general rules is a very
unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis only by
following them that we can correct this, and all other
unphilosophical probabilities (T, 150) .
What Hume may have in mind in endorsing the rules for
causal reasoning is, as I suggested in chapter IV, a kind of
pragmatic justification of them. Given our inability to
rationally justify causal inference, we are "justified" in
following canons of reasoning that have been successful in
the past. We are justified, however, only in the sense that
we have no alternative method that we have reason to believe
is more reliable than the method codified in those
previously successful rules, not in the sense that we have
good reason to believe that the conclusions of our causal
inferences will be true more often than not. In other words,
given that we are committed by our very natures to making
causal inferences, once we assume the UP on which they
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depend we can articulate and endorse rules for settling, in
Beauchamp and Rosenberg's terminology, internal questions
about induction. But again this does not mean that we are
justified from the external point of view, the point of view
of the philosopher - Hume - in his study.
Besides the interpretation of T, I.lll.xv I've just
offered, one might reply to Baler's claim in this way: Even
if it were true that the only way of maintaining the
traditional interpretation of Hume is by reading this
section as ironic, if we don't interpret Hume as a skeptic
we are also left with irony of gigantic proportions in his
various seemingly skeptical pronouncements. In my opinion,
many of Hume's skeptical pronouncements simply do not seem
to be ironic. This I will leave to the decision of the
reader. However, if we are to take Hume's skeptical
pronouncements (including those which suggest a theoretical
skepticism) as ironic, then we must maintain that for some
reason Hume made a very large number of such statements in
contexts in which his substantive arguments would to many
appear to support skepticism. This from a man who is, as
philosophers go, an extraordinarily clear writer and who was
concerned with the reception of his work and with literary
fame. Further, we must explain the seeming fit between
Hume's serious substantive analyses of topics including
probable reasoning and causation and his "ironic"
skepticism. Of course, it may be that there are such reasons
and explanations. But I don't think that the claim that Hume
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wanted to undermine rationalism supplies a sufficient
explanation of why Hume would so often make seemingly
skeptical pronouncements in the context of serious
discussions of epistemological and metaphysical issues, nor
do I know of any other convincing explanation for Hume's
making remarks that would mislead his readers with regard to
his epistemological views.
8
Baier's proposed "successful reflexivity" justification
of causal inference seems very like the inductive
justification of induction offered by Max Black and others.
8
Baier's notion of "meta-causal" explanations of causal
inferences is very like the notion of higher level inductive
arguments for lower-level inductive inference rules. In
general
, the inductive justification of induction goes like
this: There is a distinction between levels of inductive
argument. Our ordinary inductive arguments about objects or
events in the world are licensed by a first level of
inductive rules. So, for example, the argument "All observed
copper conducts electricity; therefore, all copper conducts
electricity" will be licensed by the rules of inductive
inference for level 1 . Perhaps the level 1 inference rule
licensing the inference about copper would be
M/N observed A have been B
M/N A are B.
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The rules of level 1, however, will be justified by an
argument on level 2 , such as
Arguments on level 1 which are permitted by the rules of
level 1 have usually been successful in the past.
Arguments on level 1 which are permitted by the rules of
level 1 will usually be successful in the future.
9
Or, more briefly,
Level 1 inductive rules have been reliable in the past.
Level 1 inductive rules will be reliable in the future.
10
Now, the argument on level 2 will be licensed by the
rules of level 2. The rules of level 2, however, will be
justified by a higher level inductive argument on level 3
which will be licensed by the rules for level 3. Generally,
for an inductive argument on level n, there will be level n
rules which license that inference, and there will be an
inductive argument on level n+1 which is licensed by the
rules of level n+1 and the conclusion of which states that
the rules of level n will be reliable in the future.
Of course, for the level n+1 argument which justifies
the rules of level n to be a justification it must have true
premises. But an important feature of the attempt to justify
induction inductively is that it might turn out that the
premise of the n+1 argument which states that the rules of
level n have been reliable in the past is false. So, the
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justification may not go through. This fact, that is, that
the success of the justification depends on the way the
world is and is not guaranteed beforehand, is taken as
showing that the inductive justification of induction is not
circular. The inductive justification of induction does not
involve the assumption of an intended conclusion as a
premise nor the employment of an inference rule in an
argument intended to justify employment of that very rule.
For the argument offered as justification for a rule on
level n is licensed, not by the rules of level n, but by the
rules of level n+1.
There is, however, a serious problem with the inductive
justification of induction. The problem is that
counterinductive rules can be justified by the same
approach. Consider the level 1 counterinductive argument:
All observed samples of copper have conducted electricity.
The next sample of copper to be observed will not conduct
electricity.
Now, this counterinductive argument is licensed by the
following level 1 counterinductive inference rule:
All observed As have been Bs
The next A to be observed will not be a B.
But the level 1 counterinductive inference rule can be
justified on the next level by the following argument:
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Rules of level 1 have been unreliable in the past.
Rules of level 1 will be reliable in the future.
Moreover
, the premise of the level 2 counterinductive
argument will be true just when the premise of the level 2
inductive argument is. Both arguments are coherent with the
facts. This will remain true as we ascend through levels of
inductive and counterinductive arguments for lower-level
rules. So, if the inductivist can provide an inductive
justification for his inductive inference rules, the
counterinductivist (supposing he survives!) can provide a
parallel counterinductive justification for his own
counterinductive inference rules.
It seems to me that a similar problem exists for the
successful reflexivity defense of causal inference that
Baier attributes to Hume. It may be that a necessary
condition of an acceptable form of inference is that one can
apply it reflexively to itself. The attempt to justify
induction inductively, for example, requires the possibility
of making inductive inferences about inductive inferences.
Similarly, Baier' s view seems to be that causal inference is
justified because one can make causal inferences about
causal inferences and provide causal explanations for causal
inferences. But it seems that such reflexivity is not a
sufficient condition for justifying a form of inference, as
is shown by the possibility of justifying counterinductive
12
inference rules by counterinductive arguments.
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Accepting that causal inference can be successfully
applied in predicting our causal inferences, what then?
First, this might involve a kind of rule circularity if
causal inference cannot plausibly be thought of as different
forms of inference at different levels. If we are not
justified in making causal inferences, how can the making of
further causal inferences provide justification? Second,
even if the "meta-causal" inferences we make about lower-
order causal inferences can be thought of as analogous to
higher level inductive arguments, then, just as in the case
of the inductive justification of induction, this would only
serve to justify our adherence to causal inference and
explanation if no other form of inference inconsistent with
causal inference can be similarly justified (that is, by its
own reflexivity)
.
Now, Baier does seem to think that Hume has excluded
other forms of inference that might compete with causal
inference, for these other forms of inference are not,
according to Baier, successfully reflexive. Still, the claim
that Hume has excluded these other forms of inference from
the class of rationally justified forms of inference because
they are not successfully self-reflexive is only important
for deciding the issue of Hume's skepticism if he has not
also excluded causal inference itself from the class of
rationally justified forms of inference. I believe, however,
that my arguments have shown that Hume does exclude causal
inference from that class, even if he does not exclude it on
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the basis of failure of reflexivity. Or, to return once more
to the terminology of Beauchamp and Rosenberg, I believe
that I have shown that Hume both raises the "external"
question about induction and answers it in the negative.
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Notes To Chapter VI
1. Hereafter all references to Baier are to Baler
unless otherwise noted.
[1991]




Hume does endorse certain methodological principles for
empirical reasoning in the Enquiry . For example, in "Of A




When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we
must proportion the one to the other, and can never be
allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are
exactly sufficient to produce the effect (136)
.
But if the rules that appear in T I. III. XV were, as Baier
suggests, normative principles that both encapsulate Hume's
methods and complete his epistemology, then, it seems




As I noted in the Introduction, in the "Advertisement"
which Hume wrote to be attached to the Enquiries , he refers
to the Treatise as a "juvenile work" and says explicitly
that he wishes his Enquiries to be taken as his final word
on the relevant topics. [See E, 2], The first Enquiry may be
said to support the traditional view of Hume as a skeptic in
its focus on epistemological issues and its avoidance of
many of the ontological issues with which Hume was concerned
in Book I of the Treatise . A. H. Basson suggests that it is
likely that Hume omitted from the Enquiry many of the
ontological discussions of the Treatise Book I precisely
because "...he was chiefly interested in establishing a
sceptical theory of knowledge..." (Basson [1958], 16).
5.
Strictly speaking, there is no more a negative test for
the causal relation than there is a positive one. For though
251
we may find that two events do not appear to be related in
the way necessary for causal connection, it may be that
their regular conjunction has been interfered with by ’’the
secret operation of contrary causes" (T, 132) . Hume
discusses "secret" causes in "Of the probability of causes
(T, I. III. XII, 130-42)
.
6.
Hume moves away from requiring spatial contiguity of
cause and effect later on, in "Of the immateriality of the
soul" (T, I.IV.V, 232-51).
7.
Again, I'm not suggesting that Hume had in mind the kind
of technical "pragmatic" defense of induction proposed in
this century.
8.
See, for example, chapter 11 of Problems of Analysis
(Black [1954]).
9.
What is meant by saying that arguments permitted by a
rule are usually successful is that such arguments, when
their premises are frue
, have true conclusions more often
than not.
10.
What is meant by saying that a rule is reliable is that
arguments permitted by this rule usually are successful.
11. In his review of Baier's Progress of Sentiments , Kenneth
Winkler makes a similar point with regard to Baier's claims
about the role of reflexivity in Hume's theory of causal
inference and belief. See Winkler's review of Progress in
The Philosophical Review, Vol . 103, No. 4 (October 1994)
12. Of course, one may object that reading a recognition of
the lack of sufficiency of reflexivity-based or inductive
justifications of inductive inference into Hume's texts is a
stretch. It seems, however, that if we employ a principle of
charity in reading philosophical texts it is no more of a
stretch to suppose that Hume would see the lack of
sufficiency of the reflexivity/inductive justification of
induction than it is to suppose that he had in mind the
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SCIENCE, NATURALISM, AND HUME'S SKEPTICISM
1
In "Hume's New Science of the Mind," John Biro writes
that in the two centuries following its publication
The barrage of arguments in the first book of the
Treatise
, apparently questioning the very possibility of
knowing anything about the world and about ourselves, was
seen as directed not against various philosophical doctrines
on these subjects (as these arguments are construed,
increasingly, today) but against the very possibility of
such knowledge. That such skepticism is on the face of it
incompatible with the project Hume announced in the
Introduction to the work was either not noticed or dismissed
as unproblematic by the simple expedient of not taking him
at his word (Biro [1993], 37).
In a footnote to this passage, Biro says that though it may
be that Hume was simply contradicting himself, it is more
plausible that some of his pronouncements - those which seem
to espouse a serious skepticism - were ironic.
1
Biro's comments here are very much in line with the
current tendency to downplay the skeptical aspects of Hume's
philosophy. Biro points to the apparent incompatibility of
Hume's espousal of empirical, scientific method with the
skepticism that traditionally has been attributed to Hume
and which I have attributed to Hume. Recall Beauchamp and
Rosenberg's similar complaint, which I addressed in chapter
IV. Of course, as I said there, the distinction between
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theoretical skepticism on the hand, and prescriptive and
practicing skepticism on the other resolves any outright
inconsistency involved in espousing the pursuit of empirical
science while also espousing a serious (theoretical)
skepticism.
Still, a certain worry remains. For if Hume really is a
theoretical skeptic with regard to our ordinary and
scientific inductive practices, why should he favor those
practices over alternative methods of forming beliefs? If
our accepted inductive methods are themselves totally
without rational justification, why should Hume prefer and
prescribe those methods as opposed to, say, the
counterinductive methods I mentioned in chapter VI? There
seems to be a certain awkwardness in Hume's espousal of
empirical science, if he is in fact a skeptic.
Though I've argued that Hume is a serious skeptic, I
must admit that an awareness of the tension created by
attributing skepticism to Hume while recognizing his
commitment to and faith in empirical science provides a
strong motivation for scholars to provide a nonskeptical
reading of Hume. Yet, as I've argued in chapters I -VI, I
don't think that such a reading fits Hume's texts as well as
the traditional, skeptical reading does. So, how would I
resolve this tension?
The simplest and most straightforward resolution of
this problem comes, I think, from simply restating Hume's
point that it is human nature to engage in inductive
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reasoning but it is not human nature to engage in, for
example, counterinductive reasoning. So, Hume can espouse
the methods of empirical science because those methods are
by and large an outgrowth of our ordinary patterns of
inductive reasoning, and hence, like that reasoning, not to
be avoided for any sustained period. Nor can Hume himself
avoid putting his faith in those methods that are an
outgrowth of our instinctive reasoning practices
.
But I think one can also offer a slightly less
straightforward but nevertheless convincing answer - an
answer that acknowledges Hume's positive, scientific
endeavors and his general enthusiasm for empirical science -
while retaining one's interpretation of Hume as a serious
theoretical skeptic. Though Hume is a theoretical skeptic
with regard to our ordinary and scientific beliefs based on
inductive reasoning, he is not in general a prescriptive
skeptic with regard to those beliefs, and though Hume thinks
our beliefs and claims about unobserved matters of fact are
ultimately unjustified, he does not say that we should stop
holding those beliefs or making those claims. Hume was a
proponent of the empirical approach to science and was
opposed to both superstition and Cartesian rationalism. Hume
could distinguish between those practices, such as
observation-based induction, which are instinctive, and
supposed sources of knowledge such as mysticism. Hume would
also distinguish between, for example, Newton's physics and
Descartes' more ambitious metaphysical claims.
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How would Hume make these distinctions? As I said in
chapter IV, I believe that for Hume a factual claim may be
"justified" in a secondary sense insofar as it is formed in
accordance with our natural, instinctive inferential
practices when those practices have been reflected on and
perhaps refined, as in scientific investigation, though
those practices themselves and hence that claim too are
ultimately without rational justification. Certain beliefs
are justified from vithin our instinctive practices, that
is, presupposing the reliability of those practices, while
others are unjustified even if we presuppose the reliability
of our instinctive practices. When we hold beliefs based on
observation-based inductive inference we’re doing what we
must given that we have no choice but to hold beliefs and
draw conclusions about the world in order to live. Such
beliefs, though ultimately unjustified, are justified
relative to the inferential procedures that are instinctive
to us and hence ultimately unavoidable. In short, while I
concede to Baier that there is a sense of 'justified' in
which Hume thinks our scientific beliefs are justified, this





Of course, if one were inclined to read Hume wholly as
a proponent of naturalism one would be inclined to insist
that Hume is not concerned with issues of ultimate
justification but only with providing naturalistic
explanations of mental phenomena.
2
David Pears, in Hume's
System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise
(Pears [1990]), claims that Hume is not a skeptic but rather
a "cautious naturalist." According to Pears, Hume
...is not a sceptic about causation, because the extra
content of causal statements about which he might have been
a sceptic is eliminated by his theory of meaning (Pears
[1990] , 64)
.
Yet, Pears says, Hume is not a reductionist about
causal statements, that is, Hume does not think that a
causal generalization such as "A's cause B's" is simply
equivalent in meaning to the claim that thus far all
observed A's have been followed by B's. Rather, though the
evidence a person has for a causal generalization and a
particular predictive inference made on the basis of such a
generalization "can only be a limited set of observed
conjunctions...," if we ask what the person means by the
generalization, Hume's answer
...must be that he means something audacious: he is
claiming that the conjunction is constant for ever, and,
therefore, includes the further case about which he is now
drawing the conclusion. . .Hume is not making causal
inferences safe by confining them to a limited set of
observed conjunctions. . . (Pears, 80)
.
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So though Hume puts a restriction on the type of
evidence--i t will be more and more instances of the same
conjunction he never reduces the content of the general
causal belief to any finite sequence of instances. The
belief is always audacious ... (Pears
, 86).
According to Pears , though Hume leaves a gap between
our causal beliefs and the evidence we have for them, the
test of whether Hume believes in causal necessity is
"whether he is prepared to make audacious causal
inferences," which, of course, he is (Pears, 79). Pears
writes
,
. . .his belief in causal necessity is manifested in his
readiness to make audacious causal inferences and in his
approval of the same readiness in others (Pears, 78-9).
I find Pears' treatment of Hume somewhat puzzling. On
the one hand, Pears wants to say that Hume is not a skeptic.
On the other hand, in considering Hume's treatment of
causation and induction, and our knowledge of the external
world, Pears concludes that in each case Hume's theory
yields skeptical results. It seems, however, that because he
thinks Hume is not a skeptic, Pears has to see Hume as
trying and failing at the project of providing sufficient
rational grounds for our inductive inferences and beliefs
within the context of a naturalistic theory. According to
Pears, Hume's empiricist theory simply leaves him with
insufficient resources for accounting for our causal
inferences and beliefs.
259
There is a general issue of textual interpretation
raised by Pears’ interpretation of Hume. Pears says that
Hume started out to answer philosophical questions in the
light of naturalistic, psychological theories. Yet he
doesn't see the fact that Hume's answers to certain
philosophical questions support skepticism as evidence that
Hume is in any way a skeptic. It is as if Pears thinks that
Hume either simply didn't recognize the skeptical results of
his investigations or recognized them but didn't take them
seriously. I find this reading implausible in general. For
it seems to me that Hume would have and did in fact
recognize the skeptical results of his investigations. It
also seems that Hume took these results seriously as
theoretical results. Hume's recognition of the skeptical
results of much of his philosophizing and his appreciation
of the theoretical importance of those results are
manifested in many passages throughout the Treatise and the
first Enquiry . I have quoted many such passages throughout
this work and will not repeat them here.
As I see it, there are three main specific claims made
by Pears that must be addressed:
(1) Pears' claim that Hume's willingness to make audacious
causal claims shows that he is not a skeptic about causal
necessity.
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(2) Pears' claim that Hume's theory of meaning eliminates
the alleged extra content of causal statements that would
allow for skepticism.
(3) Pears' claim that Hume recognizes the audacious
character of causal generalizations and singular causal
inferences
.
Consider (1). Pears' claim that Hume's willingness to
make audacious causal claims shows that he is not a skeptic
about causal necessity is answered in terms of the
distinction between theoretical, prescriptive, and practical
skepticisms. Hume's willingness to make audacious causal
claims and his approval of such willingness in others shows
only that he is not generally a prescriptive or a practicing
skeptic. It does not show that he is not a serious
theoretical skeptic. In fact, reading Hume as a theoretical
but (in general) not a prescriptive or practicing skeptic
makes sense of a central fact that Pears himself recognizes:
Hume employs and endorses beliefs and forms of reasoning
which he thinks, on the basis of his own philosophical
views, cannot be rationally justified. Reading Hume in light
of such a distinction is, I believe, far more plausible than
supposing that he somehow failed to recognize or failed to
take seriously the skeptical results of much of his
reasoning.
I will address points (2) and (3) together. First, (2)
is, of course, controversial. Galen Strawson, for example,
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holds that Hume does believe that there is such a thing as
objective necessary connections or "causal powers" in the
world (powers which are responsible for the regularities we
observe) but that Hume thinks that we have only a relative
idea of objective necessity or causal power, have no access to
it, and therefore have no way of verifying any claim that such
a connection holds. According to Strawson, it is Hume's
recognition of the extra content of causal beliefs - a content
involving a reference to an objective necessity of which we
have no impression-contentful idea - that allows him to be a




Second, Pears himself says, correctly, that Hume does not
reduce causal statements to reports of hitherto observed
conjunctions and that Hume sees our causal claims as
"audacious." So, we need not get into the issue of whether or
not Hume believes in objective necessary connections or thinks
we can have even a relative idea of such connections . For we
can see that the issue of content is irrelevant to Hume's
skepticism about our causal claims. The claim that A's cause
B's entails, on Hume's view, the claim that all A's and B's,
past, present, and future, are conjoined. But how can we
justify such a claim? Only by presupposing the UP. But how can
we justify the UP? We can't! So, we can't justify the claim
that A's cause B's even when that is not taken to involve
claims or pseudo-claims about objective necessary connections.
The central point is that given Hume's argument for inductive
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skepticism and his characterization of causation in terms of
constant conjunction, we can never be sure that we have a real




Of course, one might reject Pears' reading of Hume but
nevertheless see Hume purely as a proponent of naturalism.
One might insist that "relative justification" is
justification period, because that's all the justification
we can hope to get. Still, though Hume, pursuing his science
of man, provides naturalistic, psychological explanations of
beliefs, I see no reason to think that Hume thought the only
legitimate questions regarding rational justification are
those that take for granted the legitimacy of our
scientific, inductive practices. I believe that reading Hume
as a 'naturalist' as that term is used today is a mistake.
Why do I believe that reading Hume as a modern-day
naturalist is a mistake? Before I answer that question, I
should clarify what I mean by 'naturalism' and 'naturalist' .
There are many different philosophical positions that fall
under the heading of 'naturalism' , but here I am speaking of
what may be called 'epistemological naturalism', that is,
naturalism as applied to epistemological issues. I cannot
discuss here the details of the positions of particular
epistemological naturalists. Epistemological naturalism is
associated with people such as Willard Quine, Alvin Goldman,
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and Hilary Kornblith, among others. Many if not most of
those who consider themselves naturalists with regard to
epistemology would not accept Quine's view that epistemology
as a normative enterprise should be abandoned in favor of
descriptive psychology, and again, I cannot discuss details
of competing epistemological naturalisms. But I will state
three basic principles that I believe are characteristic of
epistemological naturalism and which jointly constitute a
relatively uncontroversial characterization of generic
epistemological naturalism.
Epistemological naturalism, as I understand it, is
characterized by the following three basic principles:
(1) (i) Normative epistemic facts supervene on nonnormative
,
descriptive facts and (ii) The concept of justification is
to be analyzed in such a way that normative concepts and
evidential considerations are not employed in the analysans
as primitive. In other words, normative concepts are to be
used in analyzing the concept of justification only if a
further analysis of those normative concepts in non-
6
normative terms is or at least can be provided.
(2) Justification of beliefs is external. The factors that
justify a belief are not necessarily something to which the
believer has access. For these factors may include, for
example, a psychological or neurophysiological state or
process of the person himself which is not available on
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reflection, or facts about the reliability of perceptual
processes measured in terms of ratio of production of true
to false beliefs, to which the believer has no access.
(3) Empirical science must at some stage play a role in the
project of epistemology and hence it is legitimate to employ
(that is, we are rationally justified in employing)
scientific induction in showing that certain kinds of
beliefs are rationally justified.
7
A person who holds (1) - (3) would, then, be an
epistemological naturalist, though not everyone who would be
considered an epistemological naturalist would hold all of
(1) - (3)
.
But as I understand epistemological naturalism,
all naturalists would hold (3)
.
It is the turn to empirical
sciences such as psychology, neuro-science, and physiology
(either as replacements for traditional epistemology or as
contributors to epistemological investigation) that marks
off naturalists from more traditional epistemologists
.
So, again, why do I believe that we should not read
Hume as a modern-day epistemological naturalist? Throughout
the Treatise and the first Enquiry Hume asks for the
rational justification of our beliefs and practices. Though
he finds that many of our beliefs and practices have,
ultimately, no rational justification, that result doesn't
alter the fact that Hume pursues the traditional
epistemological project of assessing beliefs and inferential
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practices in terms of evidence and rational justification.
Hume is not doing only psychology in these works. So Hume is
not a Quinean naturalist.
The relative" justification of our beliefs based on
inductive inference does not seem to be the only sort of
justification Hume was searching for, even though in the end
that's all he finds. Further, Hume's argument for inductive
skepticism is itself motivated by the search for the
justification of inductive inference, so it clearly doesn't
take place only from within a science that accepts such
inference without question. So Hume would, I believe, reject
(3)
,
the epistemological naturalist's appeal to empirical
science as a legitimate part of an epistemological project
seeking to show that certain kinds of beliefs are rationally
justified. For the claims of empirical science are not
themselves rationally justified, on Hume's view.
Hume would also reject (2)
,
the view that justification
is external. Hume's examinations of our beliefs proceed on
the assumption that if a person is justified in believing P,
he has access to whatever it is that justifies him in
believing P, whether that is another belief or an
experience. For example, when Hume finds, in considering his
causal inferences, that neither his reasoning or reason-
based beliefs nor his experiences or experience-based
beliefs justifies his belief in the UP he concludes not that
its justification must lie elsewhere but that it cannot be
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justified. Hume, then, falls on the internalist side of the
externalist/internalist distinction
.
In Naturali zing Epistemology , Hilary Kornblith has
argued that since our cognitive processes are by nature
biased toward true beliefs, in general "the processes by
which we arrive at beliefs just are those by which we ought
to arrive at them" (Kornblith [1987], 5). Far from
suggesting, a la Kornblith, that those beliefs we naturally
form are likely to be true or are those we "ought" (in a
full-blown, non-relative, normative sense) to form, Hume
thinks that many of our important natural beliefs are,




Though Hume himself engages in a posteriori explanation
of beliefs, this is not part of a project of analyzing the
concept of justification or of showing that certain beliefs
are justified. Far from asserting that beliefs formed
through, for example, scientific induction, are justified,
Hume explicitly says that such beliefs are unjustified. Hume
does not suggest that justification in some way supervenes
on the natural psychological properties and processes he
describes and employs in his explanations of our beliefs and
inferential practices. The a posteriori project is
undertaken by Hume primarily when the project of justifying
9
a set of beliefs has, according to Hume himself, failed.
Hume does not then go on to say that the natural
,
psychological properties and processes he refers to in his
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explanations themselves give rise to epistemic properties
such as justification or reasonableness. In fact, he
laments the fact that "trivial qualities" of the imagination
and "false suppositions" give rise to some of our most
important beliefs, such as the belief in a continued and
independent world of material objects (T, I. IV. II, 217).
So, though it is not clear that Hume would reject (ii)
of (1) , he certainly does not seem to commit himself to it.
Hume also does not tell us that he holds (i) of (1) , though
for all I know he may.
10
In sum, Hume does not seem to commit himself to any one
(1)~(3), the three principles that are characteristic of
epistemological naturalism. Moreover, his actual procedures
suggest that he rejects (or would reject if he considered)
both (2) and, most importantly , (3) . At any rate, the main
issue I have been discussing is whether Hume thinks that
relative justification is rational justification period. And
I think that the answer is no, for again, Hume's argument
for inductive skepticism is itself motivated by the search
for the justification of inductive inference, so he does not
accept such inference without question. And, of course, his
verdict with regard to the rational justification of
inductive inference is negative.
3
In "Of The Academical or Sceptical Philosophy" (E, XII,
149-65) , Hume takes up the theme of skepticism and our
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alleged knowledge of the external world. Hume makes several
distinctions between different kinds of skepticism. Hume
first distinguishes between antecedent skepticism and
consequent skepticism. Antecedent skepticism is a form of
skepticism in which prior to philosophizing one employs a
universal doubt with regard to all of one's beliefs and
cognitive faculties and then attempts to allay that doubt
through philosophizing. Hume suggests that unqualified
antecedent skepticism was proposed by Descartes, and he
rejects this form of skepticism. According to Hume, if we
antecedently doubt all of our beliefs and the reliability of
°ur belief-forming faculties we can never get beyond
the stage of doubt. Hume writes,
The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible
to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not)
would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever
bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any
subject (E, 150)
.
Though Hume rejects unqualified antecedent skepticism, he
thinks a moderate form of it is reasonable and even
necessary as a preparative to research. This moderate
antecedent "skepticism" is basically a matter of being
careful in reasoning and diffident with respect to our
beliefs
.
Consequent skepticism is a form of skepticism in which
after and as a result of epistemological inquiry one
realizes that our human cognitive faculties are not fit to
reach the truth in metaphysics and that even in science and
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common life our beliefs are ultimately lacking rational
justification (E, 150) . Hume does hold a form of consequent
skepticism which I will specify more fully in the course of
this chapter.
Hume also distinguishes skepticism with regard to
reason from skepticism with regard to the senses. Skepticism
with regard to reason applies to our supposed a priori
knowledge based on reasoning about relations of ideas as
well as to our supposed a posteriori knowledge based on
inductive inference. Insofar as it is directed at our
alleged a posteriori knowledge skepticism with regard to
reason is based on Hume's argument for inductive skepticism,
which I have already treated at length in chapters II, III,
IV, and V. Skepticism with regard to reason arises with
reference to our alleged a priori knowledge largely from
puzzles concerning our ideas about space and time. Hume's
attitude toward skepticism concerning our alleged a priori
12
knowledge is not clear. He writes,
How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances,
contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct
idea, is absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as
absurd as any proposition, which can be formed. So nothing
can be more skeptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation,
than this scepticism itself, which arises from some of the
paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of
quantity (E, 157-8)
.
Skepticism with regard to the senses consists in the
view that the senses provide us with no basis for claiming
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knowledge of an external world. This skepticism arises from
the Humean analysis of causation combined with the theory of
ideas. As we saw in chapter V, according to Hume, in our
instinctive or common-sense view we don't distinguish
between an immediate or direct object of perception and a
mediate or indirect object of perception. Ordinarily we
think that in sense perception we are immediately aware of
objects that exist independently of us. Our ordinary view,
in other words, is that in normal cases of observation we
are immediately aware of mind-independent external objects.
This view is often called naive or direct realism. Hume says
that we
. . . always suppose the very images
,
presented by the
senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any
suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of
the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we
feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our
perception, and to be something external to our mind, which
perceives it (E, 151-2)
.
But, Hume says, only a bit of reflection is sufficient
to show us that our ordinary view is not correct; nothing
can be present to a mind but a perception. Why should we
think that we have direct access to perceptions only? The
main reason to which Hume refers in the Enquiry is
perceptual relativity. He writes,
The table which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove
farther from it: but the real table, which exists
independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore,
nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These
are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who
reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we
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consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing
but perceptions in the mind. . . (E, 152) .
At any rate, reflection on the weakness of the common-sense
view gives rise to a philosophical theory according to which
we are immediately aware of our own perceptions but these
correspond to independent material objects that cause them.
The philosophical theory is the representative or indirect
realism of, for example, John Locke.
But the philosophical theory itself has skeptical
consequences. The existence of independent material objects
which cause our perceptions of them is a question of fact.
On the philosophical theory we are not directly aware of
these objects. So if we are to know of their existence we
must infer that they exist from what we are directly aware
of, our perceptions. But our only basis for inference to
unobserved entities is causal reasoning, which requires
experience of the regular conjunction of things of two
kinds . But in the present case we have experience of the
perceptions only. So we have no experience of a constant
conjunction between supposed independent material objects
and our perceptions. So we have no experiential basis for
inferring the existence of a world of independent material
objects. Hume writes,
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of
the senses be produced by external objects resembling them:
How shall this question be determined? By experience surely;
as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience
is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything
present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach
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any experience of their connexion with objects. The
supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without anyfoundation in reasoning (E, 153)
.
In other words, the claim that in addition to mind-
dependent perceptions there are mind-independent material
objects that cause them is a claim of fact. But there is no
way to confirm it. The only way to confirm such a claim is
by causal reasoning but causal reasoning requires that we
have experience of both the cause, in this case the alleged
mind-independent material object, and the effect, in this
case the perception. But we have no access to mind-
independent entities. So the philosophical theory is
groundless
.
Hume rejects what he refers to as the more "trite"
observations concerning misleading sense experiences, those
that "...are derived from the imperfection and
fallaciousness of our organs..." such as "the crooked
appearance of an oar in water..." (E, 151). Descartes'
Dreaming argument in the Medi tations and Hume's skeptical
argument in Section XII both make the same basic point: All
of the empirical (perceptual) evidence we could ever get
would be consistent with the hypothesis that there is no
external material world at all. Hume's rejection of "trite"
observations concerning the occasional deceptiveness of
sense experience parallels Descartes' move, in the first
Meditation, from the argument from sense deception - the
observation that "...from time to time... the senses deceive,
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and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have
deceived us even once" - to the dreaming argument (Descartes
[ [1984] (1641) ] , 12) . Neither Descartes nor Hume wants to
base the skeptical doubt concerning an external world merely
on the claim that the senses are sometimes deceptive.
For Descartes, the problem of justifying our beliefs
about the existence and nature of the external world on the
supposition that we are immediately aware only of
perceptions can be overcome through proof of the existence
of a nondeceiving God. But Hume dismisses Descartes'
13argument for mind-independent material objects. For Hume,
with his empiricist view that causation is our only means
for discovering unobserved matters of fact and that causal
relations can only be discovered empirically, this problem
is theoretically unsolvable. On this topic "the profounder
and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph,"
according to Hume (E, 153)
.
So our instinctive view is clearly incorrect. But we
cannot confirm our reflective theory at all. We can have no
empirical evidence for its truth. So we can choose between a
false view and a view for which we can amass no evidence
whatsoever. Thus Hume, in the Enquiry , which he wished to be
taken as his last word on epistemological and metaphysical
topics, produces a skeptical argument concerning our alleged
14
, .
knowledge of the external world. This argument, moreover,
is based on his own views about perception and causal
274
inference and it is one which '’will always triumph,"
according to Hume himself.
4
What kind of skeptic is Hume? It is perhaps better to
ask what kinds of skeptic Hume is. The particular forms of
skepticism Hume holds are determined by his views on many
topics, including the genesis of our ideas, the lack of
rational justification of inductive inference, and his
theory of belief. Hume's view of human nature largely
determines the forms of skepticism he accepts and the forms
of skepticism he does not accept. It is not that there is
some a priori logical relation between, say, theoretical and
consequent skepticism that determines exactly what forms of
skepticism Hume holds. It seems to me that the
theoretical /prescriptive and consequent/antecedent
distinctions are largely independent, with one exception: If
one held an unmitigated antecedent prescriptive skepticism
and followed one's own prescriptions, then presumably one
would not engage in the theoretical work needed to produce a
consequent skepticism.
So, again, what kinds of skeptic is Hume? Hume accepts
moderate antecedent skepticism. But this isn't really much
of a skepticism. Antecedent skepticism is basically a
commitment to careful inquiry. But Hume is more of a skeptic
than this. Hume also adopts consequent skepticism: Hume
thinks that our faculties do not fit us to have justified
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beliefs in metaphysical matters that go beyond the range of
experience. According to Hume we can show that a thing
exists only by perceiving it or reasoning from some object
which is its causal correlate, the existence of which we
know independently - ultimately on the basis of impressions.
And our knowledge of cause and effect comes only
empirically. So all of our justified existence claims must,
directly or indirectly, be anchored in impressions. We lack
any justification for asserting the existence of anything
that cannot be so anchored. Hume would not, for example,
accept Descartes' ontological argument for the existence of
God.l^ Hume would also reject Plato's claims about the
existence of Forms. Claims about necessary connections are
also unjustified; we have no basis in logic or experience
for asserting that there are necessary connections between
objects considered in themselves. And of course, realism
with regard to a mind-independent material world is also
rationally unjustified.
But Hume's consequent skepticism extends further than
metaphysics. Even our ordinary everyday and scientific
claims are ultimately without rational justification insofar
as they are based on moral and hence inductive inference and
hence presuppose the UP. For we have no way whatsoever of
justifying our belief that the UP is true.
Note, however, that in saying that the beliefs in mind-
independent material things, necessary connections, forms,
etc. , are unjustified Hume is not himself asserting or
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claiming to know that such things do not exist. His point is
that we can't know or even have good reason to believe that
such objects do exist.
The kind of skepticism Hume does not accept is
PYrrhon±sm. Pyrrhonism is, according to Hume, an extreme
form of skepticism which not only holds that all of our
beliefs are without rational foundation but prescribes
suspension of belief and judgment.
16
Hume says that this
form of skepticism, insofar as it prescribes suspension of
belief and judgment, is impossible for us. We must believe
and judge; there are certain things which it is simply not
in our power to refrain from believing.
Hume thinks that it is not in our power to effect the
suspension of belief prescribed by the Pyrrhonists. Even if
it were, such a suspension of belief could lead to nothing
but our ruin. But even though Hume rejects the skepticism of
the Pyrrhonists, he says that we must "act and reason and
believe," not because our beliefs are rationally justified,
but in spite of the fact that ultimately we cannot support
our beliefs. The supposed Pyrrhonist, when he is awakened
from his Pyrrhonistic dreams by the demands of life, will
laugh at himself because he will recognize
...the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and
reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the
foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections,
which may be raised against them (E, 160) .
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In short
, we must hold and act on beliefs which are
ultimately without rational justification.
So, clearly Hume's consequent skepticism is not
Pyrrhonian. But one might still wonder: just what is Hume's
attitude toward skepticism? After all, some scholars claim
that Hume is not really a skeptic and, as I said earlier,
there is a prima facie plausibility to the suggestion that
if Hume really thought that our beliefs are ultimately
without rational justification he could not consistently
espouse the pursuit of empirical science, in particular, the
science of human nature. Doesn't Hume's espousal of
empirical scientific investigation show that he was not
himself a serious skeptic?
The answer to that question requires, once again, the
distinction between theoretical skepticism (the view that
the members of a certain general class of beliefs or claims
are not rationally justified and hence cannot constitute
knowledge) and prescriptive skepticism (the view that we
should abstain from holding certain beliefs or making
certain claims because those beliefs or claims lack rational
justification). The Pyrrhonists (accepting Hume's
characterization of them) were prescriptive skeptics and
tried to be practicing skeptics (that is, they tried to
follow the prescriptions of prescriptive skepticism, and




One can, without inconsistency, be a theoretical
skeptic without being a prescriptive or practicing skeptic.
As I said in chapter I, the claim that a certain class of
beliefs are unjustified does not commit one to the further
claim that people should refrain from holding such beliefs.
One can be a theoretical skeptic in holding that beliefs and
claims about, say, the existence of a mind-independent
external world are ultimately rationally unjustified without
prescribing or engaging in a suspension of beliefs and
claims about that world.
Hume strongly suggests the distinction between
theoretical and prescriptive/practicing skepticism and
further suggests that his own skepticism is theoretical, in
"Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the
Understanding" (E IV, 25-39) . After presenting (what I
interpret as) the argument for inductive skepticism, Hume
addresses a likely objection:
My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you
mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite
satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some
share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want £.0
learn the foundation of this inference (E, IV. II, 38).
Hume is a theoretical skeptic with regard to our
beliefs in and claims about unobserved matters of fact. As I
pointed out in chapter IV, when Hume sets out the
considerations that will give the skeptic reason for triumph
it is his own view of causation and his own argument for
inductive skepticism to which he refers:
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The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his
proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections,
which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to
have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that
all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond
the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from
the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea
of this relation than that of two objects, which have been
frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience,
been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other
instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing
leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct
of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but
which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and
deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he
shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our
weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all
assurance and conviction (E, XII. II, 159).
As I pointed out in chapter V, skepticism concerning the
external world perfectly fits Hume's analysis of causal
inference combined with his view that "...nothing can ever
be present to the mind but an image or perception" (E, 152) .
We simply lack the "data base" necessary for the employment
of causal inference.
When Hume makes comments suggesting that there are no
skeptics, he means that there are no Pyrrhonists - because a
total suspension of belief and judgment is not possible for
us. Hume refers to the "excessive principles of
scepticism" as Pyrrhonism, and he says that what defeats
Pyrrhonism is our need to act: "The great subverter of
Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is
action, and employment, and the occupations of life" (E,
158-59) . This suggests that Pyrrhonism is defeated insofar
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as it prescribes abstaining from judgment, not insofar as it
makes the theoretical claim that our beliefs lack rational
justification.
Though Hume is a theoretical skeptic with regard to our
ordinary and scientific beliefs in unobserved matters of
fact he is not in general a prescriptive skeptic. Though
Hume thinks our beliefs and claims about unobserved matters
fsct are ultimately unjustified, he does not say that we
should stop holding those beliefs or making those claims. In
fact, Hume was a proponent of the empirical approach to
science and was opposed to superstition, and Cartesian
rationalism. Hume could distinguish between those practices
such as observation-based induction which are instinctive,
and supposed sources of knowledge such as mysticism. Hume
would distinguish between Newton's physics and Descartes'
more ambitious metaphysical claims.
How would Hume make these distinctions? As I said
earlier, I believe that for Hume a factual claim may be
justified in a secondary sense insofar as it is formed in
accordance with our instinctive inferential practices when
those practices have been reflected on and perhaps refined,
as in scientific investigation, though those practices
themselves and hence that claim too are ultimately without
rational justification. Certain beliefs are justified from
withi: our instinctive practices, while others arc
unjustified even if we presuppose the reliability of our
instinctive practices. When we hold beliefs based on
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observation based inductive inference we're doing what we
must given that we have no choice but to hold beliefs and
^raw conclusions about the world in order to live.
The useful, mitigated prescriptive skepticism that Hume
accepts prescribes diffidence or anti -dogmatism with respect
to our beliefs, carefulness in drawing conclusions, and
limiting our inquiries to those subjects our minds are fit
to deal with: math, logic, empirical science, and the study
of human nature. (See E, XII. Ill, 161-5) Hume is a
prescriptive and practicing skeptic only with regard to
claims which involve terms that are without meaning because
they do not stand for any idea that is derivable from
impressions, metaphysical and theological claims which go
beyond the limits of experience and yet are not instinctive,
and claims which are made on the basis of noninstinctive
18
inferential practices such as crystal ball gazing. So
though Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic he holds only a
limited prescriptive skepticism. So Hume is a moderate
prescriptive antecedent skeptic, a mitigated prescriptive
consequent skeptic, and an unmitigated theoretical
consequent skeptic with regard to our beliefs about
unobserved matters of fact.
5
I believe, then, that examination of the texts of
Hume's Treatise , Abstract , and first Enquiry supports the
traditional interpretation of Hume as a serious theoretical
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skeptic. This is not to say that one need not be careful in
attributing skepticism to Hume. In attributing skepticism to
Hume one must distinguish between theoretical,
prescriptive/practical, and conceptual skepticisms, in order
to do justice to Hume's thought. Hume is a skeptic of each
of these kinds to some extent. But while Hume's theoretical
skepticism is extensive, his conceptual skepticism and his
prescriptive/practical skepticism are, though important,
much more limited. It is Hume's theoretical skepticism,
especially insofar as it is directed at our inductive
inferences and our belief in a mind-independent world of
material objects, that should lead us to regard Hume as
perhaps the most formidable skeptic in the history of
Western philosophy.
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Notes to Chapter VII1.
As I said in chapter VI, in my opinion Hume's skeptical
pronouncements simply do not seem to be ironic. Again, I
will leave this to the decision of the reader. But as I said
earlier, if we are to take Hume's skeptical pronouncements
as ironic, then we must maintain that for some reason he
made very many such pronouncements in contexts in which his
substantive arguments would suggest support for skepticism.
This, despite the fact that he was generally a clear and
straightforward writer concerned that his work be well-
received. Further, we must explain away the seeming fit
between Hume's serious substantive analyses of topics
including probable reasoning and causation and his allegedly
ironic skepticism.
2.
As David Fate Norton points out (Norton [1982]), Hume is
a naturalist in several ways: for example, he follows the
methods of the other natural sciences, and he provides
explanations appealing to human nature which are devoid of
theological principles . But Norton argues that Hume was both
a naturalist and a skeptic. One may interpret Hume as a
naturalist of some kind without denying his skepticism.
[Wade L. Robison also makes the point that Hume is both
naturalist and skeptic. See Robison [1976].] That is why I
say that if one were inclined to interpret Hume vholly as a
naturalist one would be inclined to deny his skepticism.
3.
All references to Pears are to Pears [1990] unless
otherwise indicated.
4.
See The Secret Connection, (Strawson [1989]).
5.
I an not convinced by Strawson's claim that Hume recognizes
our possession of referential but not impression-contentful
ideas. For a forceful critical response to Strawson's
interpretation of Hume see "The New Hume" (Winkler [1991]).
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. Again, not all of those who would consider themselves
proponents of naturalized epistemology would accept my
characterization in all its respects. According to Willard
Quine, the normative concepts of traditional epistemology
should be abandoned in favor of purely descriptive conceptsof a scientific, naturalized epistemology. This new
epistemology will seek not justification of our beliefs butrather scientific explanation of how those beliefs are
produced on the basis of sensory input. So analyzing the
normative concepts of traditional epistemology won’t be a
part of naturalized epistemology at all, for Quine. See his
"Epistemology Naturalized," (Quine [1969]).
7. I say that epistemological naturalism includes the view
that empirical science must at some stage play a role in the
project of epistemology because epistemological naturalists
as to just where empirical investigation comes into
the epistemological project. For example, for Quine science
comes in at the very beginning of a naturalized
epistemology, but for Alvin Goldman science comes in only in
the last of three stages of epistemological investigation,
after an a priori investigation which in its first two
stages (1) establishes the relationship between
justification and justificational rules, and (2) specifies a
criterion for the correctness of a system of justificational
rules. The criterion for the correctness of a system of
justificational rules is, for Goldman, reliability. Only at
the third stage - the stage at which it is to be determined
what in fact are the reliable cognitive processes available
to humans - does empirical science enter the picture. See
the introduction to Goldman ' s Epistemology and Cognition
(Goldman [1986]), especially page 9.
8. Our belief in an external world of material objects and
our belief that nature is uniform are two prime examples of
beliefs that according to Hume are natural, unavoidable
, and
without rational justification. Our common sense belief that
in sense experience we are directly acquainted with mind-
independent objects is a prime example of a belief that
according to Hume is natural and yet false.
9.
I am not claiming that Hume's philosophical and his
psychological investigations are fully unrelated. In "David
Hume: Naturalist and Meta-sceptic," Wade Robison argues
forcefully that Hume's theory of association is intended to
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show how various kinds of empirical judgments are possible.
Robison writes,
...Hume's Newtonian pretensions have a philosophical
point: how are certain empirical judgments possible? They
are possible, Hume is claiming, only if some of our thought
are tied together by some natural relations.
If we cannot even make certain judgments unless certain
our thoughts are related by the principle of association,
the traditional splitting off of Hume's psychological from
his philosophical concerns is mistaken (Robison [1976] , 25) .
Note, however, that to allow that Hume's psychological
theories have this philosophical point is not to deny that
one can distinguish logical and psychological theses in
Hume's philosophy. For example, the distinction between
propositions stating relations of ideas and those stating
matters of fact can be presented as a nonpsychological
logical and epistemological principle which is logically
independent of the theory of association. Nor does
acceptance of Robison's point require abandoning the
interpretation of Hume as a skeptic. Robison himself regards
Hume as a skeptic. According to Robison, Hume's skepticism,
if correct, is "devastating to our pretensions of
rationality" (Robison [1976], 27).
10. As a nonnaturalist who accepts (i) the view that
normative epistemic facts supervene on nonnormative
,
descriptive facts Hume would not be alone. Roderick Chisholm
accepts both (i) and (ii) the view that the concept of
justification is to be analyzed in such a way that normative
concepts and evidential considerations are not employed in
the analysans as primitive. Yet Chisholm is ordinarily
regarded as an opponent of epistemological naturalism -
largely because he rejects the claim that empirical science
plays a role in normative epistemology.
11. Hume suggests that Descartes proposed unqualified
antecedent skepticism. But Descartes' reliance on the "Light
of Nature" and beliefs recognized thereby suggests that he
recognized the point Hume is making about unmitigated
antecedent skepticism and did not put literally all of his
cognitive faculties and beliefs in doubt. So Hume's
imputation to Descartes of unmitigated antecedent skepticism
as Hume characterizes it is, I think, inaccurate.
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12.
Hume's apparent ambivalence about skepticism with regard
to a priori reasoning may be, as Flew suggests, a result of
his unwillingness to give comfort to those who would employ
paradox to humble human reason in order to press the
interests of religious faith. See Flew [1961], 255-6.13.
Hume writes,
To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in
order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making
a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all
concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely
infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever
deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once
called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments,
by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of
his attributes (E, 153)
.
14.
When I say "Hume, in the Enquiry . . . produces a skeptical
argument concerning our alleged knowledge of the external
world," I don't mean to suggest that this argument is new.
The argument presented in the Enquiry is basically the same
as that presented in the Treatise, I. IV. II.
15.
Hume writes,
Whatever is may not be. No negation of a fact can
involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being,
without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its
existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be,
however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than
that which affirms it to be (E, XII. Ill, 164).
16.
Various commentators have pointed out that Hume
misrepresents the Pyrrhonists. For example, in Skepticism
(Hookway [1990]), Christopher Hookway claims that Hume's
criticism of the Pyrrhonists is misplaced. According to
Hookway, when the Pyrrhonists prescribe a suspension of
belief they are not using 'belief' in our sense but in a
more limited sense. In this more limited sense the
Pyrrhonists prescribe a suspension of belief insofar as
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belief is dogma. Dogma, as I understand Hookway, involves a
presumption of final truth about the way things really are
as opposed to the way they seem. Hookway claims that the
Pyrrhonist's view is that one can eschew belief as dogma
though one has beliefs in a wider sense, that is, opinions
about such things as one's surroundings and the ways to
®^t-^-sfy one's desires. Belief in this wider sense does not
involve a presumption of final truth or of cognitive access
to reality as opposed to appearance. We might say that in
this sense the skeptic regards all of his beliefs as
concerning only appearances and as defeasible. Also see
Norton [1982], 255-269.
17. Hume also suggests the distinction in a footnote to his
discussion of the skeptical implications of the primary
quality/secondary quality distinction. Hume says that
Berkeley's arguments "form the best lessons of scepticism,"
and that the skeptical character of those arguments is
apparent from the fact that "...they admit of no answer and
produce no conviction" (E, XII. II, 155). Hume means, I
believe, that like his own arguments concerning our
inductively derived beliefs and our belief in an external
world, Berkeley's arguments produce no stable , long-lasting
conviction. They cannot undermine our instinctive beliefs
for any extended period. Still, these arguments, far from
being faulty, according to Hume, "admit of no answer."
18. I think that Hume's objection to a practice such as
foretelling the future through crystal ball gazing would be
based on its lack of success. If in fact the predictions
rendered through crystal ball gazing were regularly true,
Hume would, I believe, have to admit crystal ball gazing as
a legitimate means of inquiry. But note: If crystal ball
gazing regularly yielded true predictions then our
acceptance of it as a means of inquiry would simply be
another application of our instinctive inductive practices.
For then our acceptance of the deliverances of the crystal
ball gazer would be based on the past regular conjunction of
crystal ball gazings with true predictions.
Of course, even in the absence of regular success,
inferences from, e.g., "The crystal ball says such-and-such
will occur" to "Such-and-such will occur" are inductive
inferences, that is, inferences from premises that do not
entail a statement to that statement. And of course they are
also "natural" in the sense that they are nonmiraculous . But
these inferences are not the kinds of inferences we
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naturally or instinctively make in that they (presumably)
are not based on observation of regularities.
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